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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
MEMEM'S ARGENTINA: ECONOMIC REFORM AND DEMOCRACY
IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY
by
Mariano J. Beillard
Florida International University, 1995
Miami, Florida
Professor Dario Moreno, Major Professor
A study of the possible correlation between drastic neo-
liberal economic reform and the undermining of democratic
mechanisms in late twentieth century Argentina. The adoption
of free market mechanisms, within the Modern Political Economy
theoretical perspective, may tend to erode the workings of
western style democracy leading to a situation of increased
domestic sociopolitical and economic tensions in Argentina.
The foregoing is especially applicable as the continues to
endeavors to maintain its neo-liberal economic reform program
on track.
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INTRODUCTION
When Carlos Saul Menem assumed the Argentine
presidency in 1989, he was immediately faced with the
necessity of addressing the paramount issues associated with
his country's economic stagnation and hyper-inflation. Carlos
Menem's electoral success over his party's traditional
political rival, the Uni6n Civica Radical (UCR), was largely
the result of the Argentine electorate's disillusionment with
the ineffective economic policies implemented by not only the
preceding Radical government of Raul Alfonsin, but also with
the economic development policies of the past fifty years.
Interestingly enough with regards to the preceding Carlos
Menem ran a traditional populist campaign in order to be
elected, but once in office he subsequently changed course in
favor of neo-liberal economic policy.'
Recall that Alfonsin's Austral Plan, Latin America's
first heterodox attempt to control inflation without economic
contraction, collapsed after a year and a half under the
pressure of affected interest groups. The Austral Plan
included a wage-price freeze, de-indexation of the economy, a
new currency, a tough stance with creditors, and commitments
to a realistic exchange rate, a reduced budget deficit, and no
inflationary financing. Unfortunately for the Alfonsin
government economic stagnation in 1985 and a decline in real
wages led to insistent demands for relief. By late 1987 the
budget deficit was rising and inflation had past 300 percent.
This contributed directly to the Radicals midterm election
defeat. Presidential elections in October 1988 were won by the
Peronist candidate Carlos Menem who took office in December
1988. Yet, once in office Menem reneged on his populist past
1
Required by political expediency to address the
these issues, Menem a year and half after his election turned
to Domingo Cavallo in the hope of arresting the endemic
hemorrhaging of the Argentine national economy. During the
greater part of their term in office the Menem/ Cavallo team
has been able to successfully implement a series of economic
reforms which have reversed the economic decline of the
Argentine Republic. The Menem government's hope now is to
transform these short-term successes into long-term economic
growth and prosperity for Argentina and in the process, assure
the current government's political continuity into the next
century.
As recently as just five years ago the
implementation of drastic economic measures of the likes of
those set in motion by the Menem/ Cavallo team would have
caused most political analysts and economists to seriously
doubt their success. This holds especially true as it relates
to the Argentine populace's acquiescence to the government's
retreat from an active interventionist role in the nation's
economy. In essence, the Menem administration has had the
political savvy to convince the Argentine populace of the
necessity of confronting the notions associated with economic
and rhetoric in order to initially introduce orthodox
stabilization and reform policies. See, Jeffrey A. Frieden,
Debt, Development & Democracy: Modern Political Economy and
Latin America, 1965-1985. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1991, pg. 227.
2
development in the post-Debt Crisis era and thus has been able
to implement the appropriate measures required to seek new
sources of financing.2
In implementing Domingo Cavallo's economic reform
program, the Menem administration has been able to effectively
bring Argentine hyper-inflation down to single digit levels
which have not been seen for decades. 3 Furthermore, the
resulting economic stability has resulted in flooding the
Argentine marketplace and industrial park with renewed foreign
investment. 4  The aforesaid is a direct consequence of the
international banking community's perception of the Argentine
Republic as once again being financially credit worthy. In
2
Namely brought about by the wholesale divestment of the
state sector, adoption of free-market strategies, and the
pairing of the Argentine Peso to the United States' Dollar
(Cavallo's much heralded Convertibility Plan).
3
See, Benjamin Keen, A History of Latin America. Boston,
MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1992, pg. 319. By May 1989,
Argentine economic collapse is made evident by the 12,000
percent annual inflation rate, the fact that prices were
rising four times a day, and that in the previous forty-five
days real wages had fallen by 35 percent.
4
Recall that in 1989, probably the worst year in recent
Argentine economic history, capital exodus was reported at 4.3
billion dollars. Yet by 1990, the preceding figure had dropped
to 769 million dollars. As a result of renewed economic
stability capital returned to Argentina to take advantage of
the wide opportunities for investment. This is made evident by
the 1991 figure of 2.4 billion dollars, the 1992 figure of 7.8
billion dollars and the 1993 figure of 5 billion dollars
entering the Argentine Republic. See, Argentina: A country for
investment and growth - 1994. Buenos Aires, Argentina:
Ministerio de Economia, Obras y Servicios Publicos, 1994, pg.
45.
3
addition renewed economic stability, as well as international
financial confidence, has resulted in the repatriation of a
substantially large portion of Argentine capital which had
fled overseas during the years of sociopolitical and economic
instability. In effect the Menem government has achieved
sustained recovery through increased private-sector investment
by providing the favorable conditions (ie privatization of the
state-sector, macro-economic stability, the Convertibility
Plan, etc.) for this to come about.
In essence the Menem/ Cavallo neo-liberal reforms
have primarily aimed at drastically reducing the state-sector
while subsequently replacing the former with free-market
mechanisms. Even though these reforms have brought about
renewed international confidence in the Argentine economy,
there exist certain tendencies that indicate a correlation
between successful economic reforms and the propensity for
political mischief on the part of the government in office (ie
recourse to rule by presidential decree as a means of side
stepping congressional opposition). In other words there has
developed, as a consequence of the successful implementation
of drastic economic reform and the need to continue fueling
these, the possibility for undermining the effectiveness of
democratic mechanisms in the Argentine Republic.
The issue alluded to above persuades one to question
whether the successful implementation of an inflation
4
controlling ec.onomic reform program can dilute some of the
Argentine state's recent advances in the field of democratic
procedures. Thus, a valid argument can be formulated based on
the notion that the Menem administration's, especially Domingo
Cavallo's zeal, in implementing a successful economic reform
program, may for the sake of political expediency and the
reduced perception of country risk, contribute in eroding
democracy in the Argentine Republic. As a result of the
preceding there exists the possibility of a threat to the
workings of the Argentine democratic system by further
consolidating the position of a traditionally strong Executive
Branch capable of achieving its policy goals with minimal
interference from the other two branches of the national
government. Thus, the available evidence seems to indicate
that certain aspects of Argentine democracy and the workings
of its mechanisms may be threatened by the successful
implementation of drastic economic reform policy.' This is
brought about by the fact that populist and nationalistic
inspired State-Centric economic development policies have
5
It should be pointed out that the presidency's power
resides in the National Constitution. In effect article n* 86
of the 1853 Constitution states that the president of the
country is not only the supreme leader of the country, but is
also responsible for issuing instructions and rules necessary
for the execution of the country's laws. Furthermore, the
president is allowed to participate in the formation of laws,
as well as in their sanction and promulgation. Within this
particular context Argentina's much heralded privatization
program has been implemented.
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failed, the issues associated with the reform of the Argentine
National Constitution as sponsored by the Menem government,
and the need to assure continued economic stability as a means
of financing development. Arguably in turn it becomes a
situation in which the adoption of neo-liberal economic policy
could contribute in allowing Menem to renew himself over and
over again as long as the national economy accompanied by at
least forty percent of the electorate prospers.
In order to properly address the requirements
associated with this particular issue one needs to comprehend
the nature of Argentine democracy, as well as that country's
particular economy, within a given historical and theoretical
framework.6  Thus, the Modern Political Economy perspective
will be the theoretical approach utilized in this study to
view the possible threat to current Argentine democracy vis-a-
vis the success of economic reform. This approach is chosen
since it is the one which most adequately identifies and
explains the tensions generated by the Argentine economy in
6
It can be argued that Argentina, like other Latin
American countries, has fallen behind with respect to the East
Asian economies as a consequence of its greater dependence on
commodities as exports. Argentina's more independent inward
approach of development, based on the international
profitability of its agricultural exports, has caused the
country to suffer more from external shocks and has thus
compounded its debt problem. See, John D. Macomber, "East
Asia's Lessons for Latin American Resurgence" in International
Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth.
2nd ed., Jeffrey A. Frieden and David Lake ed. New York, NY:
St. Martin's Press, 1991, pg. 386 - 387.
6
tandem with its politics.
Chapter One will introduce the basic principles
associated with Modern Political Economy theory as they relate
to the Argentine state and identify the principle tensions
within the country. Chapter Two will put into perspective the
development of the Argentine state and its propensity for
political and economic dependence on external sources. It is
worthwhile to point out here that this has come to affect the
country's internal political arena in the process. In order to
comprehend these particular issues the chapter will review
Argentina's recent sociopolitical and economic development,
which are key factors that have led to constitutional reform
in 1994. Chapter Three will consider the issue of how
Argentine democracy may be threatened by economic reform and
the adoption of certain aspects of neo-liberalism. This will
be undertaken with regards to the issue of development and
international competitiveness in light of the failure of
previous policies of State-Centric development. Furthermore,
this chapter will consider the need for structural adjustment
vis-a-vis democracy in the Argentine Republic. Chapter Four
collates the issues of the preceding chapters with the
statistical results of a sociopolitical and economic
questionnaire administered during the October 1993,
parliamentary elections (midterm electorial contest).
Consequently, this chapter will attempt to verify the nature
7
of the threat to democratic principles by gauging the
tendencies of a particular sector of Argentine society. It
should be pointed out that said survey relates to not only the
issues of constitutional reform and democracy, but also to
national economic development in the post-Debt Crisis era.
Lastly Chapter Five will draw together the individual
conclusions reached at the end of the preceding chapters and
elaborate an overall conclusion of how successful economic
reform may come to affect the workings of Argentine democracy
in conjunction to recent developments in the Argentine
Republic.
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CHAPTER ONE
NEO-LIBERALISM & TENSIONS IN ARGENTINA
The Argentine Republic of the 1990s is an
interesting case of how the implementation of failed economic-
development policies of the past have necessitated the
adoption of diametrically opposed methods aimed at arresting
and solving economic decline. Unfortunately, as an added
consequence of the failure of the policies of State-Centric
development, the institutional power of the Executive Branch
of the Argentine government has been strengthened during the
Menem administration. What is interesting to note is that the
consolidation of the institutional strength of the presidency
has been carried out by legal constitutional means. It should
be pointed out that the issue of the constitutionality of the
strengthening of the presidency shall be addressed in chapter
II. What is important to recall at this point is that the
strengthening of the presidency's position has set in motion
the possibility of a gradual deterioration of Argentine
democratic mechanisms by widening the gulf of power between
the different branches of the government.
The aim here is to explain not only the current
state of affairs in the Argentine Republic and the principal
tensions which are naturally brought about by the economic
9
realities of the day, but also to identify how these issues
can be addressed within an overall theoretical framework. The
purpose here is to identify the implementation of neo-liberal
economic policy, and the reforms which it advocates, as being
the primary cause of a possible deterioration of Argentine
democracy. The preceding is made quite evident when neo-
liberal economic policy is reviewed from the perspective of
the theory known as Modern Political Economy.1
In order to make these issues easier to comprehend
this work will shortly list the main causes that have led to
an erosion of Argentine democracy and explain these within the
Modern Political Economy theoretical framework. It needs to be
pointed out that the objective of this study is to serve not
as a criticism of the Argentine Executive Branch or of
President Menem, but rather serve as a guideline as to what
measures should be avoided on an institutional level in order
to inhibit a gradual deterioration of democracy in the present
and a return of authoritarian rule in the future.
I should point out that this study does not claim to
provide an all-encompassing explanation of Argentine politics
and economics. Nor for that matter does this study seek to
explain every detail associated with the events its deals
1
See, Jeffrey A. Frieden, Debt, Development, & Democracy:
Modern Political Economy and Latin America, 1965-1985.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991, pg. 15-16,
for a detailed account of the theory and its adherents.
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with. Rather, what this study does address are those issues
associated with the implementation of neo-liberal economic
policy and the sociopolitical tensions which these have caused
during the Menem administration. It can consequently be held
that these tensions have tended to undermine Argentine
democracy by consolidating the traditional strength of
presidency.
KEY TENSIONS WITHIN THE ARGENTINE SYSTEM
The key tensions within the Argentine body-politic
during the Menem administration (1989-1995) can briefly be
enumerated as follows:
1) A statistically high increment in the number of
unemployed, as well as underemployed. This has largely been
brought about by the result of the Menem administration's
adoption of neo-liberal economic policies which have been
geared towards divesting the state from its inefficient and
bloated public enterprises (see table n* 1). In addition the
neo-liberal economic measures implemented during Domingo
Cavallo's tenure has promoted a contraction of both the
national and provincial governments (traditionally government
employment has served in Argentina as a form of unemployment
11
insurance and ballot box support). The reduction in the
numbers of public sector employees without a commensurate
increase in levels of private sector employment has
contributed in increasing sociopolitical tensions, especially
evident as the May 1995 presidential elections have drawn
nearer.
TABLE N* 1
ARGENTINE EMPLOYMENT LEVELS
MAY 1989 TO MAY 1995
(EVOLUTION OF UNEMPLOYMENT & UNDEREMPLOYMENT LEVELS)
PERIOD UNEMPLOYED UNDEREMPLOYED TOTAL PERCENT TOTAL NUMBER
MAY 1989 8.1 8.6 16.7 1.831.000
OCT 1989 7.1 8.6 15.7 1.699.000
MAY 1990 8.6 9.3 17.9 1.945.000
OCT 1990 6.3 8.9 15.2 1.663.000
JUN 1991 6.9 8.6 15.5 1.734.000
OCT 1991 6.0 7.9 13.9 1.570.000
MAY 1992 6.9 8.3 15.2 1.746.000
OCT 1992 7.0 8.1 15.1 1.768.000
MAY 1993 9.9 8.8 18.7 2.283.000
OCT 1993 9.3 9.3 18.6 2.264.000
MAY 1994 10.8 10.2 21.0 2.587.000
OCT 1994 12.2 10.4 22.6 2.789.000
MAY 1995* 14.5 12.0 26.5 3.270.000
* PRIVATE SECTOR ESTIMATE
SOURCE: Noticias, April 9,1995, Buenos Aires, Argentina, pg. 63.
2) A major issue of sociopolitical tension in the Argentine
case is the resort to rule by presidential decree. Even though
such a measure is constitutionally admissible, continued
recourse to it, as a means of circumventing congressional
opposition to politically troublesome issues, undermines the
12
role of the National Congress.'
3) The possible transformation of the Argentine economy
into primarily an export orientated economy to the
disadvantage of the Argentine domestic market, mainly the
labor sector and its consumption practices. This situation in
the process tends to reduce the relative importance of the
domestic market in favor of increased access to the much
larger regional markets (ie MERCOSUR and EEC).
In this context it should be pointed out that though
Argentina has run a trade deficit in recent years, this has
been caused in part by substantial increases during the 1991-
1993 period in the importation of capital goods (increased
from 18.5 percent to 24.5 percent) and parts/ spares for
capital goods (increased from 15.5 percent to 16.7 percent)
while registering a drop in the importation of intermediate
goods (decreased from 41.3 percent to 30.2 percent). In the
2
On October 31, 1991, Carlos Menem suddenly liberalized a
large portion of the Argentine economy via the recourse to
presidential decree. This measure is based upon a power
granted to the presidency by Argentine jurisprudence. It has
been argued that even though the legislative branch can
discuss the measure after the fact, effective discussion would
tend to be hindered, since it has both been announced by the
country's maximum authority and counts in many cases with the
support of the majority of the electorate. Thus, it has become
a case in which reform is "dictated" by the executive and
latter given the stamp of approval by the legislature. See,
Jos& Pifera Echeique, "Chile, el poder de una idea" in El
Desafio Neoliberal: El fin del tercermundismo en America
Latina. Barry Levine ed. Santa F& de Bogota, Colombia: Grupo
Editorial Norma, 1992, pg 83.
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process in 1993 alone total imports grew by 13 percent while
capital goods increased by 33 percent. The total value of such
goods imported during 1993 (U$S 4.1 billion) was roughly equal
to the total amount of capital goods imported during the last
five years of the 1980s. It is worthwhile to recall that the
importation of consumer goods serves in the Argentine case as
a measure of the population's buying power. The importation of
consumer goods has increased during this same period (gone
from 17.2 percent to 21 percent), but has been the result
mainly of built-up demand that had been stagnate for years
during the 1980s.3 As demand has gone down in accordance with
the country's recent economic woes, Argentine exports have
commenced to rapidly out-pace imports. This in turn makes both
the agro-export and the manufacturing (car and auto-parts)
export-sector increasing more important than the contracting
domestic consumer-sector.
4) The Argentine Republic's political opposition currently
is far too divided for it to pose a significant threat to the
Menem presidency's re-election bid (see table n* 2). This
should hold true unless the opposition parties can suddenly
3
See, "Projection of the Principal Variables of the
Economy" in Argentina: A Growing Nation. Buenos Aires,
Argentina: Ministerio de Economia y Obras y Servicios
Pdblicos, 1994, pg. 95-97.
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forgo their particular party ideologies and agendas in order
for them to present a united front against President Menem's
re-election bid. What is interesting to note here is that
Argentina's traditional bi-party political system has with the
advent of this election become a tri-party struggle for
national political dominance. The relevance of this issue is
that the Menem government by merely controlling 40 to 45
percent of the national electorate can effectively govern the
country on the basis of the opposition's disunity. This allows
the Menem administration to impose its policies with far
greater ease than would be expected with regards to the size
of its current constituency.
TABLE N* 2
POLITICAL PARTIES REGISTERED FOR
THE MAY 1995 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
1. PARTIDO JUSTICIALISTA (PJ)
2. UNION CIVICA RADICAL (UCR)
3. FRENTE PAIS SOLIDARIO (FREPASO)
4. MOVIMIENTO POR LA DIGNIDAD (MODIN)
5. UNION DEL CENTRO DEMOCRATICO (UCEDE)
6. FRENTE UNIDAD DE TRABAJADORES Y P. OBRERO (ALIANZA FUT-PO)
7. MOVIMIENTO AL SOCIALISMO Y PARTIDO DE LOS TRABAJADORES DEL
SOCIALISMO (ALIANZA MAS-PTS)
8. ALIANZA SUR
9. CORRIENTE PATRIA LIBRE
1o. FRENTE PARA LA COINCIDENCIA PATRIOTICA (FRECOPA)
11. FUERZA REPUBLICANA
12. MOVIMIENTO POPULAR Y DEMOCRATICO ANTIIMPERIALISTA (MODEPA)
13. MOVIMIENTO SOCIALISTA DE LOS TRABAJADORES (MST)
14. PARTIDO HUMANISTA
15. PARTIDO SOCIALISTA AUTENTICO
15
MODERN POLITICAL ECONOMY THEORY
Modern Political Economy theory arises as a result
of the need to reach some manner of viable conclusions with
regards to the issues associated with the devastating
depression which struck the Latin American Region during the
1980s. Recall that the Debt-Crisis of the 1980s has led to
what Latin Americans have come to refer to as the Lost Decade.
During that period Latin America evidenced a drop in output
per person of 10 percent. As a result per capita income by the
early 1990s had fallen below 1975 levels. This, in turn, has
brought both economic instability and political turmoil in the
region.
Argentina, like the rest of Latin America, has
experienced a troubled history of development and
democratization. It has been a case in which economic
instability has both led to sociopolitical mobilization and
demobilization. Within this context Modern Political Economy
theory endeavors to put into context how rational self-
interested actors combine within or outside existing
institutional settings to affect social outcomes.'
This particular theory interestingly enough ties
into the current economic and sociopolitical situation, which
4
See, Frieden, pg. 16.
16
the Argentine Republic is going through, in the sense that
from a theoretical point of view it illustrates the notion
that actors maximize utility and make cost-benefit
calculations. Effectively, the Menem government reached the
conclusion quite early on that in order for it to stabilize
the nation's economic decline it had to adopt a policy which
would effectively meet such an objective. In order to
accomplish this the government concluded that it needed to
maximize income via both privatization and monetary policy
reform. This resulted as consequence of the government's
realization and acceptance of the fact that the public-sector
by 1989 was not only economically inefficient, but also
bloated for sociopolitical support.' Factors which became
unbearable for the government in light of the 1980s Debt-
Crisis realities.
It should be pointed out that the Argentine case
5
An added problem that Argentina, like other Latin
American countries, has experienced is the issue of utilizing
its exchange rates for social and political goals rather than
for to achieve balance-of-payments equilibrium and
international competitiveness. In the past these have been
utilized in order to control inflation, to maintain the
nation's standard of living or to promote national prestige
and confidence. Yet, the end result has been that these
measures have not worked and thus necessitated that the
currency be devalued with an ensuing loss of confidence in
policy stability in addition to the government's ability to
control the economy. See, John D. Macomber, "East Asia's
Lessons for Latin American Resurgence" in International
Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth.
2nd ed. Jeffery A. Frieden and David A. Lake ed. New York, NY:
St. Martin's Press, 1991, pg. 389.
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during 1989/90 period shares significant similarities with the
work of Tversky and Kahneman in the sense that the Menem
government initially sought to stem the hemorrhaging of the
Argentine economy, rather than necessary seeking to make
immediate economic gains. In essence the Menem government at
first was more immediately concerned with its overall losses
than with possible economic advances.' Thus, the Menem
government needed economic stability in order to avoid
sociopolitical upheavals.
This leads to the question of what manner of
rationality has been utilized by the Menem Administration to
implement neo-liberal economic reform in light of the tensions
that such a policy generates. Briefly stated the Menem
government has assumed correctly that the reduction of the
public-sector, via privatization accompanied by short-term
economic readjustment, will result in the reactivation of the
national economy and attract in the process renewed foreign
investor confidence in Argentina. The Menem government has
logically weighed its options; either it could continue with
the policies of the past which favored state intervention in
the economy, statism and an alliance with labor, or it could
6
See, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, "The Framing of
Decisions and the psychology of Choice," Science 211 (1981):
pg. 453-458, as quoted in Jeffrey A. Frieden, Debt,
Development and Democracy: Modern Political Economy and Latin
America, 1965 - 1985. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1991, pg. 17.
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attempt to form a coalition with capital. The current
situation has shown that Menem has opted to form an alliance
with capital.
The preceding has in turn resulted in generating
serious sociopolitical tensions which consequently have also
come to undermine aspects of Argentine democratic procedure.
Namely this has occurred as a result of the Chief Executive's
recourse to the presidential decree. This action is
constitutionally contemplated as a viable instrument of
executive authority, yet continued recourse to it tends to
undermine democracy since it side-steps congressional
opposition. This has been made especially evident with regards
to the entire economic reform of the state-sector, since it
has been carried out by decree. Furthermore, it is worthwhile
to point out that in forming an alliance of convenience with
capital, the Menem government has sacrificed a part of
organized labor's political support. Yet, it seems that the
previous is outweighed by the benefits associated with the
support of both domestic and international capital for the
government's economic measures. As a result of such action the
Menem administration has been able to divided the political
opposition along economic lines and gain in the process the
support of sectors of the electorate which before would not
19
have readily supported the Menem government.'
Consequently, in order to put into context Menem's
Argentina one must utilize Frieden's strategy in which the
first step is to identify the policy preferences of
individuals and firms based upon their position in the
economy. The second step is to see how these are grouped into
politically relevant social forces, on the basis of common
economic interest and the ability to coordinate collective
action against opponents. The third step is to determine the
pressures for institutional change.8
As a result the Menem government has identified that
there no longer exist easy sources of financing for developing
in the post Debt-Crisis world.' It has also reached the
7
It is worthwhile to point out that costs are a function
of the resources which a government controls and must expend
in order to supply a policy. Costs tend to decline as more
resources are made available to the government. This usually
occurs as a consequence of a tax increase and the interest
rate charged to the government falls. What is interesting to
note in the Argentine context is that taxes have increased
without a subsequent increase in government spending in
services aimed at the general population. Rather, funds
obtained via privatization have been utilized to promote
economic stability and bolster the national currency's
international standing.
8
See, Frieden, Debt, Development, and Democracy: Modern
Political Economy and Latin America, 1965 - 1985. pg. 28.
9
It should be pointed out that once the international
financial crisis of the 1980s hit Argentina the government is
forced to reevaluate the allocation of its resources. To make
matters worse the government is forced to increase the
transfer of resources abroad. Consequently, real wages and
consumption had to be reduced in order to increase exports and
20
conclusion that in order to reactivate the nation's economy it
must support those sectors of the economy which have the
greatest propensity and possibility to profit and increase
savings via neo-liberal economic reform, namely domestic and
international capital. This means that since the state is no
longer able to readily secure sources of development financing
it has been obliged to divest itself of the state-sector, as
well as stimulate those entities that can invest and develop
the country.
With regards to the second step it can be argued
that the Menem government and capital have formed a
politically relevant social force on the basis of common
economic interests and the ability to overcome problems of
collective action. In other words the government and capital
have combined forces in order to govern jointly. In the
process the state has abdicated its economic role to capital
and capital in return has supported the Menem government's
sociopolitical and economic policies. Additionally, the
government has made possible the implementation of measures
which favor capital, and consequently itself in this case,
primarily via the state's coercive powers.
The third step which relates to pressures for
reduce imports as a means of channeling foreign exchange to
foreign creditors. This sort of situation has necessitated the
government to increase its revenues and decrease its
expenditure in order to free up resources for debt service
payments.
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institutional change is dealt with by the privatization of the
public-sector. It can be said that once the state has
abdicated its role as the nation's principal investor to
private capital, sociopolitical pressures exerted against the
state by organize labor tend to lose a significant degree of
relevant strength. This factor is furthered by the state's
need to attract new sources of financing which can only be
done so by guaranteeing investor confidence in national
economic stability and a return on their investments .0 Labor
under such a situation will by necessity be discriminated
against on institutionalized level (ie issues associated with
labor reform) ."
10
It is worthwhile to point out that with regards to this
issue the modernization approach has focused on the positive
aspects of foreign capital as well as foreign trade. This
characterized by the new resource inflows, employment
generation, access to new technologies, and entry into new
foreign markets have been emphasized as ways in which foreign
capital promotes development. The Menem administration has
picked-up on the aforesaid, which incidentally had been
relegated to obscurity in Latin America while prospering in
East Asia. Consequently, the Menem government has come to
accept the notion that international openness in both trade
and capital flows is the optimal policy stance for Argentina.
See, Barbara Stallings, " The Role of Foreign Capital in
Economic Development" in Manufacturing Miracles: Paths to
Industrialization in Latin America and East Asia. Gary Gereffi
and Donald L. Wyman, ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1990, pg. 57.
11
This sort of situation is made apparent when one takes
into consideration the issue of car sales in the Argentine
Republic. With the recent pre-electorial instability sales of
domestically manufactured automobiles fell by 20 to 50
percent, while the fall in imports was still greater. Reduced
sales have led to lay-offs of roughly 25 percent of the work
22
With regards to the foregoing statements it should
be pointed out that a major source of tension in the Argentine
political system has arisen as a consequence of the Menem's
administration adoption of policy measures promoting the
inflow of foreign funds. Yet, unlike past experiences the
Menem government has not utilized wholesale foreign funds in
the development of the public-sector. Recall that in the past
Argentina, much like other developing countries, had become a
victim to the inflow of capital. This had traditionally
increased the supply of foreign funds in the local economy,
while in the process cheapening the price of those monies in
the domestic marketplace. As the value of the local currency
increased against the foreign currency this resulted in the
appreciation of the prices of domestic goods relative to
foreign imports. This in turn has resulted in increased
imports and reduced exports. Contrary to the past situation
the inflow of funds, via the privatization program, has not
led to a fiscal expansion. Instead the government has opted to
curtail spending, especially for ballot box support, and
chosen to utilize these monies to back the national currency
force and a 20 percent reductions in salaries paid. Thus, in
order to improve international competitiveness the aforesaid
sort of factors may become a norm instead of an exception to
the rule, since a precedent has occurred and the government is
unwilling to devalue the national coin in order to avoid a
return to inflation. See, "Por la caida en las ventas las
concesionarias despiden personal y bajan sueldos" in El
Cronista: Edicion Fax. Buenos Aires, Argentina, March 26,
1995, pg 1.
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at parity levels as a means of promoting economic stability
and confidence in Argentina. Thus, in Menem's Argentina the
funds obtained from privatization have been utilized largely
to guarantee Domingo Cavallo's Convertibility Program as a
means of inhibiting a return to inflationary tendencies.
AN EXPLANATION OF THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL TENSIONS
Neo-liberal economic reform, at least in the short-
term, can lead to an erosion of Argentine democracy. This
premise is based upon the notion that though unrestrictive
neo-liberal economic policies are championed by the
industrialized/ developed democracies, as being the proper
mechanism to be implemented in order to develop, this sort of
12
It is interesting to note that traditionally a capital
inflow results in reduced interest rates, a reduction in the
price of foreign currency, and the price of government
services. This leads to an increase in investment, increased
imports, and increased government activity. These issues are
not necessarily detrimental as long as the capital continues
to enter the economy. Once the financing source "dries up", as
occurred with the Debt-Crisis of the 1980s, investment
decreases. As the value of the local currency drops relative
to its foreign counterparts the country's imports fall. This
inhibits the public and private-sectors from modernizing their
equipment which only further undermines their competitiveness.
As government services become more expenses to finance, these
are scaled back and in the process bring about increased
sociopolitical agitation. The end result in Argentina has been
for the government to clamp down on protestors, which in the
past has only contributed to further protests and the eventual
fall of the authoritarian regime. See, Frieden, Debt,
Development, and Democracy: Modern Political Economy and Latin
America, 1965 - 1985. pg. 68-69.
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economic strategy does not necessarily seem to hold quite true
with regards to Argentina. 3 This is especially so when one
takes into consideration the high social costs brought about
by the reduction of the public sector (ie increased
unemployment, reduced domestic consumption and increased crime
among other issues), as well as the effects exerted upon the
Argentine political system.14 The tensions brought about by
13
Within this context it is worthwhile to point out the
issues associated with Argentina's development and its
relationship with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The
Menem government has agreed to subscribe to the dictates of
the IMF precisely at a point in time in which there has arisen
serious discussion as to reforming the IMF's role. This has
arisen as a consequence of the fact that for the first time in
history a majority of the world's population lives in sort of
market economy. Argentina has adopted an economic policy that
is in line with the "Washington consensus", a model of
economic development that emphasizes macroeconomic discipline
and open markets. The problem that has arisen is that the IMF
has floundered looking for a new role as Argentina, like other
developing countries, has opened up its economy, cut its
budget, privatized state assets, and attracted foreign
capital. The problem relationship is that the IMF has become
a development institution with a narrow macroeconomic focus
and thus this overlaps with the role played by the World Bank.
See, Zanny Minton-Beddoes, "Why the IMF Needs Reform" in
Foreign Affairs. vol. 74, n* 3 (May/ June 1995): 123 -124.
14
Recall that the Radical Party under President Alfonsin
had adopted an economic policy geared towards maintaining a
economic system in which the state would be allowed to
intervene as an economic actor. Though the Alfonsin
administration had described itself as interventionist, it
went to great pains to assure all parties concerned that it
was not statist. It goes to say that it did not place too much
confidence in market forces and thus permitted itself the
right to intervene in the economy as it deemed necessary. That
administration's goal had been not to expand the state sector,
but rather re-think state spending, especially by reducing
military spending, and placing civilian administrators in
industries controlled by the country's armed forces. The
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neo-liberalism are made further evident by the rise of a large
number of left-wing workers parties (see table n* 2) . The rise
of new leftists parties is the result of the politically
organized proletariat's desire to address the concerns of the
workers which have come to be negatively affected by neo-
liberalist economic policy, as well as ignored in the process
by political hierarchy which champions the first world
perspective of neo-liberalism.
In essence it becomes a situation in which the costs
associated with the Argentine electorate's adjustment to neo-
liberal economic policy may come to include certain aspects of
democracy as a liability (ie a true separation of powers). It
is quite possible that in order for the government to continue
with the implementation of neo-liberal economic policy it may
find itself forced to recur increasingly not only to rule by
presidential decree, but also to influence the revision of
legislation which if left unmodified (ie labor reform) may
jeopardize the inflows of capital. Should this be the case,
Alfonsin administration sought to reorder the state apparatus
as a means of restoring efficiency in essential activities,
and to reassign resources in order to favor areas of social
welfare, health, housing and education as means of
guaranteeing sociopolitical and economic stability. It is
worthwhile to point out that regardless of the Radical Party's
middle class roots and its strong nationalistic streak
Alfonsin and the Radicals did seek to attract foreign
investment. They sought the type of foreign investment which
would compliment Argentina's economy without sacrificing the
nation's interests. See, Business International Corporation,
The New Argentina: Planning for Profits in the 1980s. New
York, NY: Business International Corp, 1984, pg. 139-140.
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especially in light of continued success of economic reform
policy and the support of 40 to 45 percent of the electorate,
it is fair to say that it is only a question of time before
the opposition parties are forced to tone down their rhetoric
or even retire from the political arena.
It should be pointed out that the modern Argentine
Republic's economic decline is a situation different from that
experienced by most other nations in the hemisphere, as well
as in the world.15  Argentina's case is not that of a
economically backward country that failed in its moment to
adopt the correct path to development and economic prosperity,
but rather is the case of a modern economy and its society
that has pursued the wrong sort of economic policy by refusing
to accept the new realities inherent in the post-World War II
era. 6 This in turn has resulted in further strengthening,
especially under the Menem government, the preponderant role
exerted by Argentina's Executive Branch. In effect the rise of
statism, as well as its decline have fused politics and
economics under the stewardship of President Menem. Economic
15
The modern Argentine Republic in this case is defined in
terms of the period commencing in 1916 with the popular
election of Hipolito Yrigoyen of the Radical Party as a result
of the universal male suffrage obtained via the Roque Saenz
Pena Law of 1912.
16
See Felipe A. M. De La Blaze, Remaking the Argentine
Economy. New York, NY: Council of Foreign Relations Press,
1995, pg. 1.
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instability in the past has resulted in sociopolitical
upheavals, and thus the fear of returning to similar situation
again has granted the presidency a mandate to chart the
nation's course without allocating to the other two branches
of government an equal expansion of institutional importance
or strength.
Many of the foregoing tensions result as a
consequence of the fact that Argentina's economy shares more
similarities at times with the economies of the industrialized
and developed countries than differences.1 7 The previous is
17
The Argentine economy shares many of the same
characteristics of the developed countries, such as Australia,
New Zealand and Canada, in the sense that Argentina was able
to construct a modern and relatively diversified economy on
the basis of exporting primary natural resources by the mid
nineteenth century. Yet, the Argentine problem commenced in
the postwar period of the 1940s when the state adopted the
development strategy of massive import substitution. Recall
that it was then believed that industrial protectionism would
not only facilitate the transformation of the nation's
productive structure, but would also raise productivity levels
and reduce its dependence on foreign sources. The adoption of
this model of development from within has finally been
accepted by the Argentine authorities as being inadequate,
since this model has prompted the creation of an economy with
low growth potential, high-costs industrial sectors, a
weakened rural sector, a strong anti-export bias, and
excessive government intervention. The difference between the
resource rich Argentine economy of the 1946-1989 period and
that of the resource poor economies of countries such as
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, has been economic policy/
strategy duration and orientation. The Asian Tigers have been
strong advocates of export orientated policies and their
measures of effective promotion, but fundamentally have only
protected selective sectors temporarily before moving on to
new sectors in which they have comparative advantages. In the
process this has resulted in creating a highly competitive
atmosphere characteristic of notion of "swim or sink". See,
ibid, pg. 16-17.
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made evident by the fact that the country has both a
politically and economically sophisticated population which,
unlike most other developing countries, is conscious of its
sociopolitical and economic role.18 The need to effectively
address economic issues, at times more characteristic of a
developed country than of a developing country, has resulted
in granting the Executive Branch increased institutionalized
leeway in handling Argentina's sociopolitical and economic
affairs. Additionally, political factionalism has only
contributed in further facilitating this type of situation.
With regards to the preceding economic issues it
should be pointed out that a viable economic development
strategy for a resource rich country like Argentina is to
exploit those areas in which it maintains an international
comparative advantage (ie technologically sophisticated
18
Since 1946 Argentine politics have been dominated by the
conflict between Peronism and its opponents. Frieden has
argued that a stylized version is tripartite. Peronism has
traditionally been supported by organized labor, small
businessmen, and some industrialists, especially those in
import-substitution sectors; its policies were populists and
pro-industrialists. The agro-export sector has supported the
right which has been free-trade and conservative. The middle
class in turn has supported the moderate developmentalist
Radicals. Within this context it is worthwhile to recall that
the right's electoral base has been small despite its great
economic importance, and this has generally lead to it to have
recourse to military intervention in order to achieve its
objectives. This last issue has changed with the Menem
administration, because of the Menemist/ conservative
alliance. See, Frieden, Debt, Development, and Democracy:
Modern Political Economy and Latin America, 1965 - 1985. pg.
187, for more information.
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industrial sector, highly educated labor force, low population
figures, abundant raw materials and a competitive agro-export
sector). Once having accepted this basic notion it only
becomes an issue of how to exploit these resources and not
whether to exploit them or not. With regards to the foregoing
it becomes a situation in which the electorate must accept the
notion of the need for short-term economic and political
readjustment. Within this context the adoption of economic
neo-liberalism should facilitate the task of the reactivation
of the national economy, but the need to maintain it as a
viable economic policy may further strengthen the nation's
Chief Executive by eroding the viability of the concept of the
separation of powers."
Within the context of the preceding it is worthwhile
to recall that Australia, a country which shares with
Argentina a number of similar characteristics (resource rich,
agricultural producer, extensive territory and low population
figures), did opt to somewhat protect its local industrial
sector during the post-war period, but it did not commit the
error of following extreme import-substitution policies like
those implemented by Argentina. Import-substitution policies
19
It is worthwhile to recall that democracy is limited by
such factors as those associated with a country's social
conditions (including economics, culture, politics, etc), as
well as by very characteristics of the state. See, Carlos
Strasser, Teoria del Estado. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Abeledo-
Perrot, 1986, pg. 39.
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have not only resulted in economic stagnation, but also
promoted in Argentina's case the strengthening of the
presidency. Economic reform has come to be dictated usually by
presidential decree in search of specific political goals (ie
Peron and the military's nationalistic development policies,
Videla and Martinez de Hoz's liberal economic policies,
Alfonsin's timid statism, and Menem's wholesale privatization
of the Argentine public sector) as means of increasing both
its local support at the ballot box, as well as its
international standing. It is interesting to note that
Australia's liberal and "balanced" development strategy did
not damage it natural-resource export potential, which has
been the case of Argentina, but also contributed in bringing
about economic prosperity and consequently democracy.20 The
20
It is worthwhile to note that in the Argentine case the
agricultural export sector has traditionally fueled
industrialization in country through expanded linkages in the
service sector (banking, commercial transactions, etc.).
Argentine authorities seem to have finally accepted the notion
that in order to increase GDP the country need not replicate
the industrial base of other developed countries. Rather, a
country should specialized in those areas in which it holds a
comparative advantage and as other countries make inroads into
such an area the state ought to exploit other sectors in which
it continues to hold advantages. As a consequence of the
ability to make the correct development policy choices it is
not surprising to realize that Australia's GDP by 1989 was
approximately three times greater than that of Argentina. What
needs to be realized is that Australia's exports during the
past ten years have been concentrated in raw materials of
agricultural and mining origin, and exports derived from the
processing of these raw materials. Additional examples of the
same have been set by both Sweden and Denmark which have been
able to construct modern and balanced societies in the present
century on the basis of exploiting comparative advantages in
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Argentine Republic's principle error has been to sacrifice,
through benign neglect, the "fuel-source" that has driven the
engine of its development, this namely being its agro-export
sector, and in the process has contributed in strengthening
the institutional discretion of the Menem presidency by
granting it the economic excuse to increase its role in the
nation's administration.
It can be held that at present the course to modern
and sustained development is without a doubt the adoption of
neo-liberal economic policies.2' International economic and
political relations amongst the nations of the world no longer
permit a state to close itself off behind borders, nor for
that do the industrialized core states permit resource rich
natural and human resources. Australia, Denmark and Sweden
have been able to accomplis these measures by fully
integrating themselves into the international economy, while
Argentine opted to follow a semi-autarkic path. See, Frieden,
Debt, Development, and Democracy: Modern Political Economy and
Latin America, 1965 - 1985. pg. 17 - 19.
21
It should be pointed out that the East Asian development
perspective is not entirely applicable in the Argentine case
since in most cases it tends to assign the state the role of
domestic developer. With regards to the foregoing it should be
clarified that the state in this case concentrates the bulk of
attention upon domestic groups rather than on foreign actors.
The state's role is to provide credit, channelling investment
into particular industries, subsidizing export products,
protecting the domestic market, and attracting new technology.
These issues have been considered by the East Asians as being
more important than foreign capital. Under such circumstances
it is foreseeable that the Argentine government could be
pressed to once again accept the notions of State-Centric
development since local capital is not large enough to develop
the sort of industries which the state could identify as being
important for national prowess. See, Stallings, pg.58.
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nations like Argentina such a luxury.22  Consequently,
international economic interdependence has become a factor
which on the whole contributes to reducing friction among the
states and tends to elevate the general standards of living
across the board. Yet, this manner of economic policy does not
necessarily seem to always promote unequivocal adherence to
democracy and or democratic mechanisms.
This type of situation leads one to question how
economics and politics can be so closely interrelated. A
simplistic answer is that economic forces operate within a
larger political context. As a consequence both of the
preceding come to demand from each other ever increasing
amounts of resources and adjustments from each other. One can
not and should not commit the error, which many liberal
economists tend to do, of neglecting the political framework
within which economic development takes place. As a result one
should not focus exclusively, to the detriment of
sociopolitical factors, on the development of a well
functioning market. It has to be realized that economic
flexibility and the capacity of the economy to respond to
changing economic opportunities are highly dependent upon the
22
See, Thomas Richard Shannon, An Introduction to the
World-System Perspective. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989,
pg 20-21, for a detailed definition of core, semi-periphery
and periphery, as well as other matters relating to Immanuel
Wallerstein's World-System theory.
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sociopolitical aspects of a society.23
In essence it is a situation in which economics and
politics can not be divorced from each other. This is
especially applicable in the case Latin American countries of
the likes of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay. In their
case political tension has traditionally been brought about by
the advent of high inflation. Consequently, high inflation has
resulted in political polarization and popular sector
mobilization, factors which in the past have prompted the
military to intervene. 24 It is worthwhile to mention that for
its part the military, at least in the Argentine case, is no
longer a primary factor in the political process as a result
of its failure to implement effective development policies,
the issues associated with human rights abuses during the
country's Dirty War, and the Malvinas/ Falkland Islands fiasco
of 1982. With regards to economic aspects it can be briefly
stated here that the implementation of orthodox stabilization
measures, macroeconomic in scope and aimed at controlling
inflation, have tended to cause political elites to gravitate
23
For more information regarding the relationship between
economics and politics see, Robert Gilpin, The Political
Economy of International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1987, pg. 269-270.
24
See, Stephan Haggard, Pathways From The Periphery: The
Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990, pg. 255.
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towards more authoritarian control mechanisms.2"
In order to assure economic development, by
inhibiting a return to run-away inflation and the ensuing
erosion of international capital's confidence in Argentina,
the nation's electorate may find itself forced by economic
necessity to turn a blind eye towards the issue of the proper
functioning of the country's mechanisms of checks and
balances. Thus, a large segment of the national electorate may
actually vote for Menem's reelection in 1995. This would
contribute in strengthening the role of the presidency with
regards to the other two branches of the government. President
Menem may possibly be given a mandate by the electorate in
order to solve the country's economic dilemma. This mandate
may be given based on the fact that Menem has come to be
identified by many Argentines as being the presidential
candidate that will less negatively affect one's own economic
position and his government has gained the confidence of the
international banking community, as well as the backing of the
international development organizations. Added to these
factors is the issue of economic stability that has allowed
roughly 40 to 45 percent of the nation's population to better
their economic position especially with regards to the
inflationary Alfonsin years. These sort of factors in turn are
supported by the notions associated with issue of capital
25
Ibid, pg. 255.
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accumulation, which is one of the most vital requirements of
development, and the means of achieving it through an increase
rate of domestic savings.26  Thus, it can be held that the
preceding can be carried out with far greater efficiency once
the political opposition has been divided, the improper public
policies of the past which caused domestic market
imperfections identified and new more adequate economic
policies implemented by presidential decree with the
acquiescence of a majority of the electorate.
Within the context of the aforesaid statements it is
worthwhile to point out that the Argentine state is no longer
intervening directly in the nation's economy, but rather it is
stimulating through neo-liberal economic policies the more
politically and economically conservative sectors of Argentina
to the detriment of both labor and to some extent the middle
class. 27  In effect it has become a situation in which the
26
See, Gilpin, pg. 268.
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This can be seen by the fact that Argentina had the
world's third most rapidly growing economy during the 1991 to
1993 period. In the process during 1993 its industrial exports
increased sharply, inflation in consumer prices fell to 7.4%,
wholesale prices remained stable, and both investment and
industrial production continued to rise. Yet, to reach the
aforementioned levels the Menem administration implemented
reforms which re-created the market economy by eliminating
controls on prices, wages, interest rates, foreign exchange
rates, and capital flows as well as the removal of hidden
subsidies and a drastic reduction of the public sector on the
national economy. See, Undersecretariat for Investment of the
Ministry of Economy, Public Works and Services, " Investing in
a Growing Argentina " in Argentine Investment Update. Buenos
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expectations which Argentine capital holds for state policy
have been altered in its favor. The result has been that
capital's attitude towards public policies which support labor
have hardened. In the process capital's leverage over state
expenditure has in turn been strengthened.
As an added factor to the preceding it can be argued
that the state's autonomy commences to decline vis-a-vis
global capitalism and its domestic allies. Local capital in
Argentina has traditionally maintained strong ties to
transnational development financing, and these are currently
keeping the government and its economic policy afloat. As a
consequence domestic and international capital have commenced
to supplant in economic importance and power the role
previously exercised by the interventionist state. As a direct
result of this the state, in order to continue to promote
investment, will be forced to modify its stand with regards to
industrial relations, policies and laws which mediate the
labor-to-capital relationship to the detriment of the working
class.28 In effect the state may become a hostage of its own
Aires, Argentina. vol. n* 1, n* 1. (January-March 1994), pg.
1.
28
The current legislation implemented via decree n* 470/93
aims at the decentralization of collective wage bargaining by
concentrating on smaller discussion units, when there is no
agreement between the parties as to negotiation parameters.
Accordingly on this basis the signatories can modify the
negotiation level at the individual request of any employer or
group of employers and the agreement can contain rulings
referring to work conditions as well as wage scales. The
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neo-liberalist policy, since capital may come to force the
state to comply with its demands by the mere threat of
withdrawing investment funds in the eventuality that the
government readopt policies favorable to labor as a means of
achieving increased ballot-box support.29
With regards to the previous it is worthwhile now to
define the nature of democracy.30 Thus, democratic regimes are
those in which free speech and organization are guaranteed,
legislation aims at reducing the rigidity that has existed in
centralized collective bargaining, institutionalizing more
fluid negotiations through the recognition of agreements
between employers and internal workers' commissions or union
delegations. In effect this decree is a partial reform of the
existing Labor Contract Law and its intent is to avoid
unnecessary technical work and legal vacuums. The principal
economic aspects are linked to the relaxation of methods of
labor contracting and the reduction of the cost of labor (ie
reduction in dismissal costs, lower costs due to the reduction
in social security contribution, recourse to temporary and
sub-contracting employment, etc.). See, " Market Reform and
Economic Organization " in Argentina, A Growing Nation. Buenos
Aires, Argentina:.Ministerio de Economia y Obras y Servicios
Publicos, 1994, pg. 36-37.
29
See, Robert J. S. Ross and Kent C. Trachte, Global
Capitalism: The New Leviathan. Albany, NY: State University of
New York Press, 1990, pg. 223.
30
From a political perspective democracy entails that it is
constituted in liberty and equality, that the political regime
adopted is subordinated to the sovereign populace, that power
in turn is exercised by representatives and institutions
subordinated to the will of the people, and that it is
organized in order to regulate society and the common good.
Yet, in practice the degree of democracy is limited by the
actual social conditions existent in the country, by the very
characteristics of the state, by the effective means of the
regime and its workings, as well as by the actions and the
style of those who govern accompanied by their bureaucrats.
See, Strasser, pg. 38 - 39.
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leaders are chosen in competitive elections, election results
are honored, and governments are not systematically subject to
veto or control by non-elected individuals or outside
institutions such as the military, bureaucracy, or monarchy."
On the other hand authoritarian regimes truncate civil
liberties, restrict open political competition, and limit
opposition and interest group activity.32 Argentina at this
moment meets the above mentioned requirements which classify
it as a democracy.33 Yet, what needs to be realized is that
31
A democracy may be defined, or for that matter a
country's government may be defined as being democratic if it
a) holds regular elections, the results of which can alter
policy and the people that make it, b) the existence of
universal suffrage, and c) the provision of civil liberties
essential to the election process itself. Furthermore, it has
been argued by many that democracy is best justified from the
point of view of equality, justice, and the rights rather than
that of utility and efficiency. Although democracy may provide
for some checks on power by protecting certain rights and
perhaps by even creating constitutional checks and balances on
the branches of government, democracy may still be compatible
with other kinds of inequality of power. Economic and social
democratic inequality can quite possibly, and often do,
allocate to some individuals or groups more leverage over the
democratic process than others. Such inequalities if
sufficiently great can come naturally to undermine the
significance of democracy itself. See, Norman E. Bowie and
Robert L. Simon, The Individual and the Political Order: An
Introduction to Social and Political Philosophy. 2nd ed.
Englecliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1986, pg. 114-115 and 118.
32
See, Haggard, pg. 254.
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It should be noted that in a developing country like
Argentina, democracy can only survive if its is able to
promote economic growth. In the eventuality of having to
assure continued economic prosperity a government may find
itself forced to implement what has come to be known as
"democracy under scrutiny" (democracia vigilada) . This
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even though the country meets the requirements for it to be
classified as a democracy, the implementation of neo-liberal
economic policy has tended to stymie the proper and
unrestricted operation of democratic mechanisms (issue of rule
by presidential decree) .34 This has essentially been carried
out by the need to address the issue of the possibility of
losing international investor confidence.3 s
particular brand of democracy is semi-authoritarian in nature
and would in turn alternate in phases of authentic popular
participation and a broadening of the political arena with
phases in which emergency measures would be declared and
repressive controls upon certain sectors of society
(especially the labor movement) imposed. Under this sort of
situation it would be a regime that would preempt military
threats by hardening the regime and meet popular threats by
relaxation. In essence the country would be in a constant
state of institutional flux. See, Silvio R. Duncan Baretta and
John Markoff, "Brazil's Abertura: from What to What" in
Authoritarians and Democrats; Regime Transformation in Latin
America. ed. James M. Malloy and Mitchell A. Seligson.
Pittsburgh, Penn: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987, pg.
62-63.
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It is worthwhile to point out that the Argentine state is
characterized as being "presidentialist" in nature. Thus,
within the Argentine political system there predominates the
notion that there can not be a society if there does not exist
order. The executive branch that leads the state is the entity
that organizes society, since it has the responsibility of
imposing that order on the citizenry. In turn the government
may recur to judicial and legislative instruments, if it has
the capacity to do so, in order to accomplish its goals.
Consequently, it is not surprising to realize that the law of
any nation is neither politically innocent, nor for that
matter immune to the influence of politics. See, Strasser, pg.
23.
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The government has stated on a number of occasions that
Menem is the only political candidate that can possibly hope
to maintain the current level of success which has come to be
associated with Argentina's economic renascence. Furthermore,
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The preceding issues are directly associated with
the readjustment a society must make when its government goes
from a period of active involvement in the economy to one of
reduced participation. 36 It is worthwhile to mention that this
Cavallo has become indispensable for assuring the continued
acceptance of Argentine economic policy by the International
Monetary Fund, World Bank, and other international
institutions. This issue has been played politically by the
Menem government in order to be reelected, as well as become
in the process indebted to conservative Argentine capital and
its international financial allies for continued backing.
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It has been argued that economic liberalization policies
in the Southern Cone in the past have led to disastrous
consequences. This is made evident by the issue of excessive
indebtedness and the subsequent repayment problems of the
1980s. It has been stated that the model of ultra-liberalism
is irresponsible since it applies measures that tend to
destroy many activities in the short-term (especially
industry) without knowing what alternatives will emerge or
which activities will be sparked by the new conditions.
Granted that the current programs are not the same as those of
the preceding era, these have demonstrated certain
similarities and thus have caused some groups to question
their validity in light of past failures. In addition it has
been mentioned that the major group that benefits from
liberalization is the financial sector which reaps the rewards
of deregulated credit and free floating interest rates. Within
this context supposedly financial liberalization leads to a
sharp increase in interest rates. In addition financial boom
is brought about by the stagnation of the productive sector.
Yet, what this particular perspective fails to address is the
notion that the Convertibility Plan has greatly reduced risk
(especially that associated with inflation) by pegging the
Argentine Peso to the US Dollar. This inhibits the government
from increasing the local money supply, printing more
currency, without an equivalent increase in the amount of hard
currency on reserve. More over this perspective does not
address the issue that in the past the state became indebted
due to the need to develop on its own, for nationalistic
purposes, sophisticated technologies and industries.
Additionally, as a consequence of the Debt-Crisis easy
development monies are no longer available, thus requiring the
intervention of foreign direct investment as a means of
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is a different situation from that of the previous era, as
proposed by the bureaucratic-authoritarian paradigm developed
by Guillermo O'Donnell back in the early 1970s, as well as
that of State-Led Restructuring. This is primarily due to the
fact that both of these notions were originally elaborated
from a perspective which sought to formulate a response to the
military's role response to the economic and political crisis
of dependent capitalism in Latin America.3 7 With regards to
these models it is interesting to note that the military
leaders have largely proven themselves to be as incompetent as
their civilian counterparts as policy makers in addressing
economic policy and development.38
developing the country. See, Rene Villarreal, " The Latin
American Strategy of Import Substitution: Failure or Paradigm
for the Region" in Manufacturing Miracles: Paths of
Industrialization in Latin America and East Asia. Gary Gereffi
and Donald L. Wyman, ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1990, pg. 296 - 297.
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See, Alvin Y. So, Social Change and Development:
Modernization Dependency and World-System Theories. Newbury
Park, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 1990, pg.144-145, for a
more detailed analysis as to how Latin American nations opted
for producing goods which they had previously imported and how
such measures came to effect their political characteristics.
Of key importance is So's explanation of Guillermo O'Donnell's
interpretation of the threats posed by the mobilization of
the masses to the interests of the dominant classes and their
international affiliations.
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See, William C. Smith, Authoritarianism and the Crisis of
the Argentine Political Economy. Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1989, pg 1-5. It is worthwhile to note that
the BA model identifies the task of a new military regime as
that of eliminating the threat from below and the
normalization of the economy through the adoption of orthodox
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POLITICAL TENSIONS
The Argentine Republic and its body politic, even in
light of the substantial advances made in the re-
democratization process of recent years, still retains a
strong propensity on both an institutional and societal level
for favoring autocratic rule. This fact results both as a
consequence of the country's colonial legacy, which has
inculcated the norms of centralized one man rule, and the
demands of development associated with the international
economic and sociopolitical realities of the twentieth
century.39  These are facts that have only become further
stabilization measures. Whereas, the Restructuring model
focuses on explicit projects aimed at restructuring both
capital and even the dominant class itself on a sociopolitical
level. The Restructuring perspective goes on to agree that the
BA model's emphasis on the relationship between the military
regime and the dominant class is important, but it places a
greater emphasis on the reorganization of the state apparatus,
the class structure, prevailing patterns of capital
accumulation, and the country's mode of insertion in the
world-economy (New Order).
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Recall that for most of the colonial period the area that
currently comprises the Argentine Republic was considered by
the Spaniards to be economically backward and consequently of
minor international political importance. This was largely due
to the fact that the region neither had abundant mineral
resources, nor for that matter vast amounts of native laborers
that could be utilized for plantation style agriculture. It
should be pointed out that only in the Northwestern provinces
of present day Argentina was colonization accompanied by labor
intensive agriculture utilizing native labor sources (mit'a
system). Yet, it should be recalled that the region then was
economically more tied to Lima than to Buenos Aires as a
result of the limeos merchants ability to lobby the Spanish
crown in 1622 for the establishment of an internal customs
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accentuated following the 1980's Debt-Crisis.
It is worthwhile to point out that the Argentine
region has made significant economic advances only when
stimulated by external sources and their demands. A historical
case is the issue of Portuguese southerly expansion from
Brazil in the late seventeenth century, prompted already then
by a proto-capitalist and expansionist pre-industrial Britain
seeking to gain increased market access to the River Plate
region's agricultural production and under-supplied consumer
market, which in turn forces the region's Spanish overlords
to intensify their position locally.40  Thus, once having
house in the City C6rdoba. This was implemented as a means of
inhibiting the economic development of Buenos Aires which if
allowed to flourish would reduce the importance of both Lima's
port of Portobelo and the limeos economic position. This
artificial barrier to trade, located at the convergent point
of the major trade routes between Spain's Atlantic and Pacific
coast holdings, effectively hindered the development of Buenos
Aires as an entrep6t for Spanish-American colonial trade until
the late eighteenth century. In the process this situation
contributes in orientating the River Plate region's local
merchant class towards the contraband trade with Britain and
consequently the Atlantic triangular trade routes. For
additional information regarding the mit'a system of labor
see, Steve Stern, Peru's Indian Peoples and the Challenge of
Spanish Conquest: Huamanga to 1640. Madison, WI: The
University of Wisconsin Press, 1982, pg. 84-85.
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The foundation of a Portuguese colony (Nova Colonia do
Sacramento) in 1680, on the' near shore of the River Plate
facilitates the intensification of the inter-colonial
contraband trade in the River Plate region. During that period
Portuguese merchant vessels commence to routinely exchange
their cargos of African slaves and manufactured goods
(increasingly of British manufacture after the Treaty of
Methuen) for Spanish-American goods, especially Potosi silver
from Upper Peru, in the port city of Buenos Aires. In 1777
Spain takes advantage of Britain's military preoccupation with
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neutralized the Portuguese threat the Spaniards and their new
Bourbon rulers implement a series of reform measures aimed at
consolidating their position in the River Plate region by
promoting its economic development as a means of insuring its
political stability and loyalty to the crown.41 The measures
of the late colonial period contribute directly in expanding
inter-colonial trade linkages and consequently create in the
process an economically powerful local merchant class in
Buenos Aires. The new merchant class are the principle
advocate of free trade and in the process finds itself
identifying much more readily with foreign traders than with
Spain's official "comerciantes" of the Cadiz based monopolist
trade system. Buenos Aires's merchant class, as a result of
its international commercial dependence and receptiveness to
the rebellion in its North American holdings in order to expel
the Portuguese presence from the River Plate region.
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Having eliminated the Portuguese threat the Spanish
military expedition's leader, Pedro de Cevallos, proceeds to
establish the Viceroyalty of the River Plate, as well as
implement a series of reforms (Bourbon Reforms) aimed at
consolidating Spain's political and economic preponderance in
the region. Some of Cevallos measures were the elimination of
the aduana seca in C6rdoba, as well as forbidding that Potosi
silver continued to be shipped via Lima's port of Portobelo.
Furthermore, from that point onwards Buenos Aires would become
the official port of entry for Spanish mercury utilized in the
silver extraction process in Upper Peru. In order to eliminate
any remaining Portuguese influence in the region Cevallos
establishes direct contacts with the West African coast's
slave trade. Additionally, during this period Cevallos also
endeavors to guarantee Buenos Aires' independence from Lima's
overlordship by establishing salt-meat plants and promoting
the production of linseed and hemp (naval stores) on a larger
scale than before.
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the exchange of non-traditional ideas, becomes the primary
backer of Creole desires for autonomous commercial expansion,
as well as political independence from the Spanish crown.
This type of situation has been the recurrent theme
of Argentine economic development, as well as of its political
evolution. In effect it has become the norm in Argentine
society.43 Democracy and autocratic rule have been directly
linked to the shifts in the country's economic prosperity.
This situation has in turn influenced directly the development
of both Argentina's political system and its economy. Thus,
Argentina has traditionally supported the notion of autocratic
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With political turmoil in Spain, as a result of
Napoleonic France's invasion, and the renewed implementation
of many of the Hapsburg era's restrictive trade policies,
favoring the Cadiz comerciantes, Buenos Aires's Cabildo moves
on the 25th of May, 1810, to declare its own self-government.
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An interesting difference, in both sociopolitical and
economic terms, that can be highlighted with regards to the
Argentine Republic is the example set by the United States of
America. Suffice to say that though both countries had
different development policies during their colonial periods,
these economic policies have influenced their subsequent
political development. Argentina's development during that
period and until the mid nineteenth century is largely the
byproduct of what can be called extraction economics. This is
defined as being the extraction of wealth and the full
exploitation of all resources for short-term profit. Profit is
subsequently remitted back to the Old World or spent on luxury
imports. Whereas, the North American model evidences as strong
tendency to settle the land and develop it for long-term
profitability. Profits originating from the successful
development of the lands in turn are reinvested domestically
in order to perpetuate a cycle of economic profitability. In
essence it becomes a case of self-sustaining capitalist
development versus mercantalist opportunism and consumerism.
46
rule in the guise of a strong executive who could impose order
upon the masses while maintaining a good working relationship
with the owners of capital.
The strongman figure in the Argentine political
universe is the caudillo. The caudillo governed in the
nineteenth century through not only the threat of force and
fear, but also by distributing political patronage to his
supporters. 44 Yet, contrary to becoming a centralizing factor
the Argentine caudillo system of the early nineteenth century
resulted in nearly forty years of internal strife, political
violence, economic backwardness and international isolation.45
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This type role is directly inherited from the old Spanish
viceroy system with all its military, economic and
sociopolitical powers largely intact. Though with independence
from Spain there is an attempt to establish a citizen
democracy along the French Revolutionary model's lines, the
political and economic instability results in a period of
civil war and of political anarchy. The aforesaid is largely
brought about as a result of the post independence
government's attempts to continue with the Bourbon's forced
centralization policies and the implementation of a National
Constitution which largely favored Buenos Aires's position.
The end result of this has been the definitive establishment
of autocratic rule in the person of Buenos Aires's Juan Manuel
de Rosas by 1829. Initially Rosas is seen as the champion of
the Federalist interior's desire for less centralized rule/
domination from the City of Buenos Aires, as well as a
restorer of law and order. Eventually his rule turns
tyrannical, but largely unquestioned until his ouster from
power in 1852.
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Only with the dictator Rosas's ouster from power in 1852
that rule of law finally gains a definitive, yet precarious,
foothold in Argentina. This is primarily established via the
much respected Argentine National Constitution of 1853.
Unfortunately, this experiment in limited democracy is short
lived. By 1880 Argentina once again falls victim to autocratic
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Taking the preceding factors into consideration it can be
noted that President Menem has had such a large measure of
success due to the fact that he has been able to incorporate
the more benign aspect of the caudillo system, political
patronage, and merge this with charismatic leadership instead
of brute force. Yet, the nature of his administration's hold
over government has led many political analysts in Argentina
to question if whether his measures (rule by presidential
decree) are not a form of civilian dictatorship.
The importance of the preceding factors is made
evident by the realization that during the second half of the
nineteenth century Argentina goes through a substantial
process of institutional reform which contributed in
integrating the Argentine political system and creating a
national economy based on agricultural export commodities to
Europe. Economic prosperity and political stability during the
late 1800s and the years prior to World War I allowed
Argentina to make significant advances comparable to those of
rule. What needs to be pointed out is that instead of rule by
one man the Argentine situation is transformed into rule by
one all powerful oligarchic economic class. In the process the
oligarchy comes to view the country's masses (gauchos,
remaining Indians and foreign immigrants) as a direct threat
to the economic and political stability of the Argentine
state. The situation is only further aggravated by continued
and increased immigration in tandem with continuing economic
prosperity. This situation eventually results in increased
demands by immigrants and their Argentine borne children for
a greater say in then affairs of the national and provincial
governments.
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today's most advanced nations during that same period. A fact
readily proven by the country's high standard of living, as
measured by home ownership, number of university students and
physicians per inhabitant, as well as the fact that its
political system already operated within the framework of a
full democracy following World War I." It seems that
democracy and rule of law (ie a more balanced separation of
the powers of government) prospers in Argentina effectively
only during periods of economic stability.47
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Modern Argentine democracy, in this case defined in terms
of universal suffrage (Saenz Pefa Law of 1912) and a multi-
party political system, develops as a consequence of the
Radical Party's institutionalization as a legal political
party. Recall that increased economic prosperity without a
subsequent increase in political power contributed in
alienating the prosperous middle class, university students
and a small number of junior military officer, all of these
mostly being descendants of immigrants. As these were
integrated into Argentine society they came to demand a
greater say in government and thus formed the basis of the
Radical Party in its endeavors at wrestling from the
conservative oligarchy a redistribution of political power.
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The Menem presidency since it gained office in 1989 has
carried out an economic policy which has been criticized by
some as being implemented at the cost of fundamental
democratic values, in particular with regards to the issue of
judicial independence. This is made evident by the fact that
when Menem sought to expand the number of justices sitting on
the Argentine Supreme Court he was accused of intromission in
the separation of powers. The International Commission of
Jurists observed that the independence and impartiality of the
Judicial System had been attacked and as a consequence the
democratic balance of power was compromised and incapacitated
to make effective the supremacy of the Constitution. Both
jurists and members of the press have criticized the
presidency for this attempt to subordinate the judicial branch
of the government to the manipulation of the executive branch.
Thus, the issue of the Supreme Court has been at the center of
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It should be noted that the importance of the issue
regarding changes in living standards, since it is based on
the realization that changes in income levels are linked to
changes in the structure of output and the composition of
foreign trade. As income rises, there is a subsequent
increased demand for goods, manufactured goods, and services.
In the process there is a relative contraction or slowed rate
of expansion for food, clothing, and textiles. In effect
changes in living standards involve shifts in tastes, income
and consumption patterns. This not only results in influencing
the structure of domestic output, but also comes to affect the
volume and consumption of foreign trade.48
The historical factors tie directly into the current
political tensions in the Argentine state in the sense that as
the insecurity over judicial security due to the fact that it
is the Argentine Republic's highest court and consequently
does not only act as the final judge, but sets precedents,
examples and guidelines for the lower courts to follow.
Particularly troubling with regards to this issue has been the
fact that law N* 23.744, promulgated on April 11, 1990, raised
the number of justices of the supreme court from five to nine,
as well as introduced certain procedural modifications. As of
1993 Menem has been able to name six justices to the new and
expanded Argentine Supreme Court and subsequent political
maneuvering has allowed the court to be utilized as a
bargaining chip between the Menem government and the political
opposition. See, William D. Rogers and Paolo Wright-Carozza,
La Corte Suprema de Justicia y la seguridad iuridica. Buenos
Aires, Argentina: Editorial Abaco de Rodolfo Depalma -
Fundacion Hemisferio, 1995, pg. 25-27 and 43-45.
48
See A. G. Kenwood and A. L. Loughheed, Growth of the
International Economy: 1820 - 1990. 3rd edition. New York: NY.
Routledge Press, 1992, pg. 21.
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the country's economy prospers, Argentines tend to become
complacent with the political status quo as a means of
ensuring continued consumption of especially imported items."
Thus, the clamor for political rights and representation has
traditionally been brought about by international economic
contraction and instability (ie economic recession brought
about by World War I, the collapse of free trade, wartime
abandoning of the gold standard, the Great Depression, and
recently international economic recession). In other words
situations which tend to reduce the middle class's access to
credit and consumer items (issues which have both expanded
significantly under Menemism).
With the return of economic prosperity (Argentina's
post World War I and II economic booms) how is it possible
that the country happened to succumb to prolonged economic and
political decline lasting for a period of fifty years.50 The
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The Menem administration's implementation of neo-liberal
economic reform has facilitated this by means of the Economic
Emergency Law N* 23.697 of September 1989. The law not only
established the suspension of all subsidies directly and
indirectly affecting the resources of the national treasury,
the Central Bank, and state corporations, but also prohibited
the Central Bank from financing the national government. In
effect as well as in deed the benefits of industrial promotion
were cut back, and "buy Argentine" restrictions were lifted.
This in turn has lead to increased imports of consumer items.
See, " Market Reform and Economic Organization in Argentina:
A Growing Nation. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ministerio de
Economia y Obras y Servicios Pdblicos, 1994, pg. 34.
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Modern Argentina arises with Hipolito Yrigoyen's election
in 1916, yet even in light of the democratic aspects of
51
principle issue here is that in the Argentine case there seems
to exist a strong propensity for the proper working of
democracy to be associated with economic prosperity. By the
same measure there also exists a strong tendency to have
periods in which there is economic prosperity, but without the
full implementation of democracy (feasible as long as capital
inflows cbntinue). Thus, it seems that historically as
economic decline gains an ever increasing foothold, the
Argentine government has reverted to more authoritarian
mechanisms in order to arrest a further deterioration of the
national economy and as a means of controlling the political
situation.51 In the end this has resulted in a situation
whereby the population tends to favor democracy, but also
shows a strong willingness to sacrifice it in light of
economic expediency. This tends to be the case of Menem's
Argentina.
It should be pointed out that the Menem government
Yrigoyen's election his government is basically the result of
his charismatic leadership. The Radicals set the stage for
oratory domination instead of military vigor in the political
arena. Yrigoyen's politics only succeed as long as the
country's economy continued to prosper. Once the economy
flounders Yrigoyen becomes a liability to both the military,
already upset by his meddling in their internal affairs, and
the oligarchy, this being resentful of Yrigoyen's methods of
achieving popular middle class support by increasing
government spending and rising tariffs which could upset the
relationship of laissez faire trade with Britain.
Consequently, this situation results in the military coup of
1930 carried out by General Uriburu.
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See, Duncan Baretta and Markoff, pg. 62-63.
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has been able to succeed precisely where its predecessors,
both civilian and military, have failed. In essence it has
been able to divest the state of an inefficient state-sector
and in the process has attracted investment capital once again
into the country. This is especially important in the post-
Debt Crisis world since neo-liberal economic reform has become
the principal mechanism for stimulating development and it is
to this economic policy the Menem administration has hitched
Argentina's proverbial horse. In effect what the Menem
presidency has done has been to fuse the key aspects of State-
Led Restructuring with those of neo-liberal economic
perspective. The current government has accepted that
Argentina and its national economy form part of an
interdependent world economy based upon free trade,
specialization, and an international division of labor which
in turn happen to contribute to domestic development.5 2 This
has in turn resulted, at times, in bringing to the forefront
the more negative aspects of the Restructuring policy's "New
Order". Consequently, social tensions have increased as a
disproportionate share of the costs of adjustment have been
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In the process the flow of goods, capital, and technology
increase optimum efficiency in resource allocation and
therefore tend to transmit growth from the developed "core"
nations to developing "semi-periphery" nations like Argentina.
In this case Argentina as the less developed country gains
access to world markets, capital, and technology, whereas the
more developed countries gain increased access to regional
(MERCOSUR) markets, sources of raw materials, and cheaper
costs of production. See, Gilpin, pg 266.
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placed upon the lower and middle classes, which are forced to
bear the brunt of economic policies and inflation controlling
strategies designed to increase savings and investment.53
Recall that these measures and their implementation
are largely possible as a result of the divisions of the
political opposition to the Menem government. The multi-
polarization of the Argentine political arena has allowed
Menem to rule the country with less than 50 percent of the
electorate's support. With the national electorate currently
divided into 15 national parties with presidential candidates
for the May 1995 elections, Menem stands a good chance of
being reelected (see figure n* 1) without the need of
recurring to a second round. This is a consequence of the fact
that the Menem government as been able to address the concerns
of 40 to 45 percent of the national electorate, namely the
sector which has profited from trade and economic
liberalization.
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See, Smith, pg. 5.
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Source: Noticias, Buenos Aires, Argentina, April 9, 1995, pg. 51.
Fig. 1. Percentage of support for Menem by 5 major polls
This should tend to hold true unless the overall
economic situation, from both a domestic and international
point view, turns radically worse during the last four weeks
prior to the May 14, 1995, election. In the advent of such a
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situation it can be assumed that, due to the electorate's
discontent, a run-off election between Menem and his nemesis
Jose Octavio Bordon should ensue with Menem winning by a clear
margin. The defining characteristics of such a run-off
election would be based primarily upon economic issues rather
than those of political ideology. "
Furthermore, it should be clarified that President
Menem's main opposition challenger has not been able to
present a better economic policy as an alternative to that
implemented by the Menem government. Quite the contrary, Jose
Octavio Bordon as the FREPASO candidate, has stated that if
elected he would continue with the Menem government's economic
policies as a means of placating the economic worries of the
national electorate. Yet, the very nature of such a statement
can only help to further increase the tensions within the
Argentine universe, since the opposition's comments tend to
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On May 10, 1995, Domingo Cavallo called a press
conference in order to announce that Japan's Eximbank had
promised the Argentine government U$S 800 million in order to
facilitate Argentina's payment of loans and maintain its
international hard currency reserves. Furthermore, Cavallo
announced that the Inter-American Development Bank had
promised to immediately issue a credit of U$S 750 million. In
addition Cavallo also went on to announce that the government
had been able to secure an added U$S 400 million in bilateral
loans. These loans can only contribute to help improve
Argentina's productivity and ease international investors
doubts as to the solidity of the nation's economy. In essence
these sort of measures being announced five days prior to the
presidential elections can only help to further strengthen
Menem's position. See, Alberto Lippi, " El BID y el EXIMBANK
tambien votan" in El Cronista: Edicion Fax Internacional.
Buenos Aires, Argentina, (May 11, 1995), pg. 3.
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cause serious doubts as to the suitability of the opposition
candidate as a viable option.
With regards to the preceding what needs to be
realized here is that in State-Led Restructuring political
parties and subordinate sectors of civil society come to play
crucial roles in challenging authoritarianism. President
Menem's trick has been to incorporate into his government
members of the country's dominant capitalist class (major
industrialists). These had previously been largely excluded in
the classic State-Led Restructuring policy of the "Proceso
Years" of military rule. With the support of the dominant
economic class of the country behind him, Menem has in effect
implemented early on in his presidency measures that have
restructured the national economy to benefit capital and
include the capitalist class in the nation's decision making
process. This sort of presidential backing has made capital a
powerful ally of Menemism. By having effectively carried out
the preceding measure the Menem government has broken open the
largely bi-party Argentine political system of the past fifty
years. Furthermore, Menem has been able to astutely divide the
political opposition and exploit internal party differences
both within and outside of his own party by invoking the issue
of the success of inflation controlling measures and
Convertibility plan.
From an economic perspective Menem has "scared" the
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greater part of the Argentine middle class into supporting him
out of fear of a return to a period of renewed hyper-
inflation.55  In effect Menem has also made Argentina
attractive to renewed foreign investor confidence. His
government has accomplished this by improving the country's
international competitiveness via decreasing organized labor's
costs and by bringing about constitutional reform as a means
of reducing fears associated with the issue of the erosion of
democracy. In addition Menem has championed the rapid
consolidation of MERCOSUR as a means of extending the reach of
the Argentine economy. These measures have been further
strengthened recently by the dollar's international fall,
which incidentally has served Argentina as pseudo-devaluation
of the peso. This most unexpected turn of events has
contributed in making Argentina's exports internationally more
competitive. Menem has succeeded precisely because his
policies emulate aspects of the previous neo-liberal policies,
but without the need to recourse to political alliance
building with organized labor. This is the principle issue why
bureaucratic authoritarianism, as well as State-Led
Restructuring failed in the past.
It should be realized that Menem's rule is not in
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President Menem went on the public record, prior to the
elections, and stated that people should vote for him in order
to avoid a return hyper-inflation and economic chaos.
President Menem's own words were, "yo o el caos".
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essence authoritarian, but rather politically opportunistic
and economically expedient. In effect his government has
divided, and thus conquered, its political opposition by way
of superior statesmanship. To certain extent the Menem
government has returned to a situation reminiscent of
Argentina's Oligarchic period in the sense that it has forged
an alliance with not only the Argentine conservative
capitalist class, but also with international capital. This
has contributed in cementing the predominance of the Executive
Branch. The new twist to the preceding is that Menem has
incorporated into his conservative alliance, both willingly
and unwillingly, elements of the now enfranchised and
economically active middle class through its own fear of a
return to hyper-inflation and its desire for economic gain.
Furthermore, the Menem government has been able to
effectively coopt organized labor's leadership. By having
successfully done so Menem and his labor allies have been able
to control not only the unruliness of labor's rank and file,
but also have convinced these to accept capital's control over
productive assets. It should be pointed out that the immediate
cost to the Menem government in exchange for this support has
been quite minor, it has only had to reward labor leaders with
traditional government appointments (ie embassy, secretariat,
and national commission appointments). In return labor has
largely accepted the call for restraint as a consequence of
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its belief that a substantial portion of capital's profit
would in some manner be saved, thus eventually reinvested and
consequently converted into technological modernization. It is
believed that this in turn should supposedly result in not
only technological modernization, which leads in turn to
increased productivity, but also in expanded production.
Consequently, as production and profitability expand labor has
assumed that future profits will be distributed in the form of
higher wages (trickle down theory) .56
Interestingly enough in this case is the fact that
organized labor in Argentina has traditionally been
predominantly fascist/ nationalistic in sociopolitical and
economic orientation and not anti-capitalist.57 Consequently,
organized labor and its leadership has not sought to bring
about a socialist transformation of society as a means of
improving its own well being, as well as that of general
Argentine society. Rather, organized labor has come to accept,
if grudgingly so at times, the notion that economic
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See, Smith, pg. 8.
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Though leftists parties abound, these are of
relatively minor importance outside of the Chamber of
Deputies. The best these parties, or alliances formed amongst
each other, can hope for is some sort of arrangement with
Menem's challenger as a means of influencing overall policy.
Thus, the highly atomized atmosphere of the Argentine
political arena tends to down play the role of socialist
inspired political parties instead of strengthening their
position.
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nationalism in the form of a semi-autarkic economic system can
no longer be called upon as the means of reactivating the
Argentine national economy. All parties involved have come to
the conclusion that the State-Centric development policies of
the past have failed and that easy international financing is
no longer available due to the consequences of the 1980s Debt-
Crisis.58 As a consequence not only has it been realized by
almost all of the actors of the Argentine body politic that
easy access to international credit-financing is no longer
feasible, but also that strict adherence to the International
Monetary Fund's guidelines has become acceptable as a
necessary evil and thus a price that must be paid in order to
get the country's finances in order. In essence this is the
notion of the "bitter pill of development" which must be
swallowed along with the sacrifices a society must make in
58
Domingo Cavallo has argued that there was a need to
recognize on a political level the issue of reducing the
Argentine Republic's foreign debt. Argentina's foreign debt
grew to such a point that it became an unsurpassable obstacle
for economic growth. For Cavallo the magnitude of the problem
became evident as reflected by the negative growth indexes of
the Argentine economy during the 1980s, which in turn
signified an alarming reduction of the stock of physical
capital of the economy. The principal problem generated by the
foreign debt was by 1989 hyper-inflation. Recall that previous
was the result of not only capital flight and unstable
exchange rates, but also a consequence of misguided economic
policy in conjunction with the fact that major part of the
foreign debt was public sector debt. See, Domingo Cavallo, "
La Republica Argentina y el Plan Brady " in La Revista del
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto. Buenos Aires,
Argentina: Instituto del Servicio Exterior de la Naci6n. year
1 - n*l, 1992, pg. 11.
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order to develop. This in turn has facilitated the transition
of the country's economy from a primarily statist one to an
economy based on private capital implemented via the massive
privatization of the public-sector's assets. Furthermore,
there has arisen the belief among labor leaders, government
officials, and captains of industry that the material well
being of labor is contingent upon reasonable guarantees it
must offer capital regarding the profitability of its
investments.
Contrary to the classic notions associated with
political democracy, in which the proletariat allies itself
with the middle class against the owners of capital, the
prevailing situation in Menem's Argentina has become one in
which the middle class has forgone labor and instead has
allied itself with the Menem government and its pro-government
conservative backers. This is directly a result of the Menem
government's ability to promote economic confidence by
reducing inflation, increasing credit and meeting consumer
demands by reducing restrictions against imports.59
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It should be pointed out that democracy in a capitalist
society has emerged amid national notions of national
mobilization in order to wage war and/ or as a result of
division among the dominant class. This in turn as opened the
way for progressive political alliances among the middle
classes, workers, and in some cases even rural producers. In
turn this has lead to the expansion of the franchise and full
citizenship to the subaltern classes. See, Smith, pg. 7.
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ECONOMIC TENSIONS
The Menem government has been able to forge an
understanding of convenience between the Argentine middle
class, which has come to fear a return to a renewed period of
economic instability, and the nation's conservative capitalist
class. This has allowed both the state and capital to impose,
via the state's coercive powers, at times non-democratic
solutions to the nation's economic problems. This type of
maneuvering by the Argentine state is nothing new in
Argentina's political arena, rather the combination of players
and the rhetoric has varied from the traditional norms. In
addition it should be mentioned that Argentina's political
economy and its precarious insertion in the world markets has
traditionally not been overly conducive to democratic
outcomes. In effect it has proven itself rather difficult for
the Argentine Republic to function under the exigencies of
international competition without a recourse to the
suppression of Argentine labor."
Economic tension in Argentina on an economic level
has usually resulted as a consequence of deciding which
economic sector to promote and for how long. With the Menem
60
State intervention in the past has been geared towards
the process of extracting wealth from the national economy.
In addition it has also been utilized as a means of guiding
the national investment of economic surpluses for upgrading
the country's productive activities.
63
administration this continues to be the case, but with the
added factor of controlling inflation while subsequently
promoting investment. It needs to be realized that the country
has an internationally competitive agro-export sector, as well
as a significant national industrial base. The main problem
with these two sectors is that they have traditionally tended
to be contradictory to each other in Argentina, since one has
always suffered at the expense of the other.6' In essence
every time one was promoted the other was allowed to languish
(ie in the nineteenth century agriculture was king while
industrialization was down-played and vice-versa in the years
after Per6n's rise to power). Added to this is the tension
caused by the need to increase the national wealth (stock) of
the economy.
Additionally, it should be pointed out that what
is causing further tension in the Argentine Republic at this
moment is the need to reduce overall domestic consumption and
increase savings. Thus, under such a scenario it is not
surprising to realize that the country has shown a strong
61
With the defeat of the dictator Rosas in 1852 the Pampean
agro-export bourgeoisie consolidated its position as the
country's hegemonic class. Urban and rural middle class groups
tied to the profitability of import-export activities of the
Pampean bourgeoisie. This in turn led these to defend the
notions of free trade, liberalism and acted as consumers by
opposing high tariffs on imports and other measures favoring
industrialization. They in turn provide the basis for
extensive urbanization and precocious industrial development
which gives rise to a large and prosperous middle class that
came to enjoy relatively high wages.
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propensity for its democratic regimes to fail in meeting the
challenge of reconciling legitimate rule with economic
growth. 2  Traditionally it has been difficult to get the
electorate's backing when the same is suffering the effects of
economic readjustment dictated by the government. The
interesting point here is that the Menem government has been
able to achieve this goal.
Consequently, it can be argued that the best method
of "guiding" the Argentine population at the present is not by
the overt and brutish methods characteristic of the military
regimes of the past, but rather by economic coercion. In
essence it becomes a case of "economic authoritarianism" in
which the stick is the fear of a return to a period of hyper-
inflation and the carrot is the speculation associated with
the success of MERCOSUR and access to the European Economic
Community's markets and their financing.63 Consequently, the
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See, Smith, pg. 266.
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It is seldom mentioned, outside of the European Economic
Union and the MERCOSUR states, that the EEC has cultivated an
economically significant relationship with the South American
regional trading bloc. It is worthwhile to point out that the
EEC is MERCOSUR's principal partner in terms of commerce and
investment. Furthermore, the Southern Cone region occupies a
position of priority in the relations between the EEC and
Latin America. This can be amply evidenced by the fact that
the proportion of Europeans firms in the MERCOSUR region has
increased substantially in recent years. Argentina currently
is the host to roughly 50 percent of the principal
transnational European companies in the region. See, Consejo
de la Union Europea, Europa y America Latina: Una cooperaci6n
para la accion. Luxembourg: Comisi6n Europea, 1994, pg. 13-14.
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Menem government has sought to develop capital markets and
increase the yield on investment as a means of generating a
preference for saving. This has in turn resulted in that by
1995 growth in exports have surpassed growth in imports,
reducing the deficit in the balance of trade in goods and
services."
The Menem/ Cavallo neo-liberal reforms have caused
significant sociopolitical and economic tensions in the
Argentine Republic. The current administration has committed
itself to implement market based solutions, as well as roll
back the country's excessive state intervention policies. In
addition they have also sought to integrate Argentina's semi-
peripheral economy more closely with the international
financial, trade, and capital regimes. In addition Menem,
through Cavallo, has implemented a series of economic measures
that have sought to correct external trade deficits and
stabilize international reserves at safe levels. Furthermore,
these measures have aimed at curtailing and eliminating the
public sector deficit while simultaneously bringing inflation
under control. Though the implementation of neo-liberal
economic reform has resulted in increasing in Argentina's
external solvency, these measures have tended to aggravate the
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See, "Projection of the Principal Variables of the
Economy" in Argentina: A Growing Nation. Buenos Aires,
Argentina: Ministerio de Economia y Obras y Servicios
Publicos, 1994, pg. 101, for more information.
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local tensions brought about by the need to restructure the
national economy."
THE ISSUE OF ECONOMIC STABILITY
The issue of the need for economic stability has
been utilized to convince the Argentine middle class of the
validity of measures which aim at transforming the country's
economy from that of semi-autarky to that of neo-liberalism.
The need to assure long-term economic stability has permitted
privatization of the public-sector to be grudgingly accepted
by the traditionally nationalistic middle class. As a direct
consequence of this the state has gone from intervening in the
economy, originally for sociopolitical reasons and economic
factors of sovereignty, to favoring a return to a policy of
laissez faire.
In effect it can be said that this has led the
government to accept Schumpeter's "creative destruction"
principle.66  This principle states that a government will
allow less efficient industries and technologies to be
sacrificed in order to obtain the restoration of a positive
balance which are in turn utilized in order start a new cycle
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See, Smith pg. 275-276.
66
Ibid, pg. 277-278.
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of capital accumulation.
The preceding has in turn led to the rise of
concerns over the issue of the social costs associated with
the government's inflation controlling policy. The
government's recourse to routinely decreeing economic
stabilization measures, aimed at reducing consumption, as a
means of curbing inflation via tight control over monetary
variables (ie the elimination of the indexation of monetary
contracts, rents, wages, and fixing bonds to official price
indexes among others measures) has resulted in aggravating the
sociopolitical arena's tensions.
Yet, the implementation of the neo-liberal
perspective has largely succeeded, from an economic
perspective, due to the fact that it has avoided many of the
pitfalls associated with past policies which have led to
inflation. Economic success, at the cost of increased
presidential power, has been achieved by adopting heterodox
shock policies in place of the traditional orthodox policies
of the past. In essence this has been carried out by the
wholesale de-indexation of public and private-sector prices in
addition to sweeping monetary reform. The preceding has also
been facilitated by means of the creation of a new currency
with a fixed parity to the US dollar in order to assure
economic stability. Unfortunately, economic success for the
government has led to the rise sociopolitical cost which need
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to be quickly addressed, since less than half of the national
population has prospered from these measures. 6 7 In effect this
sector of the population has prospered from Cavallo's
Converitibility Program and the privatization of the public-
sector which has pumped massive amounts of capital into the
Argentine treasury. In turn these monies have been utilized in
order to guarantee the nation's monetary base as a means of
inhibiting a return to run-away inflation. The net effect of
privatization has been to free up national "equity" that had
previously been locked-up in state industries and allowed an
expansion of the private-sector, but this has come about at
the detriment of the larger politically disunited electorate.
These factors have allowed the Menem government to
solve the problem of the negative-sum game. In this case the
negative-sum game can be defined as the strategic interaction
between labor and capital in the context of high inflation
(prisoner dilemma). The requirement of maintaining hard
currency reserves equal to the local monetary supply, as a
means of backing the local currency, has inhibited the
government from resorting to printing more money as a means of
financing its expenditure. Thus, an expansion of the money
supply would bring about both inflation and increased
speculation, neither of which are confidence builders for the
Argentine economy. As a means of achieving stability the
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government has attempted to restrain wages while
simultaneously endeavoring by any means possible to continue
guaranteeing profits for capital.
Within the context of the preceding, and especially
with regards to economic tension which in turn undermine the
mechanisms of Argentine democracy, one must address the issue
of the free-rider problem. Recall that there exists a strong
incentive for all actors - capital and labor and the state -
to refuse to share the burdens associated with austerity
measures. This major issue of contention has been resolved by
government's reduction of its participatory role in the
national economy, by having divided organized labor both
through the cooption of it leadership, as well as by the
state's catering to the demands of capital to the detriment of
other actors of the country's economy. The foregoing has also
largely been facilitated in part by the success of the
measures implemented to reduce inflation. These measures,
especially from the middle class economic consumption
perspective and especially the conservative class economic and
political position, have ameliorated some of the more negative
effects associated with privatization.68
In the past the assumption has been that the role of
the price mechanism in a competitive market and stringent
controls were necessary in order to assure price stability
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Ibid, pg. 276.
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until the inertial component of inflation had been eliminated.
In this case once price equilibrium is achieved continued
state intervention in the economy is no longer necessary. The
so-called "visible hand" of the state supposedly then would
move the economy from a high inflation equilibrium to a low
inflation equilibrium. Thus, if the government could maintain
a modest wage policy, competition and the self-interests of
individual capitalists would allow in the process the market's
"invisible hand" to reproduce a low inflation equilibrium.
The issue here is that in the Argentine case what
are usually called orthodox economic measures have proven
themselves to be inflationary, since they have usually
stressed, if not, resulted in protectionism, subsides, and
over-valued exchange rates. While the heterodox policy
position of the Menem administration stresses price stability
and renewed economic growth as a means of inhibiting a
possible return to traditional authoritarianism."
As a consequence of the previous it can be said that
it is the Argentine electorate's fear of returning to a
situation of renewed hyper-inflation which has allowed the
Menem government the political leeway necessary to carry out
its measures with a minimum of interference. Furthermore, this
has allowed Menem the luxury of not having to recourse either
to the military or organize labor in order to form an alliance
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of political necessity. The alliance with capital and its
resources has supplanted the traditional benefits offered by
the preceding groups as a consequence of the realities of
post-Debt Crisis Argentina.
CONCLUDING SUMMARY
The neo-liberal economic strategy implemented by the
Menem administration has followed a similar orientation to
that of the one carried out under General Videla and his
Minister of the Economy Martinez de Hoz. Both of these
administrations have succeeded in undermining the collective
strength of organized labor through policies which have
widened the gulf between wage differentials both across and
within economic sectors. The first through political coercion
and the latter through political cooption. This has resulted
in creating not only a segmented labor market, but has also
deepened the working class's structural heterogeneity. In the
process there has arisen a increased stratification of both
life-styles and consumption patterns which have only tended to
make collective action across class boundaries more
difficult. 70
Similarly to the Videla government the Menem
administration has sought to depolitize labor and society.
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But, has been able to accomplish this goal through economic
threats and presidential decrees instead of through brute
military/ police force. It seems that this in turn has led to
a restructuring of society by reducing the overall economic
influence traditionally exerted by organize labor and cowing
the middle class into accepting both economic and political
measures which may come to undermine the mechanisms of
Argentine democracy (ie via the possible recourse to
presidential decree as a means of imposing legislation
detrimental to certain sectors of society and latter having
these sanctioned by a Supreme Court packed with government
sympathizers) . Thus, from an economic and political
perspective the Argentine Republic has shown a strong tendency
for non-democratic rule or reduced democracy by means of an
imperfect separation of powers which favor an imperial
presidency. In any case these have traditionally failed in
meeting the challenges of reconciling legitimate rule with
economic growth.
Neo-liberalism and the economic policies which it
promotes require the acceptance of the notion that the state's
role is to provide law and order, defense, property rights,
and stable currency. Yet, this economic perspective is not
necessarily conducive to democracy, since Argentina as a
country can experience economic growth without democracy as
long as there exist capital inflows of the likes which are
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presently arriving.
In concluding it is worthwhile to recall that market
mechanisms permit a balancing of supply and demand by means of
market signals (ie prices) which in turn leads to harmony,
equilibrium, and the efficient allocation of resources. In
this scenario competition among individuals and firms leads to
increased efficiency. But the very need for increased
efficiency and employment may cause Argentina's electorate to
forgo its demands for a proper separation of powers should the
presidency continue to prove itself a more efficient and
practical economic administrator than the national congress.
Tensions in this case arise as a consequence of favoring
economic stability over the proper working of democratic
mechanisms (ie primarily limited recourse to rule by
presidential decree and an effective system of checks and
balances).
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CHAPTER TWO
THE ARGENTINE STATE: A CASE OF SOCIOPOLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
IN TANDEM WITH ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The preceding chapter has endeavored to illustrate
the major principles associated with the Modern Political
Economy perspective, as well demonstrated how these have
influenced the recent development of the Argentine state under
the Menem administration (1989-1995). To build upon the
preceding chapter's issues this chapter will introduce some of
the key historical issues and facts which have affected the
development of Argentina.
It can be held that drastic economic reform in
conjunction with a national consensus for change, if applied
in a haphazard manner and/ or without the proper safeguards
against such threats as the expansion of the Executive
Branch's power, may result in a situation in which a large
segment of the Argentine populace may be forced to bear a
disproportionate share of the sacrifice necessary to assure
the continued success of a government's economic reform
program.
This chapter will flesh out those particular issues
with Argentina's own brand of modern sociopolitical and
economic realities. It should be pointed out that these issues
have tended historically to be closely related to each other.
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This is made evident by the example of the drive towards
national unity through the forceful political consolidation of
the state in the nineteenth century and the implementation of
economic development strategies from above in the twentieth
century.
The current chapter will conclude with a brief
synthesis of how these historical facts have come to affect
the Argentine state in its move towards national economic
development. By doing so, the reader will be shown not only
the procedures utilized to identify the principal
preconditions and subsequent steps necessary for achieving
economic growth in late twentieth century Argentina, but also
will be shown the Argentine state's possible democratic
pitfalls.
PAST POLICIES
In order to properly comprehend the current nature
of economic reform, as it tends to relate to its effects upon
the workings of democratic mechanisms in the Argentine
Republic, one needs to review the economic development process
of the Argentine state in conjunction with the development of
the national sociopolitical sphere and a consensus for change.
Thus, the argument can be formulated that this new national
consensus for neo-liberal economic reform is a direct result
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of the Argentine populace's disenchantment with the failed
State-Centric development policies of past years. This
consensus is a result of the electorate's realization that
Argentina's economy must be reactivated within the exigencies
of the post-Debt Crisis world. Consequently, in order to grasp
the current state of affairs in the Argentine Republic a brief
overview of the principal sociopolitical and economic
development strategies of the past with regard to the role
exerted by the Executive Branch of the Argentine government is
necessary.
Many of the issues associated with modern
Argentina's economic, as well as sociopolitical development,
date back to some extent to the country's earlier colonial
era. These enduring elements or idiosyncrasies, of the
colonial legacy, have come to influence Argentina's modern
development. Good examples of the preceding are those issues
of lasting legal notions from the colonial period, a strong
propensity for the bureaucratic mismanagement of the economy,
resistance to innovation in fields in which the country may
come to hold a significant comparative advantage
(agriculture), and especially a tendency to attempt to
implement (since the 1940s) near-universal employment
practices in the pursuit of political patronage.
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AFTER PERON'S FALL FROM GRACE AND THE YEARS LEADING TO MENEM
One of the most striking features of the Argentine
state's relationship between economics and politics has been
the stagnation which the country experienced from Per6n's
ouster from power in 1955 and lasting until 1976. Argentina's
economic fortune and sociopolitical stability have been linked
to the upswings and downswings of the international capitalist
system. These shifts have partially contributed in bringing
about both unemployment and underemployment. They have also
resulted in arresting the Argentine Republic's
industrialization process and subsequently have been
identified as responsible for lowering the general
population's overall standard of living.
This type of situation necessitates a questioning of
why the Argentine Republic goes from a position of economic
prosperity in the immediate post-war period to one of endemic
economic stagnation, if not outright decline, during the 1955
to 1976 period. This is a result of increased competition from
an economically recovering Western Europe, funded by the
political Cold War necessities of the United States, and
increased competition for reduced market share by such
countries as the United States and Australia which compete
with an increasing inefficient producer like a statist
Argentina. Within this context it should be mentioned that
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Argentine inefficiency is a product of the implementation of
wrong domestic economic policy, as well as compounded in later
years (post 1976) by the end of easy financing with the advent
of the 1980s Debt-Crisis. In general terms the country's
policies were namely statist and interventionist in their
scope have incidentally contributed to crowding out private
capital.
Further complicating matters for the Argentine
Republic during this period is the development of the European
Economic Community (EEC) which allocates to Argentina the role
of reserve supplier of goods for short-term scarcities. In
effect a situation develops in which the Argentine state is
unable to implement sustained commercial reciprocity with
traditional trading partners, because of restrictions
associated with the consolidation of the EEC and its bias in
favor of European producers.1
This situation forced the Argentine Republic to seek
non-traditional markets for its produce in the Soviet Union
and mainland China by the 1960s. These markets have tended not
to be as profitable as the more traditional ones, but at least
the presence of trade rivals like the United States were for
1
The European Economic Union was created in the late
1950s, via the Treaty of Rome, as a means of providing lower
tariffs and a harmonization of economic policies among member
states. See, Mark Kesselman and Joel Krieger, European
Politics in Transition. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company,
1987, pg. 15 and 155.
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political reasons not as prevalent during that period.
Yet, another part of the problem with Argentine
competitiveness has also been its inability to have equivalent
access and quantities to development capital as has been made
available by the United States to countries like Australia and
the Western European states (see table n* 03).2 This manner
of situation has inhibited Argentine attempts at agricultural
modernization and industrial reinvestment. David Rock has gone
on to argue that though the Argentine agricultural sector
evidences many specific improvements during the 1945-1973
period its average grain yields fall far behind those of the
Australia and the United States during that same period.3
2
It should be pointed out that Argentina, like the other
states in Latin America, was deemed in the immediate post-
World War II era to be free from the threat of communism
unlike its counterparts in Western Europe. Consequently, as
early as December 2, 1947, Undersecretary of State Will
Clayton wrote a memorandum urging the American representatives
to the Bogota Conference to point out to their Latin American
counterparts that "the Marshall Plan is wholly in applicable
to the Latin American situation and that we cannot consider
extending it to tat area." Furthermore, needy governments
were to be directed to the World Bank or the Export-Import
Bank. This particular issue was due to the fact that Latin
America, as a region untouched by the scourge of modern war,
was still capable and continued to attract a large share of
American private investment capital. This issue led the US
government to purposely exclude the region from foreign aid
allotments. See, Robert E. Wood, From Marshall Plan to Debt
Crisis: Foreign Aid and Development Choices in the World
Economy. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1986,
pg. 44 - 46.
3
See David Rock, Argentina, 1516-1987: From Spanish
Colonization to Alfonsin. Berkeley, CA: University of
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Though important new crops (soya, sorghum and sunflower) were
brought into cultivation during that era, they have taken time
to become economically viable.
TABLE N* 03
NET U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENT ABROAD BY AREA (PRIVATE)
1946-51 (U$S MILLIONS)
PERIOD 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951
ALL AREAS 183 724 684 786 702 603
OEEC COUNTRIES 18 48 48 31 75 77
OEEC DEPENDENCIES 6 53 69 28 9 5
CANADA 38 13 77 119 265 271
LATIN AMERICA 59 442 321 429 191 187
MIDDLE EAST 21 91 123 113 117 -15
OTHER 41 77 46 66 45 78
Ohs: OEEC stands for Organization of European Economic Cooperation.
SOURCE: Balance of paments of the United States, 1949-51, supplement to the Survey of Current Business
(Washington D.C.: 0.S. Department of Commerce, 1952) as quoted in Wood, pg. 47.
The diversification and mechanization of the rural
sector has failed to trigger rapid economic growth, since even
though new lands and crops have been brought into cultivation,
rural labor has tended to be displaced in favor of the urban
centers as a by-product of State-Centric development policies.
The problem has been that Argentina, as a semi-peripheral
California Press, pg. 320 - 326. Rock has also stated that
increased grain yields have been brought about by crop
diversification and improved farming methods. Australia
witnesses during the 1945-1973 period an average increase of
89 percent in grain yields while during the same period the
United States has a 140 percent increase in its own yields.
For its part Argentine in comparison is only able to increase
its grain yields by merely a factor of 25 percent.
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state, has been unable to effectively assimilate its displaced
rural workers into its urban work force. This is a result of
the fact that industrialization during the period remained
largely stagnant, as well as the fact that the country's
domestic consumer service sector is not sufficiently developed
enough to incorporate displaced workers as has occurred in
present-day post-industrial United States.4
In essence the problem has largely been that post-
World War II Argentine governments have tended to be hesitant
in promoting subsidization and/ or price controls for the
country's agricultural sector, as well as incentives for
modernizing the agricultural sector's capital goods. Statist
policies have favored industry and inefficient producers via
the notions associated with infant industry protection which
consequently are detrimental to the agricultural sector. This
4
In addition to these sort of issues it should be
further clarified that Argentina's population can be divided
into two classes, one being cosmopolitan/ oligarchic and the
other simply classified as the people. The first group has
traditionally favored economic liberalism, whereas the second
group has traditionally feared the free market, free trade,
and free competition. In essence this last group has feared
any sort of economic modernization which is accompanied by
efficiency and labor-saving technology. For them the state is
their only hope for saving their jobs or their modest share of
local market. In the past government's sought to gain the
support of this sector of the electorate and thus were forced
to impose populist sociopolitical and economic measures on the
rest of the country which inevitably lead the oligarchy and
its supporters to recur to the military option. See, Paul H.
Lewis, The Crisis of Argentine Capitalism. Chapel Hill, NC:
University of North Carolina Press, 1990, pg. 500.
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sector, in which Argentina holds a comparative advantage with
regard to other states in the world market, has been allowed
largely to drift along and left to its own devices. This has
been done in order not to detract attention/ capital from the
development of the industrial sector. In the process this
situation has motivated many Argentine agricultural producers,
reluctant to reinvest their profits in industry, to produce
just enough to meet domestic demand and minor exports levels.
Satisfied with short-term economic well-being they have
utilized their non-producing lands as mere hedges against
inflation (a traditional tactic of the agricultural sector).
The principal problem for Argentina's agriculture
has been reduced access to government subsides. These have
been largely dependent during the 1955-1976 period on the
development of a mature and successful industrial base and a
prosperous and stable urban sector.' But, industry's- growth
has also been dependent in turn on the agricultural sector's
ability to generate increasingly higher export earnings. In
essence it has become a vicious cycle in which increased
competition in the international marketplace, especially in
foreign markets once traditionally dominated by Argentina, has
hindered the possibility of successful sustained economic
development for the Argentine Republic. This situation has
only been aggravated by the international chaos caused by the
s See, Rock, pg. 325.
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1970's easy access to petrol-dollars, as an alternative source
of financing, and the ensuing debt-crisis of the 1980s.
The post-Per6n era's principal economic advisor is
Jose A. Martinez de Hoz (1976-1981). As the military juntas's
Finance Minister he promoted a policy which has come to be
known as convergence. Under this program the country would
rapidly liberalize the national economy in order to freely
compete in the world economy. Martinez de Hoz's plan consisted
of using imports in order to systematically drive down the
price of domestically produced goods. The relevance of this
point is that it shares significant similarities with the
Menem/ Cavallo economic reform strategy of today. This is made
evident by the fact that Martinez de Hoz's policies were not
only neo-liberalist and an advocate of laissez faire trade
notions, but also like the Menem/ Cavallo policies aimed at
undermining the institutionalized strength of organized labor.
It should be pointed out that the difference between both
these neo-liberal strategies resides in the political arena,
since the Videla/ Martinez de Hoz policies aimed at creating
a bureaucratic-authoritarian state, while the Menem/ Cavallo
measures aim at consolidating an economically conservative
regime which in this context can be called "neo-oligarchical".
With regards to the issue of inflation, the primary
cause of the failure of almost all previous Argentine economic
stabilization policies, the Videla/ Martinez de Hoz regime
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sought not only to open the economy to international
competition, but also aimed at controlling inflation via
monetary controls and by assuming the notions that
inefficiencies are conquerable by open competition.'
Furthermore, the issue of price distortions for them could be
addressed by ending subsides, tariff controls and a regulated
exchange rates, as well as by the creation of new financial
markets. It is worthwhile to point out that this last issue
became one of the principal causes of the economic/ financial
collapse of 1981.7 In addition it has been argued by Rock
that in the short-term imports and reduced tariff barriers, as
well as the removal of capital restrictions, will contribute
to inhibit local prices from rising too quickly. Essentially
it can be held that then, much like now, the aim was to reduce
the state sector, the chief source of employment and
distributor of resources in urban society. This was to be
carried out as a means of curtailing both the political clout
and collective bargaining power of organized labor, the middle
class and industry.
The problem with this particular policy, which
6
See, Rena Villarreal, " The Latin American Strategy of
Import Substitution: Failure or Paradigm for the Region" in
Manufacturing Miracles: Paths of Industrialization in Latin
America and East Asia. Gary Gereffi and Donald 1. Wyman ed.
Princeton, NJ: University of Princeton, 1990, pg. 294 - 298,
for more details on this matter.
7 See, Rock, pg. 368-369.
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becomes severely aggravated by 1981, is that the private
domestic banks in their desire to compete for additional
deposits raised the real interest rates to approximately 40
percent per year during that period. Those individuals and
corporations with access to foreign credit during that decade
were able to borrow abroad and subsequently invest borrowed
monies in 30-day accounts. Briefly put this situation of
financial speculation allowed investors the possibility of
quickly pocketing the difference arising as a consequence of
the spread between domestic and foreign interest rates.
Consequently, there is an infusion of nearly U$S 2 billion in
so-called "hot money" belonging to investors looking for quick
returns beginning in the late 1970s and lasting until 1981.8
These measures, especially the issue of high interest rates,
have contributed in bringing about inflationary tendencies in
the Argentine economy which have subsequently led to increased
political tensions.'
8
See Michael Monteon, "Can Argentina's Democracy Survive
Economic Disaster", in From Military Rule to Liberal Democracy
in Argentina, edited by Monica Peralta-Ramos and Carlos H.
Waisman, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987, pg. 26.
9
Many economists tend to argue that as interest rates fall
investment should go up and therefore lead to increased
output. Investment is the key to economic growth. Increases in
government spending do lead to short-term growth via an
increases in levels of output, but such action tends to
decrease private investment (crowding out effect). It should
be pointed out that running a deficit is not always
necessarily an economic evil if the return on the public
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Most analysts agree that the open economy permitted
those with access to foreign credit the luxury of borrowing
internationally at a much lower interest rate than those
relegated to borrowing at higher domestic rates (these
usually being small to medium size firms). This consequently
compels such entities, which are unable to borrow abroad, to
encounter heavy financial burdens. Furthermore, balance of
trade figures rapidly turned sour as a consequence of the
over-valued peso's proclivity in attracting imports. 0
investment is greater than a return from a private investment.
As long as the government's investments (building infra-
structure, buying capital equipment, educating workers, etc)
is able to generate a higher return in dollars, to be utilized
to pay back the loans plus interests, than that which could be
generated by an equal from the private sector, the issue of
crowding out of private investment is not as important.
10
It should be pointed out that Martinez de Hoz attempted
to restore international confidence in the Argentine economy
by rebuilding the nation's reserves via the negotiation of
short-term foreign loans. Consequently, by July 1980, foreign
investors were permitted to open month-to-month accounts,
these led to U$S 700 million being deposited in July 1980
alone. Yet, this new influx of monies contributed in
increasing of imports, as well as straining of the country's
balance of trade. What needs to be realized is that regardless
of Martinez de Hoz's measures the Argentine financial system,
by October of 1980, was on the verge of collapse as a
consequence of number of firms which had sought to survive the
storm of economic instability by renegotiating their debts
through new short-term loans. To the further detriment of the
Argentine economic situation a new series of bankruptcies
occur in February 1981, these were accompanied by an
unprogrammed devaluation which in turn resulted in an
immediate capital flight of U$S 2 billion. These sort of
factors caused Argentina's foreign debt to escalate from U$S
8.5 billion to U$S 25.3 billion, an increase of 14 percent to
42 percent of the gross domestic product, between December
1979 and March 1981. As a consequence interest charges on the
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The termination of state protection for infant and/
or inefficient Argentine industries exposed these to much more
competitive international producers who in the process quickly
gained expanded market share. Consequently, the nation's
export sector found itself seriously hampered by increased
competition from more efficient international competitors. The
deteriorating economic situation is directly responsible for
bringing about massive capital flight (estimated at U$S 1.9
billion between April and June 1980 alone). This results in
quickly cutting national reserves in half from U$S 10 billion
to U$S 5 billion, as well as doubling unemployment levels in
a period of just six months by 1981.
The military junta, then presided over by Army
General Jorge Rafael Videla, hands power to Army General
Roberto Viola in October 1981. Consequently, Martinez de Hoz
was replaced by Lorenzo Sigaut as Finance Minister. The
worsening economic situation obliged Sigaut to not only close
the economy by implementing numerous financial controls, but
also led him to seek increased over-seas financing as a short-
term remedy for the losses resulting from the record number of
national banking failures and bankruptcies. As a consequence
of the erosion of Argentina's international creditworthiness,
foreign debt, which had been 10 percent of exports in 1979,
came to surpass 30 percent by the end of 1980. Added to the
foregoing 1980 export values fell in constant dollars by 3.9
percent, while registering a simultaneous increase of 43
percent in imports. See, Rock, pg. 374.
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accompanied by new runs on the Argentine peso in November
1981, Viola is forced from office by Army Commander General
Leopoldo Galtieri ."
The new military junta, ushered in and presided over
by General Leopold Galtieri, sponsors both a hard line
political attitude towards the peronists, as well as reimpose
Martinez de Hoz's economic policy.12 In order to get the
country's collective mind off the national economic crisis, as
well as gain political momentum, popular support and end rifts
within the Army, Galtieri opted to invade the Malvinas/
Falkland Islands in April 1982. The military's failure was
directly responsible for undermining any chance it had at
consolidating institutionalized corporatist rule in Argentina.
Defeat and the ensuing disillusionment with military rule
11
A decrease in interest rates combined with an increase in
government spending and/ or borrowing usually leads to
decreased expectations. Thus, the aforesaid leads to a
decrease in output and results in a situation of economic
collapse due to lack of optimism on the part of the private
sector. When a state runs a large budget deficit it means that
it has a large negative government Savings (taxes minus
government expenditure). In order to avoid a drop in
Investment (crowding out) the national economy requires that
Household Savings and/ or Foreigner's savings (imports minus
exports) increase.
12
Recall that Galtieri, like Martinez de Hoz, championed
the notion of alienate state industries and services into
private hands. In addition the new regime sought to secure new
sources of foreign investment, aiming for a partnership with
the United States based upon ideological affinities between
Galtieri and the Reagan administration. See, Rock, pg. 375.
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subsequently resulted in bringing about the reinstallment of
liberal democracy by 1983.13
Even though the presidential administration of Raul
Alfonsin continued to follow a path largely similar to that
undertaken by the previous regimes, it did initiate limited
attempts aimed at addressing some of the more pressing
economic concerns geared towards opening up the Argentine
national economy.14 Yet, the Radical administration's
13
It should be realized that Argentine military governments
have failed to stay in power or to guarantee an orderly
transition to civilian rule because they have not been able to
solve the political-economic dilemma caused by the tensions
the nation economy's need to accumulate capital and popular
demands for the redistribution of wealth. The military has
failed to gain an expansion of their base of support since it
has come to power declaring that the country is passing
through its most serious socioeconomic crisis, blaming in the
process the preceding administration's management of the
economy for the ensuing political crisis. In the process the
military government has usually named a conservative economic
team which formulates an orthodox stabilization program aimed
at increasing savings and investment and to contain inflation
and fiscal deficits. Such strategies of economic accumulation
imply consequently strict wage controls and lead to mounting
opposition by the low income groups, and afterwards by the
middle-class and the economic sectors that produce for
domestic consumption. See, Aldo C. Vacs, "Authoritarian
Breakdown and Redemocratization in Argentina" in
Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition in Latin
America. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh, 1987, pg.
18.
14
It is worthwhile to point out that the main features of
Alfonsin's Austral Plan were (1) wage and price controls; (2)
a promise to reduce the government's deficits by increasing
its revenues and cutting its expenditure; (3) a promise to
impose discipline on state enterprises by requiring
presidential approval of their budgets and by ordering the
Central Bank to stop printing money to cover their losses; (4)
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inability to successfully carry out the majority of the
provisions of its own economic plan (Plan Austral), much less
de-nationalize a fairly large sector of the national economy,
resulted in the sort of domestic economic turmoil which forced
President Alfonsin eventually to hand over the presidency to
the Justicialista (Peronist) Party of Carlos Saul Menem six
months ahead of schedule. 5
It is in light of such economic and sociopolitical
turmoil in which The Menem/ Cavallo economic reform were
subsequently implemented in 1990. These ahve been geared
towards making the Argentine national economy internationally
more competitive by reforming the state-sector as a reaction
to external challenges posed by the Modern Political Economy.
The express objective behind the implementation of heterodox
measures such as these has been not only to achieve monetary
the encouragement of exports; (5) a reduction of protective
tariffs; (6) the encouragement of foreign investment; and (7)
the issuance of a new currency called the Austral. See, Lewis,
pg. 484.
15
The last years of the Alfonsin presidency came to be
characterized by extreme economic and political instability.
A clear example of this sort of instability is the case of the
sacking of urban supermarkets in such major urban population
centers as the City of Rosario in the Province of Santa F&.
One may logically deduce and/ or extrapolate that members of
the political opposition may have had a hand in undermining
the economic plan by possibly promoting such acts to be
carried out in order to further discredit the Alfonsin
government. Additionally, the failed rouge military coups
d'etat attempted by Colonel Mohamed Ali Seineldin and his band
of "Cara Pintados" worked against inspiring confidence/
assurances in the Alfonsin government's stability.
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stability and sound public sector accounts, but also to
promote growth in the Argentine Republic by making it
attractive to foreign investment. The preceding is a result of
the realization that the state-sector, from an economic
perspective was highly inefficient, and that corporatist
military rule, from a political perspective, both had failed
to bring enduring prosperity to Argentina.
THE EFFECTS OF DRASTIC ECONOMIC REFORM ON ARGENTINE DEMOCRACY:
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
The Menem administration has been able to lobby
successfully for the reform of the Argentine national
constitution and in the process has thus been able to achieve
the legal requirements for immediate presidential re-election
in 1995. The government's express aim behind such an endeavor
has been the need to guarantee the continuity of the economic
reforms implemented during Menem's presidency and thus assure
the sort of economic stability which has become characteristic
of Menem's Argentina. Yet, though there has developed a
consensus amongst a large percentage of the electorate
regarding the benefits of the previous, there still remain
significant reservations in other sectors of the Argentine
political arena."
16
See, " El temor como recurso politico " in La Nacion,
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The Menem administration has been able to
successfully convince roughly about 40 percent of the national
electorate into accepting that the continued prosperity of the
Argentine state is largely dependent on President Menem's own
immediate re-election in the May 1995 presidential election.
In the process the Menem administration has been able to
effectively divide the country's political opposition. This
has largely been brought about by implementing measures which
cater on a case by case basis to specific demands of the
national electorate (ie promulgating the long promised
abolition of the military draft) or to other powerful
Argentine institutions." These types of action have allowed
Buenos Aires, Argentina, Sept. 18, 1994, pg. 9, for a more
detailed explanation regarding the statement that the Menem
presidency lacks an authentic party ideology. The Menem
government has aimed at instilling in the Argentine electorate
the belief that only the Menemist can govern. To be precise
with regards to the aforesaid the current administration has
been accused of not only lacking a perpetuating political
ideology, but also goes on to criticize its lacks substance,
as well as depth. The preceding article argues that the Menem
administration's only sense of continuity has been its ability
to readily attract the power hungry, regardless how
insignificant their share of power could result to be in the
end. It has been stated that this has been precisely the way
in which supposed liberals have been attracted to the Menemist
camp. Traditionalists within the Radical Party have been keen
in pointing out that though the Menem administration has
succeeded in implementing significant economic policies, these
have been the creation of Cavallo who is not precisely a
Menemist/ Justicialista regardless of his statement s to the
contrary.
17
In the process the Menem administration has recoursed to
the implementation of unorthodox and/ or non-traditional
solutions in order to address a wide range of problems during
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the administration to undermine possible political support for
the opposition and thus have allowed it to retain, so far,
political preeminence in the Argentine Republic. It is astute
political statesmanship, in conjunction with the successful
implementation of economic reform, which has largely permitted
President Menem the distinct possibility of achieving an
additional and now constitutionally sanctioned second
consecutive term of office in 1995.
The successful implementation of drastic economic
reform has contributed to making Argentina not only a more
efficient and internationally competitive state than had been
the case during the preceding Radical administration of Raul
Alfonsin, but it has also made the country more attractive to
its tenure in office. For example when the military hierarchy
showed signs of restlessness in December 1990, President Menem
moved to pardon the military leaders of the Junta Period in
order to placate simmering doubts. Furthermore, whenever
external governmental sources have commenced to question
Argentina's internal social problems the government has either
responded by increasing its United Nations peace keeping
commitments worldwide and/ or adopted measures aimed at
addressing the key social issues that have been questioned. A
clear example of the aforesaid has been the case of the
Argentine Catholic Church's questioning of the country's
internal social price being paid as a consequence of the
effects of the Cavallo Plan. This has lead the government to
adopt an anti-abortionist position (which was criticized by
Alfonsin during the constitutional convention's deliberations)
in order to dilute the Church's criticism of the government.
And most recently in the ongoing Malvinas/ Falkland Islands
debate Menem has proposed to buy out the resident Kelpers and
thus address in a fair and compensatory manner the issue of
property values. For more information regarding this matter
see, Fernando Gonzalez and Edi Zunino, " Los trucos de Menem
para su reeleccion: El gran ilusionista " in Noticias, Buenos
Aires, Argentina, August 21, 1994, pg. 63.
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international investor confidence.18 These measures are
largely responsible for gradually modernizing, in the process
through private - largely foreign - investor financing, the
infra-structure of the Argentine Republic, which as a result
of years of investor neglect had deteriorated through the lack
of capital investment. 9  It can be readily seen from the
18
The Argentine state, unlike the politically trouble
countries of Colombia and Venezuela and even to some extent
Brazil, has been able to successfully once again to float new
bonds in the European financial market. For example it has
recently been able to place bonds in the amount of 100 million
Canadian dollars, equivalent to approximately 72 million US
dollars, in Europe. The terms have been set at three years
with a annual yield of 10.50% and a price of 99.97% with which
the yield should approach 220 basic points with regards to the
Canadian rates of reference. This transaction, in addition to
similar ones undertaken recently in German marks, Japanese
yens, Dutch guilders, and Austrian schillings, should allow
the Argentine Republic the possibility of obtaining financing
at favorable terms. This issue is associated with the high
volatility of interests rates, especially as these relate to
ups and downs of the US dollar. See, " La Argentina coloco mas
bonos externos en el euromercado " in La Prensa, (Vida
Economica) Buenos Aires, Argentina, Sept. 7, 1994, pg. 1.
19
See, " Notable Ingreso de Empresas al Negocio Minero en
Argentina " in Boletin Semanal Informativo Buenos Aires,
Argentina. Ministerio de Economia y Obras y Servicios Publicos
- Secretaria de Industria ( Direccion de Prensa ) A5o 1, N*
16, pg. 1 - 2. The article argues that increased confidence in
Argentine stability has resulted in a drastic increase in
foreign investor confidence in the Argentine mining sector
since 1991. It goes on to point out that the Mining
Secretariat has estimated that by 1999 foreign investment in
the Argentine mining sector shall have reached approximately
1.5 billion US dollars. This is largely due to a switch in
extraction priorities. Previously, the emphasis had been on
the extraction of iron and aluminum which require significant
costs in transportation and infrastructure. Presently there is
an emphasis on the extraction of scare high value added ores
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numerous pre-election public opinion polls that the economic
measures implemented by the current administration have so far
contributed in benefiting the position of roughly 40 percent
of the Argentine national electorate. The remaining 60 percent
of the electorate is either undecided or identifies itself as
an opponent of Menemism. President Menem's opposition arises
mainly from those who are unemployed (which hover at
approximately the 15 percent level of the economically active
population), old-age pension holders, and a large number of
low and middle level government employees. 20 This fragmentation
of the electorate into various political fronts has given
Carlos Saul Menem the sociopolitical leeway needed to
successfully reform the national constitution and seek his own
immediate reelection."
( ie gold and silver ).
20
Indicative of this is the example set public-sector
workers. These have seen their wage purchasing power
contracting 1.5 percent in recent months. Added to this is the
issue that the government , businessmen and unions have signed
an accord through consensus to reform the system of labor
relations, maintaining the macro-economic objectives in order
to improve job levels and competitiveness. The aim has been to
lower business overhead, stimulate the creation of new jobs
and introduce changes such as in the trial period,
apprenticeship contract, part-time employment, professional
specialization and job training. See, Consejo Tecnico de
Inversiones, Anuario 1994: The Argentine Economy. Buenos
Aires, Argentina: Consejo Tecnico de Inversiones S.A., 1994,
pg. 75.
21
It should be pointed out that in regards to unemployment
figures the government has expressed that "the increase in the
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THE POSSIBLE THREAT TO ARGENTINE DEMOCRATIC MECHANISMS
In this light, it should be mentioned that the
preceding discussion has sought to identify the key
sociopolitical and economic issues affecting the development
of the Argentine state and have attempted to illustrate how
the Argentine Republic's economic ties to core markets and
their demands have at times drastically affected national
economic and sociopolitical development. These issues have
been utilize in order to illustrate the realization that late
twentieth century developing countries need to become more
efficient producers within the Modern Political Economy in
order to be internationally more competitive in an ever
expanding global economy, as well as more attractive to
foreign investment. Such types of factors have led the Menem
administration to re-think not only the country's traditional
political and economic stance internationally, but also from
a domestic perspective.22 The continuation of the privatization
level of employment is not always reflected in the rate of
unemployment because more workers, who were previously
discouraged, have re-entered the labor market". See Argentina:
A country for investment and growth - 1994. Buenos Aires,
Argentina: Ministerio de Economia, Obras y Servicios Publicos,
1994, pg. 16.
22
Since 1989 the Argentine government has put into place a
process of unilateral reductions in tariffs and non-tariff
barriers on imports. Consequently, as a result of such actions
the Argentine economy has in the process become one of the
world's most open economies. A clear example of the foregoing
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process and the implementation of tax legislation reform
(simplification of norms for businesses) have been measures
implemented as a means of assuring the continued flow of
foreign investment into the Argentine Republic.23  Economic
stability and the continued implementation of the
Convertibility Plan, have become dependent on the preceding,
as well as a political bully pulpit for the Menem government. 2 4
The issue that needs to be addressed at this point
has been the November 1992 tax rebate scheme implemented for
exports. It now includes rebates on all taxes covered by the
rules of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT).
Ibid, pg. 96.
23
Though by the beginning of 1994 substantial advances had
been made in reducing employer social security contributions,
as a means of improving competitiveness and lowering business
costs, progress still needs to be made on the issue of labor
reform. Most government authorities have argued that there
still remains significant work to be done in with regards to
the labor issue, especially as it relates to cost cutting
measures, doing away with disproportionate taxes, financial
reform, and provincial belt tightening by carrying out tax
changes, intensifying deregulation and curbing and optimizing
spending. See, Consejo Tecnico de Inversiones, pg. 48.
24
In August and early September Domingo Cavallo announced
a set of measures aimed at stimulating economic activity and
in the process increase employment in the Argentine Republic
by reducing the costs of doing business in the country. In
effect several laws and executive orders promulgated since the
approval of the Foreign Investment Law of 1976 have been
recently unified and re-sated in a single executive order. It
essentially reaffirms that foreign investors can invest in the
Argentine Republic without prior authorization and both
capital and profits can be repatriated with no waiting period.
See, " The Economy and Economic Policy " Argentine Investment
Update. Buenos Aires, Argentina. The Undersecrateriat for
Investment of the Ministry of Economy and Public Works and
Services. vol 1, N* 1, January - March 1994, pg. 4 - 5.
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is if successful economic reform, which reduces inflation and
reactivates the growth in the national economy, can possibly
contribute to threaten the mechanisms of democracy in the
Argentine Republic. In essence what is at the center of this
issue is to what extent can successful economic reform and the
continuation of the same threaten democracy via constitutional
reform aimed at assuring in the near-term one party's (a
renewed implementation of Argentina's 19th century unicato/
one party rule) dominance over the national government through
constitutional mechanisms.
Thus, does constitutional reform, without proper
safeguards and limitations, when championed by the ruling
party become a potential threat to a country's political
mechanisms? It is not surprising to see that Alfonsin and the
Radicals whom he leads, as the main opposition party, have
been forced by political necessity to accept with certain
guarantees the issue of constitutional reform. They have
acquiesced to Menem's personal desire for a second term as a
means of preventing the Menem government from obtaining a
free-hand in writing a largely one sided constitution
sanctioned by a mandate obtained through recourse to
plebiscite during a period of sociopolitical and economic
stability. Thus, it is worthwhile to point out that the
principle aspects associated with this question were obtained
by negotiating the same behind close doors prior to the
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Constitutional Assembly.
The next question to be addressed is the issue of
how successful economic reform has not only laid the
groundwork for constitutional reform, but also how
constitutional reform has occurred in today's Argentina. In
the process the remaining half of the chapter will discuss
what the new constitution and the negotiated guarantees will
provide for the Argentine Republic. In the end the chapter
shall attempt to reach a conclusion regarding whether if
successful economic reform, under present circumstances, can
come to pose a possible threat to the workings of democracy.
THE GROUNDWORK FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
The Menem administration has proposed that
undertaking constitutional reform is a measure necessary for
guaranteeing the continued success of its economic reform
program. The Argentine Republic's main opposition party, the
Uni6n Civica Radical (UCR), has gone on the public record as
stating that the government's pursuit of constitutional reform
is merely a self-serving endeavor aimed at perpetuating
President Menem's own current term of office. The Radical
Party members of the Argentine Lower House of Congress have
argued that they are in favor of the sort of constitutional
reform which aims at reducing the concentration of power in
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the Executive Branch of government, as well as de-
personalizing the Presidency. They favor the vigorization of
the role played by the Argentine Republic's Congress,
guarantees of adequate control of state power, and notions of
the rule of law through a truly independent Judicial Branch of
the national government .2 5
The successful implementation of economic reform has
made constitutional reform geared towards addressing the
Argentine President's desire for immediate re-election a
reality. Political opposition in the Argentine Republic has
shown itself to have been divided or been weakened by the
Menem administration's success in bringing about
sociopolitical stability via the implementation of successful
economic reform. The greatest headway the political opposition
has been able to achieve so far has been to negotiate the
terms which in the end have made constitutional reform easier
to accept politically for the electorate.
As has previously been mentioned constitutional
reform has been brought about largely by the Menem
administration's success in addressing the Argentine
Republic's economic problems of the late 1980s and early
1990s. In effect Argentina's ability to stabilize its economy
25
See, Mario Losada, et al. " Antes que sea tarde ", Temas
Parlamentarios: Publicaci6n del Bloque de Diputados Nacionales
de la U.C.R. Oct. 1993, n*13, Ao II. pg. 1.
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through fiscal and structural reforms has given President
Menem the means of achieving his goal of being immediately re-
elected. 26
It is worthwhile to recall that Argentina has become
during the three year period, ranging between 1991 and 1993,
the world's third most rapidly growing economy. This can be
seen in part by the sharp rise in foreign trade volummes by
1993 (see table n° 04), but especially facilitated by the fact
that inflation in consumer prices has fallen to 7.4 percent,
that wholesale prices have remained stable, and that both
investment and industrial production have continued to rise.27
26
The International Monetary Fund has stated in its March
1994 survey, that Argentina's remarkable turnaround since the
late 1980s reflects a comprehensive effort to lower inflation
and promote sustainable growth. The Argentine Republic has in
effect brought inflation under control by eliminating its
fiscal deficit, curbing central bank credit and by pegging the
peso to the dollar. It has been argued that these sort of
measures, in conjunction with structural reforms and the
resumptions of internal and external debt service, have
strengthened confidence in Argentina and have led consequently
to large-scale capital inflows. In essence Argentina is
currently showing positive signs of strong economic recovery.
See, " Argentina Stabilizes Economy through Fiscal and
Structural Reforms ", in Argentina: Trade & Investment News.
Argentine Embassy, Washington D.C., vol. 1, n*2, April 1994.
pg. 1.
27
See, " Investing in a Growing Argentina ", in Argentine
Investment Update, Undersecretariat for Investment for the
Ministry of Economy and Public Works and Services. Buenos
Aires, Argentina: vol n*1, n*1, January - March 1994. pg. 1.
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TABLE N* 04
FOREIGN TRADE IN U$S MILLIONS
YEAR EXPTS VARIAT VS. 1994 IMPTS VARIAT VS. 1994 BALANCE VARIAT VS. 1994
1974 9066 (6434) 8384 (12816) 671 4337
1975 6252 (9248) 8332 (12868) (2045) 1620
1976 7904 (7596) 6122 (15078) 1753 5418
1977 10746 (4754) 7912 (13288) 2786 6452
1978 11289 (4211) 6763 (14437) 4451 8116
1979 12241 (3259) 10501 (10699) 1710 5376
1980 11016 (4484) 14475 (6725) (3402) 264
1981 11505 (3995) 11866 (9334) (355) 3311
1982 9405 (6095) 6583 (14617) 2774 6440
1983 9545 (5955) 5487 (15713) 3991 7656
1984 9647 (5853) 5455 (15745) 4122 7787
1985 10040 (5460) 4561 (16639) 5387 9053
1986 8439 (7061) 5818 (15382) 2578 6244
1987 7629 (7871) 6980 (14220) 638 4304
1988 10314 (5186) 6138 (15062) 4105 7771
1989 10557 (4943) 4634 (16566) 5824 9490
1990 13177 (2323) 4349 (16851) 8681 12346
1991 12584 (2916) 8512 (12688) 4004 7670
1992 12717 (2783) 15457 (5743) (2695) 971
1993 13341 (2159) 17069 (4131) (3666) 0
1994e 15500 21200 (5605)
Obs: e stands for estimate
Source: Consejo Tecnico de Inversiones, pg. 145.
Especially interesting with regards to the preceding
issues has been the fact that the Argentine automobile and
consumer-service sectors have shown a marked expansion during
the period.28 This is important since it signifies that
28
General Motors, Mercedes Benz, and Mazada have announced
that they are in the process of expanding and/ or opening new
production lines in the Argentine Republic. Furthermore,
Isuzu, Honda, Toyota, Rover, and Mitusubishi have indicated
that they are presently in advanced stages of feasibility
projects regarding the opening of new plants in Argentina.
See, " Foreign Investment Highlights: Automobiles " in
Argentine Investment News. Buenos Aires, Argentina.
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international investment capital is willing to bet on Menem
and his neo-liberal economic strategy regardless of the
sociopolitical and economic tensions these can bring in
Argentina. This becomes especially relevant as the country's
technologically sophisticated industrial sector is gradually
reactivated via the infusion of new investment capital. Recall
that capital is entering the Argentine economy precisely
because of both the divestment of the large state-sector and
the economic possibilities associated with supplying (without
major tariff restrictins) the MERCOSUR countries (see table n*
05).
As a consequence of the preceding it can be held
that as economic stability is maintained, modernization and
capital inflows will increase in the MERCOSUR countries,
especially in Brazil. This will tend to allow domestic
consumption to increase and consequently favor an increment
in the levels of Argentine exports within the overall
framework of MERCOSUR. Furthermore, this should also tend to
trim the asymmetries which have previously hindered the
competitiveness of some fields of industrial activity in
Argentina.29
Undersecretariat for Investment of the Ministry of economy,
Public Works and Services, vol n* 1 n* 1 (January-March 1994)
pg. 2.
29
See, Consejo Tecnico de Inversiones, Anuario - 94:
Business Trends and the Argentine Economy. Buenos Aires,
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TABLE N0 05
ARGENTINE FOREIGN TRADE WITH MERCOSUR
(U$S MILLIONS)
TOTAL MERCOSUR BRAZIL URUGUAY PARAGUAY
YEAR EXPTS IMPTS EXPTS IMPTS EXPTS IMPTS EXPTS IMPTS
1977 647 441 465 373 97 32 85 36
1978 827 414 577 341 122 30 128 43
1979 1309 792 886 657 239 79 184 56
1980 1136 1305 765 1072 182 148 189 85
1981 892 1106 595 893 128 121 169 92
1982 829 827 568 688 116 90 145 49
1983 522 795 358 667 77 89 87 39
1984 655 979 478 831 83 98 94 50
1985 667 698 496 612 99 66 72 20
1986 894 831 698 691 129 93 67 47
1987 768 1003 539 819 168 114 61 70
1988 875 1170 608 971 187 131 80 68
1989 1428 869 1124 721 208 99 96 49
1990 1833 876 1423 718 263 116 147 42
1991 1977 1805 1489 1527 311 235 178 43
1992 2327 3755 1671 3339 384 351 272 65
1993 3684 4214 2814 3570 512 571 358 73
1994(e) 3587 4237 2691 3561 518 622 378 54
Obs: e stands for 1994 estimate
Source: Consejo Tcnico de Inversiones S.A., pg. 150.
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN ARGENTINA
President Menem and the members of his government
have been able to successfully bring about the legal
implementation of constitutional reform in the Argentine
Republic with a minimal amount of political opposition.
Constitutional reform has aimed at granting Menem a second
Argentina: Consejo Tecnico de Inversiones, S.A., ed. n* 167,
1994, pg. 49.
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term of office and has been facilitated as a consequence of
the success his administration has achieved in not only
stabilizing the Argentine Republic's situation of hyper-
inflation, but also as a result of the nation's renewed
international competitiveness and credit-worthiness.
Granted not all sectors of the Argentine electorate
have profited directly from the successful outcome of the
Menem/ Cavallo measures, but there does exist a sizeable
segment of the national electorate which largely subscribes to
the government's position and tacitly supports it. This is
made clearly evident by the realization that if presidential
elections were to be held at this very moment Menem would be
able to muster support from approximately 45 percent of
national electorate. 30 In the process the divided main
opposition parties would be relegated to the mid-twenty
percent range at best.3 1 Notwithstanding that finding, in the
eventuality of such a situation occurring the new national
constitution provides for a run-off election, ballotage,
between the two political contestants which obtain the largest
30
See, "Politica" in El Cronista: Edicion Fax
Internacional. Buenos Aires, Argentina (May 11, 1995) pg. 1.
The same states that Menem should obtain 45 percent of the
vote with a difference 10 percent over the main rival Jose
Octavio Bordon.
31
See, " Seria entre Menem y Alvarez: Segun una encuesta
oficial, en el '95 habria ballotage " in El Clarin. Buenos
Aires, Argentina, August 25, 1994, pg. 6.
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percentage of votes in the first round. 3 2 Though the Radicals
originally thought that a second round would favor their
candidate, in reality their cooperation with Menem has shown
them to be politically weak. This has furthered undermined
their position as the country's main opposition party. The
Radicals are gradually loosing ground to Bord6n's FREPASO.
Therefore, the next inquiry involves whether the
successful implementation of drastic economic reform, which in
turn has led to constitutional reform in the Argentine
Republic, may ultimately affect the proper workings of
democracy if certain safeguards are not assured. There is a
tendency for such a occurrence when one considers, for
example, the increasingly powerful role being played by the
Executive Branch of government, which has in effect been
responsible for spear-heading the privatization drive via
presidential decree and now aims at further consolidating its
32
It is worthwhile to note that one of the constitutional
reform measures adopted foresees the possibility of avoiding
a second round if one of the presidential candidates obtains
forty-five percent of the votes or more. It also foresees the
possibility of avoiding a second round if one of the
candidates obtains forty percent of the votes and leads the
next political contestant by a margin of at least ten
percentage points. In effect this factor and the issue of a
multi-polar electorate allows the Menem administration to
target key sectors of support instead of having to target the
majority the electorate in order to gain re-election. This
more "cost effective" in the sense that if reelected President
Menem will be beholding to a smaller constituency than would
be the case if he were to win by recurring to the entire
electorate's support.
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preeminence by assuming the role of a national regulatory
body.33 The main issues surrounding constitutional reform in
the Argentine Republic must be addressed in order to gauge the
possibilities of successful economic reform negatively
influencing democracy and/ or its mechanisms.
What has made negotiated multi-party constitutional
reform in the Argentine Republic feasible has been the
possibility of the Menem administration resorting to a
plebiscite in the eventuality of continued minority party
opposition. The Radical Party's hierarchy realized after the
October 1993 parliamentary elections that it could not hope to
marshal the necessary national support to impede Menem's re-
election aspirations. 34 The Olivos Pact is the direct result
of the aforesaid realization by the Radicals of their ballot-
box weakness and the success of the Menemist economic reform
33
In effect the state through the privatization program has
abandoned its previous role as the nation's chief investor and
in the process has delegated it to the domestic and/ or
international private sectors. Such a role had previously been
undertaken in order to provide the state with ballot box
support, brought about by full employment practices
characteristic of State-Centric development, and in order to
develop independently of the core industrial states' control.
The implications of this is that middle class/ conservative
alliance may come to oblige the presidency to impose a new
form of unicato on the Argentine Republic in order to assure
the continuity of the success of the neo-liberal policies.
34
The support that President Menem obtained during the
October 1993 parliamentary elections clearly demonstrates the
weak position in which the political opposition now finds
itself relegated to.
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Policies.35
The Menem administration has also recognized that
there still remains opposition, albeit disunited and
fragmented, in the Argentine Republic to many of its measures.
This in turn has required it to negotiate certain aspects of
the constitutional reform in conjunction with provincial
constitutional reform.36 Provincial constitutional reform has
aimed at assuring opposition party governors the possibility
of serving additional terms of office in exchange for support
at the constitutional convention. This serves as a text book
example of a case of political quid pro quo.
The Radicals by mid-1993 fear the possibility of
Menem, being able to ride the crest of economic recovery,
unilaterally promulgating constitutional reform. At that point
in time the Menem administration was still basking in the
unquestioned light of being responsible for unprecedented
renewed economic prosperity and the ensuing increase in levels
of personal consumption.37 Such a situation, if not addressed
35
Named after the locality in which Dante Caputo,
Alfonsin's former Minister of Foreign Affairs, maintains an
apartment utilized for the initial negotiations undertaken
between Alfonsin and the Menem administration.
36
The Argentine Constitution of 1853 guaranteed the
nation's provinces the right to elect their own governors and
legislatures, as well as frame their own constitutions.
37
This sort of situation has gradually eroded due to the
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via political negotiation, would have allowed the Menem
government the possibility of achieving its goals by merely
convoking a national plebescite requesting authorization to
rewrite the constitution as it saw fit. Recourse to plebescite
was however never convoked by the Menem administration, even
despite its strong showing during the October 1993 and April
1994 parliamentary elections, because the Radical opposition
realized that it had lost substantial national representation,
as is further evidenced by the poor showing obtained even in
their own bulwark of the City of Buenos Aires.38 It can thus
be logically held that had the plebiscite been convoked by the
Menem Administration immediately following the April 1994
elections, the government would without a doubt have been in
a far more powerful position to dictate the general terms and
conditions of the new Argentine Constitution than resulted to
changing nature of the World-System. Countries like Argentina
are tied to the economic upswings and downswings of the core
states and the international capitalist economy which these
influence directly. An example of this is the issue that an
increase in the United States interest rate may contribute in
halting the flow of capital to developing countries. It has
become the case that the flow of capital has been largely
responsible for Cavallo's miracles in the Argentine economy.
It is worthwhile to note that the preceding sort of situation
has affected also Mexico, Brazil, and Venezuela, among other
Latin American states. For more information see, Joaquin
Morales Sola, " Amor con barreras " in Noticias, Buenos Aires,
Argentina, April 10, 1994, pg. 62.
38
A large segment of the Radical electorate voted for the
parties opposing the government and/ or the accords of the
Olivos Pact negotiated by the Menem administration and
Alfonsin.
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be the case as carried out by negotiation.
These sort of factors increase political tensions as
a result of the necessity of assuring continued allegiance to
the neo-liberalist economic policies that have inhibited a
return to inflation. The need to assure the continuity of the
economic measures has allowed the presidency to suggest that
it could resort to convoking a plebiscite in order to
accomplish its goals. In order to avoid such a debacle the
opposition has opted to reach a negotiated solution that would
guarantee its concerns.
CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS
The mechanisms of Argentine democracy may become
victims to the very success of the economic reforms
implemented by the Menem administration if certain safe-guards
are not implemented. The foregoing chapters have also
attempted to illustrate that Argentina, as a semi-peripheral
state, is not only affected by the core's requirements, but
also by core demands for stability in the semi-periphery.
These sort of factors have been readily made evident, among
other issues, by the Oil Crisis of the 1970s and the ensuing
need to recycle petrol-dollars, as well as by the subsequent
Debt-Crisis of the 1980s. In the end it can be said that core
instability during the preceding period has lead to financial/
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economic instability in semi-peripheral Argentina, which in
turn has required core intervention (primarily via the IMF's
auspices) in order to reestablish economic stability in
Argentina.
This correlation endeavors to illustrate that the
national government may become prone to exert greater demands
on the Argentine populace in order to avoid a recurrence of
the previous situation. It is precisely out of such fears that
the Radicals have been led to negotiate and bargain with the
Menem government via the Olivos Pact. The result of those
negotiations has been among other issues the incorporation
into the new constitution of supposed constitutional
safeguards.
One of these has been the creation of the post of
Cabinet Chief of Staff charged with the general administration
of the Argentine Republic. Though the person heading this post
will be designated and removed by the President, the Argentine
Congress will also be empowered to remove the Cabinet Chief of
Staff through a vote of censure. Notably, under the previous
considerations the administration of the country had been the
exclusive domain of the President. Arguably this new
constitutional measure could allow the Argentine Congress a
greater degree of influence in the administration of the
country than had been the case previously.
An additional safeguard of the new constitution has
112
been the increase in the number of senators per province from
two to three after the year 2001. These senators are to be
elected by direct vote to six year terms instead of the
current nine year ones. Before, senators had been elected
indirectly. In effect this measure should allow the
electorate, especially minority parties, to have more
political representation in the Argentine Senate. This could
contribute in further fragmenting the opposition and thus
strengthen the Executive.
Another key measure adopted has been the extension
of the ordinary session of the Argentine Congress by four
months. The 1853 Constitution had allowed Congress to meet
from May 1st to September 30th each year. The constitutional
reform implemented in 1994 defines the congressional session
as running from March 1st to November 30th. This should
facilitate increased congressional oversight of the workings
of the Executive Branch of government and in the process
further safeguard the workings of Argentine democracy.
A fundamental issue addressed within the text of the
new Constitution is that pertaining to the Judicial Branch of
government. Previously judges had been appointed to their
offices by the President. From this point onwards the Council
of the Magistracy is to be given constitutional standing. It
will thus be empowered to present the President with a list of
three candidates for each judicial position, from which the
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President must choose one to fill the corresponding vacancy.
Furthermore, the Council of the Magistracy will administer the
Judicial Branch of government.
An added judicial measure has also been the creation
of the Office of the Public Defender. This office is charged
with protecting the citizenry against damaging or excessive
acts perpetuated by the state. The Public Defender will be
autonomous, but will be chosen by the Congress.
An additional element involved with the Judicial
Branch of government is the issue of the Supreme Court and
political trials. The justices of the court are to be chosen
with the approval of 2/3 of the Senate and can only be removed
by political trial for having failed to properly carry out
their functions or for having committed crimes. In order to be
removed a sitting justice must go before a Jury of Judicial
Proceeding, Jurado de Enjuiciamiento, which is composed of
lawyers, magistrates, and members of the legislature.
Previously the Supreme Court had been nominated by the
President and approved by a simple majority of the Senate. In
effect these measures are aimed at strengthening the concept
of rule by law and independence for the other branches of the
national government.
One of the most important measures adopted pertained
to the control of the national public administration. This
will be undertaken by the General Accounting Office of the
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Nation, Auditoria General de la Nacion, which will be presided
over by a person nominated by the chief opposition party.
Previously there had been no such instrument mentioned in the
Argentine national Constitution. This development is
noteworthy, especially in light of recent accusations made
against presidential appointees of official mismanagement of
public funds. Thus, the new Constitution adds a check meant to
inhibit official corruption and to disqualify proven corrupt
public officials from again holding public office.
Another key measure adopted relates to the issue of
semi-direct democracy. Previously the Argentine Constitution
held the precept that the people did not deliberate nor did
they govern except through their representatives. The new
National Constitution introduces the concept which has been
labelled as vinculating plebescite. This plebiscite is
convoked by the House of Representatives to allow that if a
bill proposed by plebiscite triumphs at the ballot box it
automatically becomes law. The issue of non-vinculating
plebescite has also been introduced into the new National
Constitution. It is convoked by the President, though only the
National Congress can convert the resulting bill into law.
Bills dealing with constitutional reform, international
treaties, taxes, the budget, and penal legislation cannot be
addressed by plebescite.
Another innovation in the new National Constitution
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is that of citizen initiative. It essentially allows the
common citizenry to obligate the Congress to address a bill if
at least three percent of the electorate signs a petition so
demanding. Furthermore, the Congress may not take more than
one year to actually consider the proposals of the bill.
The adoption and implementation of such measures
should contribute to inhibit the Executive Branch from having
a free and unrestricted hand on the reigns of government. Such
measures were negotiated in exchange for allowing the direct
election and subsequently the direct re-election of the
President and Vice-President of the Republic to four-year
periods of office. The presidential term of office had been
restricted, under article 77 of the 1853 Constitution, to six
years without the possibility of immediate re-election.
Further, under the old constitution the election of the
President and Vice-President of the Republic was indirect;
previously they were both elected by an Electoral College.
Furthermore, the President of the Republic is no longer
required to be a member of the Roman Catholic faith.
The new Argentine Constitution also foresees the
implementation of run-off elections, ballotage, between the
two presidential tickets with the most votes.
Additionally, the new Constitution attempts to
protect the presidency from future coups d'etat by the
incorporation of a constitutional clause which establishes in
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perpetuity the inability to occupy public office for those who
commit acts of aggression against the democratic system, as
well as for the members of the ensuing de facto government. It
goes on to establish that those perpetuators of aggression to
the constitutional order shall be considered as traitors to
the nation, traidores a la patria.
The Constitution of 1994 placates Menem's desires
for immediate re-election and also addresses many of Raul
Alfonsin's most significant concerns relating to unbridled
executive power by placing constitutional restraints on
Argentina's chief executive. Yet, the constitutional reform of
1994 has had its share of detractors from both within the
traditional rank and file membership of the Justicialista
Party in addition to that emanating from the political
opposition.
Especially troubling for many has been the role
assigned to the Constitutional Convention, that seems to have
been largely delegated a symbolic and rubber-stamping role,
since most of the critical details of the new Constitution
were previously negotiated during the Olivos Pact
deliberations. Many Argentine political observers have tended
to argue that the fundamental law of the country has in effect
fallen victim to both Menem's re-election whims and the
aspirations for renewed political importance by Alfonsin, a
largely unrepresentative politician.
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The only defense that can be offered on the behalf
of Alfonsin and his supporters is that they have agreed to
assist Menem in order to avoid allowing him the possibility of
consolidating total political hegemony.39 These Radical Party
adherents have argued that they have been able to "sell"
Menem, in view of his obsession with being re-elected, a
package deal of guarantees. 40 Supposedly the negociated terms
of the Olivos Pact should safe-guard the major principles of
Argentine democracy.
CONCLUDING SUMMARY
Those in not complete agreement with the Menem
government have asumed that the Argentine Republic's renewed
experiment with democracy may be negatively influenced by the
need to continue with the economic viability of the current
economic reform program. It is obvious that the Menem
government has aimed and adopted every measure that it could
39
Alfonsin's former Minister of Economics, Jesus Rodriguez,
has argued that even though his main objective is to comply to
the letter of the agreement signed between Alfonsin and Menem,
he has his reservations. Essentially, he has argued that the
Olivos Pact has been a difficult pill that he has had to
swallow. See, Gustavo Gonzalez, "Un medico aqui", in Noticias
Buenos Aires, Argentina. Feb. 20, 1994, pg 80-81.
40
See, James Nielson, " La Historia y los constituyentes de
hoy: Alberdi, Alberdi a qu& altura.. .?" in Noticias Buenos
Aires, Argentina, Feb. 20, 1994, pg. 61.
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Buenos Aires, up from the 10 percent level in 1993).
One can conclude that what needs to be done in order
to avoid a return to the sort of on-again-off-again autocratic
rule of past years is not only the effective implementation
and adherence to the constitutional safe-guards which have
been negotiated in order to assure the democratic process, but
also adopt effective economic reactivation measures.41 Added
to this there must also be a firm commitment by the national
government to stimulate not only the large producers of the
Argentine Republic, but also the small and medium-sized
producers as well. These compose directly and indirectly the
bulk of the middle class and thus national electorate.
The constitutional deliberations have attempted to
address the opposition's main concerns about the democratic
workings of the Argentine system in conjunction with the
administration's desire to achieve immediate presidential
reelection and thus supposedly assure the continuity of the
Convertitbility Plan. This goal has been paramount and pursued
as a means of maintaining renewed Argentine international
creditworthiness, as well as the viability of a globalized
41
In essence what is needed in order to guarantee the
viability of constitutional reform and democracy is the
implementation of measures aimed at promoting exports, by way
of production refunds and subsidies in exchange for
undertaking increased commitments for exporting. See, Carlos
Abalo, "Remedios para el descontento social" in El Cronista:
Edicion Fax Internacional. Buenos Aires, Argentina. (May 30,
1994), pg. 1.
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Argentine national economy. But the country and its leadership
must prepare itself to address a second phase of the
Convertibility Plan, one that aims at addressing more social
issues than have been during the first phase.
The 1994 Constitution has been apparently construed
in such a manner that it seems to dilute the possibility of
the rise of an "imperial presidency" in the Argentine
Republic. But the new constitution has a series of defects (ie
increased number of senators, rule by vinculating plebescite
and citizen initiative) which if properly exploited by a
charismatic president could lead to a circumvention of the
impediments placed to impede expanded presidencial authority.
The previous could further be facilitated if the ruling
government controls the Congress. In theory there do exist
constitutional safeguards that aim at inhibiting (ie Council
of Magistracy) the possibility of the rise of an imperial
presidency, but these may prove to be inadequate in the face
of economic dislocation brought about by international
sociopolitical (ie the Peruvian-Ecuadorian War in the Andes)
and economic upheavals (Mexico's Tequila effect) .42 These sort
42
The Mexican crisis has shown that bondholders are prone
to panic once a stock market in one country collapses. These
in turn suffer the effects of "contagion" in which investors
sell-off their assets in other markets in order to recoup
their initial losses. This results in a situation of
irrational market behavior that comes to negatively affect
countries (ie Argentina) that in good economic shape to suffer
from crises elsewhere. See, Zanny Minton-Beddoes, "Why the IMF
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of circumstances contribute in undermining international
opinion of both the Latin American Region and subsequently of
Argentina since it forms an integral part of it. This in turn
may force Argentina and its government to impose ever harsher
stabilization programs as means of arresting those fears, and
as a by-product increases sociopolitical and economic tensions
in the country.
Needs Reforming" in Foreign Affairs. vol. 74, n* 3 (May/ June
1995): 125 - 126.
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CHAPTER THREE
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND DEMOCRACY
In the preceding chapters I have attempted not only
to illustrate the main issues associated with the Argentine
Republic's key historical economic and sociopolitical
development as they pertain to the Modern Political Economy
perspective, but also endeavored to set the stage for
addressing the question of how successful economic reform
implemented via neo-liberal policies can influence the proper
working of Argentine democracy. This has been carried out by
looking at the economic, as well as the sociopolitical
development of the Argentine state and the tensions generated
by the Menem/ Cavallo economic reforms.
Having briefly done so it becomes evident that the
modern Argentine state's experiment with State-Centric
development has failed. This issue is made readily evident by
the Menem administration's wholesale privatization program of
the early 1990s.1 Furthermore, the principal notions
Privatization requires both the transfer of ownership, as
well as the operational and administrative control of a state
company, to the private sector. The Menem administration has
assumed that by exposing Argentine firms to the discipline/
rigors of the capital markets, and in turn by also allowing
the owners and managers of these to reap the rewards of
improved levels of costs and services, these would become more
efficient producers. In the process this should supposedly
reduce costs, as well as increase national economic
efficiency. Furthermore, it can also be held that
privatization has been an effective tool for improving the
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associated with constitutional reform have also been addressed
as a means of illustrating the principle fears of the
opposition parties to an additional term of office for
President Menem. Consequently, the aim has been to illustrate
how a failed economic development policy (State-Centric
development), subject to the demands associated with the
realities of the Modern Political Economy and neo-liberal
economic reform, have led to the 1994 Constitutional Reform
and in the process increased sociopolitical tensions in
Argentina.
It is interesting to note that the principle threat
to Argentine democracy in this case does not tend to arise
from the military sector of the Argentine Republic as had been
the case in the past, but rather may arise from the Executive
Branch of government seeking to perpetuate itself in office.
Thus, the possibility of returning to autocratic military
style rule of earlier years is remote at the best in the
Argentine Republic at this point in time. This is due
primarily to the fact that the military has proven itself to
fiscal health of the Argentine Republic by reducing the
country's fiscal deficit. This in turn assists in reducing the
funding losses previously brought about by inefficient state-
run concerns. In the Argentine case this has consequently lead
to both a reduction of the external and domestic public debt.
For more information regarding this particular matter see,
David L. Moore and Diana M. DePinto, " Solving the Capital
Crisis: Energy Sector Restructuring, Commercialization and
Privatization " in LatinFinance. ( Supplement June 1994 ), pg.
19-24.
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be an inefficient economic allocator of resources, an
ineffectual sociopolitical leader, and a failed military
machine because of the Malvinas/ Falkland Islands War waged
with Britain in 1982.
Having briefly clarified the preceding I should
point out that the present chapter will address the issue of
how the implementation of successful economic reform may come
to adversely affected the proper workings of Argentine
democracy as a consequence of the government's policy and its
need to assure continued economic stability. This section of
the study will simultaneously look into both the Argentine
labor issue, as well as the need to restructure the economy
along more competitive lines. Especially relevant in this case
are the issues that pertain to the requirements inherent in
the Modern Political Economy and neo-liberal economic reform
in light of the post-Debt Crisis situation faced by Menem's
Argentina.
THE ISSUE OF ARGENTINE LABOR & INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS
It is precisely within the greater context of the
international competitiveness of the Argentine national
economy that the issue of labor must be addressed. Recall that
the current economic reform program, as implemented by the
Menem administration, has sought to improve the country's
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overall international competitive position. The economic
reform program carried out by the Menem/ Cavallo team has
sought to open up the national economy, restructure the
state's activities and reduce the size of government while
simultaneously boosting its operating efficiency. In the
process this major restructuring of the Argentine economy has
also included a deep and broad privatization program.2
The issue of Argentine labor and its political
mobilization as it tends to pertain to Argentina's twentieth
century economic and industrial development is particularly
relevant here. In the past half century Argentine labor has
come to play a central and powerful role in the country's
development. Any attempts at reducing its institutionalized
strength has led to increased sociopolitical tensions. The
labor issue in light of Argentina's renewed economic growth,
resulting from the implementation of neo-liberal policies,
continues to be a question of significant economic and
sociopolitical importance for the Argentine state.
The relative importance of the labor sector is made
evident by the fact that it still constitutes the Argentine
Republic's single largest voting bloc. This factor is still
2
See, Jerry Haas, " The Argentine Miracle Continues " in
LatinFinance. N* 58 ( June 1994 ) pg. 82. The author makes the
argument that the ambitious economic reform program
implemented by the Menem administration has sought to
eliminate the country's fiscal deficit, as well as liberalize
the Argentine labor and capital markets in the process.
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relevant today as it was when first identified by Juan Domingo
Per6n in 1943 and which was subsequently ratified with his
election to the Argentine presidency in 1946. Even though
labor has been marginalized by the Menem administration its
relevance as a potential political force still remains valid.
With regards to the preceding it should be pointed out that
the Menem administration has reneged on what was initially
supposed to have been a populist government in favor of neo-
liberal economic reforms. These reforms have largely addressed
the financial concerns of the Argentine middle class, as well
as those of the more conservative elements of the national
electorate and international corporations. Yet, as a
consequence of increased economic stability individual workers
have been able to increase their levels of consumption of
consumer items.
As a consequence of the success of the neo-liberal
economic reforms implemented by Carlos Menem the country's GDP
has risen 6.5 percent in 1994, speeding up in the process the
rate of growth compared to 1993 and taking cumulative growth
in the 4-year period 1991-94 to almost 34 percent, a fact
previously unheard of in other Argentine stabilization plans
(see table n* 06).3 In having abandoned the populist pro-
labor policies of the past the Menem government has been able
3
See, Consejo Tecnico de Inversiones, Anuario-94. Buenos
Aires, Argentina: Consejo Tecnico de Inversiones, S.A., 1994,
pg. 50.
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to gain the confidence of economic actors which had previously
been ignored in the government-labor alliances of the past. In
essence this has stimulated the economy and led to an
expansion in construction and the exploitation of economic
sectors which had stagnated due to the lack of capital.
TABLE N* 06
DEVELOPMENT OF ARGENTINE GDP IN CURRENT U$S
PESOS(a) U$S MILLIONS IN U$S MILLIONS POP. IN GDP/HEAD
CURRENT DOLLAR IN CURRENT MILLION CURRENT
QUOTATION (1) VALUES IN ACQ. VALUES
PARITY (b) (2) U$S
YEAR P/(1) P/(2)
1960 0.00000010 12,198 12,198 20.0 610 610
1965 0.00000036 14,928 15,446 21.6 691 715
1970 0.00000088 23,150 20,177 23.4 989 862
1971 0.00000126 23,688 22,299 23.8 995 937
1972 0.00000209 21,628 24,073 24.2 894 995
1973 0.00000356 35,657 29,704 24.7 1,443 1,202
1974 0.00000488 48,934 39,006 25.1 1,950 1,554
1975 0.00001452 45,381 45,282 25.6 1,773 1,769
1976 0.00007546 46,288 41,616 26.0 1,780 1,601
1977 0.000208 51,870 50,856 26.4 1,859 1.813
1978 0.000518 64,900 55,569 26.7 2,373 1,905
1979 0.001390 103,423 65,044 27.1 3,792 2,243
1980 0.003840 206,897 116,895 27.4 5,495 2,802
1981 0.00747 114,985 118,484 27.9 4,121 4,247
1982 0.02185 81,425 99,201 28.3 2,877 3,505
1983 0.10950 97,088 109,220 28.8 3,371 3,792
1984 0.79092 105,846 119,615 29.2 3,625 4,096
1985 5.3055 85,024 104,645 29.7 2,863 3,523
1986 9.9841 103,677 116,773 30.1 3,444 3,880
1987 23.3324 103,515 125,578 30.6 3,383 4,104
1988 111.0619 127,657 129,142 31.1 4,105 4,152
1989 3,244.05 67,938 113,349 31.6 2,150 3,587
1990 68,922.27 140,543 144,977 32.1 4,378 4,516
1991 180,898 189,760 182,762 32.6 5,821 5,606
1992 226,636 228,303 221,541 33.1 6,906 6,701
1993e 255,326 255,326 238,044 33.5 7,615 7.100
1994e 280,000 280,000 262,172 34.0 8,235 7,711
obs: e stands for estimate. Acq. stands for acquisitive
SOURCE: Consejo T6cnico de Inversiones, pg. 61
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Within the context of the foregoing it should be
realized that the principal means of achieving the injection
of financing in the post-Debt Crisis world has been via not
only privatization, but also by restructuring the state-system
to favor neo-liberal economic policy. This has resulted in
increasing sociopolitical tensions among organized labor. In
effect it has seen not only its wages reduced and/or frozen in
the short-term, but also its collective bargaining strength
undermined as consequence of the implementation of more agile
labor-dispute resolution mechanisms promoted by the
government. Yet, contrary to what may first be assumed this
particular situation has tended to favored the individual
worker to detriment of organized labor.
Negatively affected by the preceding is the case of
public-sector workers which have been forced to accept the
notion that their overall purchasing power has contracted by
1.5 percent because of government policy.4 The government's
aim apparently has been to set an example for the private-
sector to follow as means of lowering business costs and
increasing the nation's overall competitiveness while
simultaneously bringing about greater transparency in the
labor market.5
4
Ibid, pg. 75.
5
A principal policy instrument implemented by the
government, as a stimulus for both industry and agriculture,
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With regards to the preceding, and especially in
conjunction with overall historical terms, it is worthwhile to
recall that the importance of the labor sector was made amply
apparent to Juan Domingo Peron, as the founder of the
Peronist/ Justicialista Party. He in effect utilized labor as
the pillar of his political power in an alliance with the
nationalistic industrialist sector. This is made clear as
early as 1943 when Peron commenced to effectively manipulate
Argentine labor to his political benefit by promulgating pro-
labor social legislation, as well as by increasing organized
labor's wages in exchange for its political backing. Juan
Peron undertook such populist measures in order to gain the
support of a then largely untapped source of potential
political power.6
has been to reduce payroll taxes and other contributions paid
by employers. Reductions have been set according to distance
from Buenos Aires and income levels of the employees. It
should be pointed out that these reductions were implemented
by January 1994, and have varied from 30 percent 80 percent in
most cases. The firms targeted for this sort of stimulus have
been those companies involved in the production of' primary
products, industry, construction, and tourism. Specifically
excluded are other services and the retail trade. The
government has estimated that though the fiscal cost of the
reductions will be roughly one billion dollars in lost
revenue, this shall be compensated (from the government's and
not employee's perspective) by greater economic activity and
tax enforcement. See, Ministry of the Economy, "The Economy
and Economic Policy", in Argentine Investment Update. Buenos
Aires, Argentina: Undersecretariat for Investment of the
Ministry of Economy, 1994, pg. 4.
6
What greatly facilitated Peron's political aspirations
was his official position as a member of the Farrell
government to lavish unprecedented attention on labor. This
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Peron was able to effectively channel/ manipulate
labor's discontent over its situation of lack of
representation and sense of oppression vis-a-vis the Argentine
Republic's traditional elitist/ conservative sector into
propelling him into the presidency. Labor's support of Peron,
in conjunction with the post-war economic boom, facilitated
the ensuing Peronist government's ability to implement
policies of economic nationalism as means of seeking an
alternative route to development (tercer camino) than that
proposed by the Soviet Union (communism) or the United States
of America (free-market/ laissez faire capitalism).
In addition to the previous it should be recalled
that the native Argentine capitalist class has traditionally
been hesitant to invest in long-term and slow growing
investments needed to produce capital goods. Rather, it has
shown a propensity to favor quick and high profit rates over
a definite and limited period of time.7 This was one of the
principle factors that led to the state's increased
involvement with State-Centric development. Recall that this
resulted in raising not only the standard of living of the
average worker of the period, but also contributed to vastly
improve the general sense of dignity and self-worth of the
Argentine proletariat. See, Benjamin Keen, A History of Latin
America. 4th ed. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1992,
pg. 308 - 309.
7
See, E. Bradford Burns. Latin America: A concise
interpretative history. 6th ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice
Hall, 1994, pg. 240 - 241.
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is basically a situation in which the state becomes directly
involved with the financing of larger and more capital risky
undertakings since the local capitalist class is either unable
or unwilling to invest such large amounts of capital.
As a consequence of the state's expanded role in
domestic economy, Peron sought to provide increased national
employment at higher wages and increased social benefits to
further consolidate his ballot-box support. Consequently, when
blocked by the political opposition, the Executive Branch of
the government would then either rule by decree or turn to
Peronist controlled national electorate for plebiscite
approval. It is within such an atmosphere in which Peron's
first Quinquennial Plan, aimed at achieving accelerated
industrialization and greater economic independence, was
initially undertaken.8
Per6n's eventual fall from power in 1955 is a result
not of the loss of popular backing, but the loss of support
from the Argentine Roman Catholic Church, the nation's
military, the traditional oligarchy's effective opposition,
and middle class discontent over the mismanagement of the
national economy. Yet, regardless of these facts Argentine
8
In rapidly increasing the country's industrial park, by
becoming the principle driving force for it, the Peron
government speculates that it will be able to increase high
wage employment. If successful the government could point with
pride not only its economic accomplishments, but also to its
pro-social successes as well in the process.
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labor, for the most part, continues to remain even to this day
a firm supporter of Peron and the Peronist cause ideology.
This type of allegiance to the personality cult created by
Per6n in the 1940s succeeded in bringing the ousted leader
back from exile in 1973. Furthermore, it should be realized
that organized labor's support granted the newly returned
Peron a third new term of office with over sixty-two percent
of the popular vote.9
This contributed to effectively legitimizing the
reentry of the Argentine proletariat as an institutional mass
into the country's political life by 1973. Yet, it should be
pointed out that not even Peron and his charismatic leadership
were enough to control the complex demands of a
sociopolitically and economically agitated Argentina of the
1970s. Consequently, sectors of the Argentine middle class and
the elisitist and traditional factions of the country came to
fear the rise of a populist controlled government. That
situation represented to the elites a direct erosion of their
power-base, as well as a challenge to their position from
below.
Thus, by 1973 the Argentine Republic was already
being subjected to the pull of increasing sociopolitical
9
It is worthwhile to point out that under such
circumstances the government could readily recur to plebescite
as a means of implementing policy, since all that is required
in this regard is obtaining fifty percent of the vote plus one
vote in order for measures to pass.
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tensions caused by the reappearance of not only Per6n, but
also economic tension caused by the state's need to develop
the country along nationalistic lines. It is worthwhile to
point out that regardless of Peron's nationalistic economic
development rhetoric the greatest advances in Argentine
industrial development were made after his ouster during the
1955 to 1973 period with primarily the help of foreign
investment capital. Yet, Peron and Peronism have never been
anti-capitalist, rather have favored state capitalism and
national economic independence. The general effects of Peron's
policies were to increase the number of small, labor-intensive
establishments even in light of the fact that because of
economic necessity he was forced to open the country to
foreign capital by 1954 (see table n* 07) . It is a consequence
of the inroads made by foreign capital during that period
which causes the Argentine state to increasingly seek the
possibilities of taking over the management of development
from domestic capital via State-Centric development."
10
During the 1955 to 1973 period the Argentine economy
passes from being primarily a labor-intensive one to a
capital-intensive one. During this period non-traditional
industries known as "dynamic" take-off principally in such
fields as iron and steel production, chemicals, petroleum
derivatives, rubber, automobiles and machine building. Foreign
firms during the period come dominate all of the dynamic
industries with the exception of the steel and paper
industries which continued to be dominated by local capital.
See, Paul H. Lewis, The Crisis of Argentine Industry. Chapel
Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1990, pg. 298 -
299.
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TABLE N" 07
ARGENTINE INDUSTRIALIZATION FIGURES FROM 1943 TO 1974
NUMBER OF NUMBER OF INSTALLED WORKERS P/ HP P/ HP P/
FIRMS WORKERS HP FIRM FIRM WORKER
YEAR (AVG.) (AVG.) (AVG.)
1943 59,765 820,470 1,836,453 13.7 30.73 2.24
1946 84,905 1,058,673 2,076,531 12.5 24.46 1.96
1950 81,599 1,035,765 2,661,922 12.7 32.62 2.57
1954 148,371 1,217,844 3,570,037 8.2 24.06 2.93
1964 190,892 1,370,483 5,115,913 7.2 26.80 3.73
1974 126,388 1,525,221 6,753,375 12.1 53.43 4.43
RATES OF CHANGE (%)
1943-1954 1950-1954 1954-1964 1964-1974 1954-1974
NUMBER OF FIRMS +148.3 +81.8 +28.7 -33.8 -14.8
NUMBER OF WORKERS +48.4 +17.6 +12.5 +11.3 +25.2
INSTALLED HORSEPOWER +94.4 +34.1 +43.3 +32.0 +89.2
SOURCE: Lewis, pg.299.
The foregoing figures are indicative of the changes
that have occurred in the Argentine Republic's drive towards
industrialization. These have endeavored to illustrate the
importance of foreign capital in developing the country.
Especially relevant in this case has been the role played by
U.S. capital. This is made amply evident when it is realized
that during the period in question foreign firms have been the
principle actors in the so-called second stage of development
dealing with import-substitution mechanisms led by the dynamic
domestic concerns."
11
See, Bernardo Kosacoff, " La Presencia Actual de las
Empresas Extranjeras en la Industria Argentina. Su Estrategia
ante el Mercosur", in Segundo Seminario, Mercosur:
Perspectivas y Problemas. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Centro de
Economia Internacional - Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores,
Comercio Internacional y Culto, pg. 162 - 163.
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LABOR REFORM AND WHAT IT MAY COME TO IMPLY
The Menem administration was voted into office in
1989 on a wave of popular socioeconomic discontent with the
Radical Party's administration of Raul Alfonsin. Menem, as the
Justicialista (Peronist Party) candidate, was able to defeat
Eduardo Angeloz, the Radical Party candidate, as a direct
consequence of both the deterioration of the Argentine
national economy, as well as the traditionally Peronist
Party's ability to gain the backing of then all powerful
Argentine labor sector. Notably, the political honeymoon
between the then newly elected Menem administration and
organized Argentine labor movement has not lasted as long as
most analysists and traditional Peronists would have initially
assumed or liked.
Quite the contrary the Menem government quickly and
deliberately moved to adopt a much more conservative attitude
towards the stagnant economy than would have been assumed
possible for a Peronist/ Justicialista Party government. This
has soured the relationship between the Menem administration
and the Argentine labor sector.'2  The ensuing adoption of
12
It is worthwhile to point out that organized labor's
discontent with regard to many of the government's measures
seems to have been largely diluted by the Menem
administration's privatization policy. The state, by divesting
itself of its industrial and commercial sector
responsibilities through the privatization program, has been
able to circumvent criticism by relocating blame to the new
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conservative, in this case non-populist policies logically
expected from a Peronist/ Justicialista Party presidential
administration, has drastically rearranged the Argentine
economic and sociopolitical playing field. In the process this
has increased tensions within the Argentine Republic and the
electorate.
Effectively the Menem administration, by adopting
unorthodox economic measures, has distanced itself from its
own party's traditional power-base, organized Argentine labor,
in favor of addressing the concerns of the international
financial investment community and the conservative sectors of
Argentine society. By implementing neo-liberal economic
measures, different from the traditional orthodox measures of
past Argentine stabilization programs, the government has
succeeded in effectively addressing the major fears of the
middle class, this namely being a return to inflationary
owners ( ie the case of Argentine Airlines ) . In effect the
privatization program has allowed the Menem government to
reduce its fiscal expenditure, by no longer requiring the
federal government to continue absorbing losses brought about
by inefficient and/ or employee bloated industries, while
simultaneously requiring the new owners to assume a greater
share of social responsibility. In this case social
responsibility can be defined in terms of obligating the new
owners to make capital improvements to the newly privatized
firms over a fixed of time as part of the purchase/ concession
price requirement. This sort of issue should supposedly come
to entail the fortalization and/ or development of linkages
with other complementary firms in the same sector. In the
process employment should also tend to expand both directly
and indirectly while simultaneously increasing the privatized
company's operational efficiency as it becomes able to capture
new market shares.
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levels characteristic of preceding eras of hyper-inflation and
assured the country's capitalist class of the possible
profitability of its investments.
The requirement of effectively carrying out these
measures led the Menem administration to implement early on in
its administration a series of measures which allowed the
government to largely divest itself by 1994 of most of the
former unprofitable national public sector. 3 In effect the
Menem government has opted to exchange the state's prior
statist and populist role for primarily a more regulatory
function. "4 This has allowed the national government to become
13
In August 1989 the Argentine National Congress approved
the State Reform Law, conceived as a point of departure for
the placing in order of public finances and the redefinition
of the tasks to be performed by the public-sector. Law N*
23,696 on State Reform declared a state of emergency covering
the provision of public services, the fulfillment of contracts
and the economic and financial situation of the National
Public Sector Administration, its agencies, State companies
and corporations, services from special accounts, welfare
funds and official banks and financial entities in which the
National Government held full or majority control. The law
authorized a partial or total privatization or liquidation of
the aforementioned. See, Ministry of Economics, Works and
Public Services, "Reform of the State", in Argentina: A
Growing Nation. Buenos Aires, Argentina, Ministry of
Economics, Works and Public Services, 1994, pg. 04.
14
The aim of the state is to increase national savings
directly by reducing public consumption or indirectly by
encouraging greater savings in the private sector. In either
case it is important to increase national saving and channel
it towards productive investment. Furthermore, through trade
liberalization the state has foreseen that a short-term
increase in the trade deficit, but the end effect will be that
the rate of exports will exceed that of imports. Ibid, pg.
158 - 159.
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the national promoter of both domestic and foreign investment.
In the process the Argentine state has reduced its expenditure
by cutting back on a bloated public-sector payroll which had
been built-up as a means of guaranteeing employment for
political patronage and socioeconomic stability (See table n*
08).
These measures have officially been designed to
bring about the transformation of the Argentine national
economy by re-organizing public expenditure in a much more
efficient manner and thus bringing about in the process
macroeconomic stability. The government's goal has been to
reinstall in primarily the international financial community,
and then secondarily in the Argentine electorate, assurances
of the Argentine Republic's macroeconomic stability. The
policies implemented have aimed at improving the country's
overall credibility as a safe-haven for both domestic and
foreign investment. Thus, the beliefs associated with neo-
mercantilism or economic nationalism of the pre-Menem era have
been largely abandoned by the Menem administration in favor of
economic neo-liberalism.15
15
Essentially economic nationalism can be defined in terms
of what is good for the country is therefore good for the
individual; the nation-state comes to reflect the sum
interests of national society. Within this perspective the
state manipulates the economy in order to maximize what it
views as being the national interests (wealth and economic
power). This sort of belief falls within the tenants of the
zero-sum game in which a state advances largely at the expense
of other states.
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TABLE N* 08
CONSOLIDATED PUBLIC SECTOR EXPENDITURE
YEAR (as % of GDP) 1993 1994 1995
TOTAL EXPENDITURE 28.33 26.48 25.18
SOCIAL EXPENDITURE 18.01 18.02 17.68
Health 4.36 4.46 4.32
Social Welfare 0.62 0.63 0.71
Social Security 7.02 6.77 6.38
Education & Culture 3.36 3.62 3.87
Science & Technology 0.20 0.20 0.24
Employment 0.78 0.74 0.69
Housing & Urbanism 0.43 0.43 0.35
Drinking Water & Sewers 0.31 0.30 0.25
Other Urban Services 0.94 0.85 0.88
OTHER OUTLAYS 10.31 8.46 7.50
NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION (U$S MILLIONS)
CURRENT REVENUES 38,582.3 38,870.1 41,268.4
Tributary Revenues 21,808.5 21,993.0 23,835.6
Soc. Security 13,604.1 13,861.0 13,884.4
Non-tributary 1,870.0 1,564.2 1,537.4
Sales of Goods & Services 422.2 447.0 334.1
Property Taxes 861.0 925.5 1,631.0
Current Transfers 16.5 79.4 45.9
CAPITAL REVENUES 1,251.2 1,666.0 1,619.0
TOTAL RESOURCES 39,833.5 40,536.1 42,887.4
TOTAL EXPENDITURES 39,985.5 41,527.2 39,887.4
CURRENT EXPENDITURES 36,431.3 36,725.6 38,187.8
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES 3,554.2 4,801.6 4,699.6
Source: Consejo T6cnico de Inversiones, pg. 138.
The Argentine state's adoption of free-market
mechanisms, as a means of increasing national economic
efficiency, have tended to have positive results on a
macroeconomic level. Yet, on a microeconomic level the system
has started to show definitive signs of augmented strain. Two
fundamental examples of this have been the riots in the
Northwestern region (ie in the Provinces of Santiago del
Estero and Tucuman) over the provincial governments' adoption
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of budgetary restraining measures aimed at reducing or cutting
provincial payroll expenditure (the provincial governments
have traditionally been the main employers in that
underdeveloped region of Argentina) and the International
Monetary Fund's recent concerns over the possible social costs
associated with the continued implementation of economic
measures which do not readily address microeconomic concerns
in the Argentine Republic."
The labor issue must be viewed within the context of
successfully addressed macroeconomic concerns. In effect the
adoption of free-market mechanisms by the Menem administration
has been the guideline for the Argentine Republic's economy
since 1990. As a consequence of the aforesaid supply and
demand for labor have come to be balanced by means of market
signals. For example, by allowing domestic prices to be fixed
on average international levels the government has assumed
that there should develop a situation which leads to harmony,
16
Michael Camdessus has argued during the Tenth Annual
Convention of Private Banks organized by the Argentine
association of Banks (Asociaci6n de Bancos Argentinos - ADEBA)
that the country's economic evolution during the Menem
administration has been spectacular. Yet, as head of the
International Monetary Fund he would recommend undertaking
efficient policies aimed at addressing health and education
issues. Furthermore, the IMF's director has argued that
governments must adopt imaginative measures aimed at easing
the problems associated with periods of transition and thus
assist the short-term victims of periods of transition. For
more information see, " Recomend6 una politica social el
titular del FMI " in La Nacion. Buenos Aires, Argentina. Aug.
30, 1994, pg. 1.
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equilibrium, and the efficient allocation of resource. With
regards to the labor issue it should be pointed out that
competition among individual workers, as well as among firms
freely competing in the marketplace fosters a situation of
increased efficiency and thus in the process should result in
making the Argentine Republic's industrial and commercial
sectors domestically and internationally more competitive."
Labor reform has been proposed and championed by the
Menem administration as a means of achieving the goals of
improving overall Argentine international competitiveness. The
much hailed Convertability Plan, responsible for having halted
Argentine hyper-inflation and for bringing about renewed
economic growth on a macroeconomic level, may, however, be
17
A problem with this issue and the Convertibility Plan has
been that Argentine produce, in this case defined in both
industrial and agricultural terms, pegged at equivalent dollar
to peso values has tended to hinder Argentine export
competitiveness overseas. This sort of situation thus requires
that production costs, namely wage rates, be reduced in order
to compete in the world market at lower operating costs as
part of improving efficiency. This is a fact that has also
become aggravated by the issue of a strong dollar overseas. In
the process this sort of situation has tended to make
Argentine items set at dollar parity values less competitive
internationally. The flip side of the coin has been that if
the Menem government seeks to devalue the national currency,
in order to make Argentine export items more competitive vis-
a-vis the dollar, this measure could then possibly contribute
in undermining investor confidence in Argentina. Such a
development could thus result in lower foreign investment
levels, as well as the possibility of a renewed round of
domestic capital flight in search of more profitable
investments overseas.
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threatened if a labor reform is not implemented by 1995.18 The
government sees itself pressured by the need to reactivate the
national economy and prevent a return to inflationary
policies. It is foreseeable that in order to become
competitive internationally the Menem government will have to
either de-value the national coin, thus sacrificing the sacred
cow that the Convertibility Plan has become and risking a
return to inflation, or it will have to "squeeze" additional
concessions from labor in order to lower the costs of
production for Argentine industry.
Furthermore, it has also been argued by Javier
Gonzalez Fraga, former President of the Argentine Central Bank
and current head of the Instituto Argentino de Mercado de
Capitales (Argentine Institute of Capital Markets), that the
Convertibility Plan may be seriously threatened in 1995 if
labor reform is not implemented. Essentially, this means that
labor costs in the Argentine Republic are still too high at
the moment for those Argentine producers that wish to be
internationally competitive. The importance of this particular
issue is underscored by the fact that even though the Menem
administration has divested itself of the majority of the
government's former holdings, the national economy still
18
See, Georgina M. G6mez, "Sin reforma laboral, el plan
peligra". El Cronista: Edicion Fax Internacional. Buenos
Aires, Argentina, Sept. 1, 1994, pg 3. It should be pointed
out that labor reform will most likely be carried out after
the next presidential election in 1995.
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remains largely closed. This is illustrated by the 1993 figure
of Argentina's merchandise trade which only accounted for 11
percent of nation's GDP.'9
Gonzalez Fraga has further argued that the second
phase of the Convertibility Plan must by necessity address the
labor reform issue, since without it monetary and fiscal
discipline would continue, but the national currency would no
longer be tradable at parity with the United States dollar, a
fundamental pillar of the Convertibility Plan. The preceding
is due to the fact that either the national coin must be
devalued, in order to increase the country's goods
competitiveness, or the labor-capital relationship redefined
in order to make Argentine goods better sellers
internationally. In essence it can be held that in an
atmosphere of increased access to the world's marketplace and
the globalization of the economy, Argentine industries, both
large and small, are exposed to both the benefits and the
rigors of the international capitalist system. This forces
both Argentine producers and workers, in order to survive, to
become more competitive, efficient, and increasingly more
productive at lower costs to capital.
19
See, David Lubin, " Risk and Rhetoric: In Search of a
Definition for Country Risk " in LatinFinance. ( Supplement -
September 1994 ), pg. 20.
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ASSURING CONTINUITY
The success of the Convertibility Plan has been
responsible for Argentina's vigorous reentry into the
international capitalist system, but the very continuation of
the success is largely dependent on the state and the
continued implementation of its macroeconomically stable
economic policies. Though the state is no longer charged with
the role of creator of business opportunities directly, it
still remains the vehicle by which national economic success
continues to be implemented. This essentially means that the
state has adopted the role not of entrepreneur, but rather of
promoter for businesses that have commercial concerns in the
Argentine Republic.
This in turn leads to the conclusion that labor
reform if implemented will necessarily aim at reducing the
overall costs of labor by maintaining or even lowering current
levels of employee recompensation in order to attract or
retain foreign corporate investment in an atmosphere in which
the Cavallo Convertability Plan remains largely untinkered
with.
A serious concern for the Menem government recently
raised has been Mercedes Benz's Argentine subsidiary's threat
of pulling out of the Argentine truck manufacturing market.
Mercedes Benz has stated that it might carry out such a
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drastic measure as a direct result of increased labor costs.
Additionally the company has stated that it would aim to
transfer its operations to neighboring Brazil, which
incidently has lower labor costs, if it can not negotiate
further labor wage concessions.
This sort of situation has become especially
troubling for the current Menem administration because of the
globalization of the Argentine Republic's national economy. In
effect the globalization of the economy has resulted in not
only stimulating other national industries (ie the energy
producing sector, mining, tourism, services, etc), but also
has allowed the government to find new ways of financing its
debt burden, reducing fiscal deficit, bringing about greater
local efficiency, and increasing access to foreign capital and
generating internal capital. 20  Yet, in the process the
globalization of the national economy has forced the
government to weigh each threat of investment exodus with
increased scrutiny. As a consequence of such issues the aim of
the government has been to seek the possibility of immediate
presidential reelection as a means of assuring the continued
implementation of the Convertibility Plan and sound fiscal
policy. In the process the Menem administration has committed
itself to maintaining low inflationary levels, stability, and
20
See, David L. Moore and Diana M. DePinto, " Solving the
Capital Crisis " in LatinFinance. (Supplement - June 1994),
pg. 19.
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economic growth in the Argentine Republic as a means of
obtaining both popular and conservative sector backing.
It is precisely as a consequence of the aforesaid in
which the proper workings of Argentine democratic mechanisms
can come to be threatened by the very success of the economic
reform program. The failure of the Argentine state previously
has been its inability to not only properly invest its
national wealth, but also the monies it has borrowed
internationally. The Debt-Crisis of the 1980s demonstrated
that the Argentine state was then unable to make the sort of
investments required to generate positive returns in U.S.
dollars. That situation was largely brought about by the
governments of that period utilizing funds for currency
speculation and consumer purchases, as well as for military
purchases. Furthermore, the situation was aggravated by the
fact that the governments of that era aimed at sponsoring
industries that tended to be labor intensive, as a means of
assuring domestic political tranquility, instead of financing
more capital-intensive projects. Problem with the preceding is
that labor-intensive projects were implemented for ballot-box
support in the short-term instead of capital-intensive
projects whose results usually would have taken longer to
become evident. In other words economic profitability was
sacrificed for political expediency.
The end results of those measures have largely been
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the creation of firms that quickly became technologically
outdated as a result of the lack of renewable sources of
founding for modernization brought about by the 1980s Debt-
Crisis and especially burdened by bloated payroll obligations.
It should be recalled that in order for the country to develop
as a whole the state must effectively guide and promote
sectors for development in which the nation may hold a
comparative advantage. In order to achieve this the state must
implement policies that will generate investment by increasing
the savings of the national private-sector, government, and in
the current case the foreign investment sector as well."
The 1980s Debt-Crisis has required the Argentine
state to find new and alternative sources of financing. One
measure has aimed at increasing the national tax base, whereas
another more common measure has been the privatization of the
state-sector. As a consequence of increased fiscal
responsibility, as well as a marked reduction in tax evasion,
the Argentine state in the process has been able to reduce its
deficit by spending less and taxing the population more
efficiently (see table n* 08) . It can be held that these are
clearly fiscally sound measures. The problem is that in both
cases these measures may mean that a certain sector of the
national society must ultimately make sacrifices. The usual
21
This can be easily illustrated by the formula:
I = SP + S+ SF
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route tends to be promoting private savings as a means of
increasing investment. What is interesting to note is that
private savings may be increased by effectuating a change in
the distribution of national income to the disadvantage of the
lower classes. This is because the more affluent sector of a
society is prone to save a greater portion of its income than
does the national proletariat, since it has more income
available to save.22
It is obvious that the government has committed
itself to maintaining the current economic reform policies,
but what is troubling is the attitude of the Argentine
national electorate. These same objectives are shared by a
large segment of the national population, as well as by the
main political parties which continue demanding a freer, more
22
An alternative source of development funding available to
a government when it is no longer able to procure the means of
funding investment (I) due to reduced access to SG and/ or SF
is redistributing income away from the poorer sections of its
constituency. This is usually undertaken in order to encourage
increased private savings (SP). Naturally being a highly
political move, it can only be logically implemented when a
government has the power/ political will to effect such a
move. This sort of measure is usually carried out via tax
reform, abolition of minimum wage, and/ or labor reform geared
towards de-regulating institutionalized collective bargaining
agreements. Argentina's recent constitutional reform has
facilitated the aforesaid by allowing the concept of
"ballotage". In effect the current Menem administration can
foreseeably implement these sort of measures and still be able
to effectively govern with the support of approximately fifty
percent of the national electorate.
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open, and prosperous community.23  This is despite the fact
that the new Argentine economic model has not resulted in the
general improvement of the entire Argentine electorate.
Recall that a major source of discontent has been
the continued levels of unemployment that are increasing, as
well as the fact that few benefits from drastic economic
reform have spilled over or "trickled down" to the poorer
interior provinces (see table no 01). Especially troubling in
this regard has been the issue of provincial resistance,
primarily in the Northwest, to implementing not only tax
reform as mandated by the central government, but also the
issue of cutting public-sector employment rolls.24 Regardless
of such setbacks the Argentine Republic has continued to offer
foreign investors persisting good economic news as made
readily apparent by low inflation levels (a mere 3 percent in
23
See, Hugh A. Arbat, "Argentina" in LatinFinance.
(Supplement - April 1994 ), pg. 34.
24
The Menem administration is aware that there exist a high
social cost being paid at the moment ( quite troubling during
an election year ), especially in the interior provinces.
Consequently, it is not surprising to realize that it has been
announced by Domingo Cavallo, Economic's Minister, that the
federal government will commence to invest/ grant credits
earmarked for creating employment in the provinces.
Especially, relevant in this regards has been the issue of
promoting the construction sector. The aim here has been to
create jobs in an industry that will result in the increase
of housing and housing related services. See, "Preocupaci6n de
Cavallo: Dardn cr6ditos a las provincias para obras creadoras
de empleo" in El Cronista. Buenos Aires, Argentina. (July 29,
1994).
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June 1994) which are at or near the U.S. level. President
Menem's possibility of running for a new term of office in
1995 has largely translated into meaning that the economic
reform policies and goals set by his administration would
largely tend to continue unaltered.2"
Though the Argentine Republic under the Menem
administration has made significant advances in the short-
term, these have been accomplished at a high social cost. To
guarantee the success of the neo-liberal reforms the country
has seen recently the increase of its external trade balance
(the U$S 3.2 billion trade deficit for 1993, is a 20 percent
increase over the 1992 level and the highest level ever
recorded in Argentina), as well as increased social costs
being borne by the less privileged sectors of Argentine
society. The state must prepare itself to either actively
promote job creation or improve state compensation for the
unemployed, measures alluded to by the International Monetary
Fund incidently.
Notably, even though imports are increasing in the
Argentine Republic at the moment, a large amount of these are
contributing to improving Argentina's manufacturing
25
For more information regarding this particular matter
see, Richard Voorhees, " Argentina rides the falling German
interest-rate trend " in LatinFinance. (July-August 1994), n*
59, pg 60. In essence the author makes the argument that
Menem's reelection in 1995 would contribute in maintaining on
course the country's political and economic reforms.
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infrastructure. Furthermore, exports have increased by 18
percent from the 1993 levels.26  The issue now for the
government is how to increase employment levels.
Although the Argentine state has been able to
achieve without a doubt an improved situation on a
macroeconomic level, its efforts on a microeconomic level have
tended to fall rather short. In essence the Argentine state
has brought about macroeconomic stability, which has resulted
in fiscal discipline, and thus assured the government's
economic policy credibility. The problem currently with the
Argentine economy is that it is still remains fairly closed,
as is seen by the sum of Argentina's merchandize trade in 1993
which amounted to approximately 11 percent of its GDP.27 In
26
See, Ingrid Blauer and John West, "Solid State:
Argentina's Bond market Continues to Offer Opportunities" in
LatinFinance (Supplement July-August 1994 ), pg. 16~. The
authors go on to point out that the current situation supports
the opinion that the Argentine national currency is stable,
thus largely ruling out the possibility of currency
devaluation in the medium-term.
27
With regards to this issue it should be recalled that
Argentine industry has gone through considerable changes as
off 1955. Since that point in time it has moved from labor-
intensive to capital-intensive production methods. In addition
industrial enterprises during the 1955 to 1973 period have
gotten larger will simultaneously increasing in technological
sophistication. This has largely been due to foreign
investment carried out by large multi-national corporations.
With the advent of the easy financing in the 1970s the state
sought to develop sophisticated technologies on its own as a
means of freeing itself from foreign dependence. The
subsequent Debt-Crisis of the 1980s forced the Argentine state
to seek new means of financing its development via neo-liberal
economic policy and the privatization of the state-sector.
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order to improve the situation the Argentine government may
see itself forced to implement labor market reforms in order
to improve the country's overall ability at attracting foreign
investment, as well as reducing the costs associated with
labor in the country. These sorts of measures need to be done
by improving the country's regulatory environment in favor of
business, trade, and taxation.28
This particular position is similar to the one held
by such presidential opposition candidates as Chacho Alvarez
of Frente Grande who have argued that there would not be a
state mandated wage increase for labor, but rather that the
workers' salaries should be improved by indirect methods such
as the implementation of an improved public education system,
a better public health system geared towards addressing the
needs of the workers, and a tax system that is less onerous
for the working class.29
Such proposals are in line with current
International Monetary Fund thinking as can be evidenced by
the statements made by Michael Cassimadissus when in Buenos
See, Paul H. Lewis, The Crisis of Argentine Capitalism.
Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1990, pg.
298.
28
See, David Lubin, " Risk and Rhetoric: In Search of a
Definition for Country Risk " in LatinFinance. ( Supplement -
September 1994 ), pg. 19.
29
See, "Economia", El Cronista Internacional: Edicion Fax
Internacional. Buenos Aires, Argentina, Sept. 7, 1994, pg. 2.
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Aires, as well as those of the United States Department of
State .30 The dependent nature of Argentina and the rest of
Latin America is clearly made evident by the 1980s Debt-
Crisis. Recall that this was brought about by the necessity of
finding new means of financing economic development as
alternative to direct foreign investment. Thus, in the past,
in order to undertake development projects, the state was
required to turn to international financing.
Consequently, like most other Latin American states
the Argentine Republic borrowed heavily during the 1970s in
order to implement its development projects, as well as
purchase military and consumer items. These measures were
based primarily on overly optimistic growth forecasts, which
did not contemplate the increase in oil prices (oil shock of
the 1970s) and subsequently the ensuing increases in consumer
30
Ambassador Alexander F. Watson, Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs, has recently argued that in
Latin America there is a growing perception of a new role for
government. No longer is government seen as the primary source
for economic growth. Rather, the new role being increasingly
assumed by government has been that of setting the rules and
the framework for private decision making and that the rule of
the law is applied to all citizens rich and poor alike. That
there is a need for the state to invest in basic human and
physical infra-structure which is highly beneficial to society
as a whole, but is beyond the individual's ability to finance
(i.e. health and education). Furthermore, the elimination of
artificial protection and/ or subsides to inefficient
industries lowers the cost of living which incidently benefits
the poor and the middle class. For more information see,
Alexander F. Watson, Political, Economic and Security Issues
in the Western Hemisphere, Paper as delivered as the remarks
delivered to the Miami Congressional Workshop, Miami, FL.,
January 7, 1994, ARA/ Press Release, pg. 6-7.
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and capital goods in tandem with the decline in the price of
agricultural products. As a result of the preceding, along
with a rise in interest payments, this has required that post-
1973 administrations petition the International Monetary Fund
for the approval of new loans in order to meet the demands
associated with the country's initial debt.
To accomplish these goals the state was required to
prove itself creditworthy and consequently, to implement the
economic dictates of the IMF. Typical policy recommendations
made by the IMF in the past have been aimed at emphazing
austerity measures. For example, a favorite measure has been
the abolition of governmental subsidies on gasoline,
electricity, transportation, or basic foods, as well as
freezing wages and an ending public works projects while
simultaneously emphasizing an increase in exports. It has been
argued that the IMF's policies can pose a direct challenge to
both democracy and economic development, since the
implementation of such policies threaten the popular backing
of fragile democracies like that of Argentina in the 198O's.
This leads one to question how the successful
implementation of economic reform policy can require that
labor reform measures be undertaken and how this in turn may
come to negatively affect democratic mechanisms. In essence
the government of Carlos Saul Menem has been able to implement
31
See, Burns, pg. 314.
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a structurally sound policy of official restraint
characterized by not only prudent budgetary policy, but also
by increased industrial and agricultural production. This in
turn has led to expanded regional and international trade for
the Argentine state. In addition Argentina's privatization
program has brought an estimated U$S 9 billion in cash into
the country, as well as lowered the national debt by U$S 4
billion. In essence privatization has not only resulted in
bringing about greater efficiency for the Argentine economy,
but it has also apparently brought about increased
competitiveness, productivity, improvement of infra-structure,
and better wages.32 Yet, the cost associated with these
measures has been forced upon organized labor's shoulders.
CONCLUDING SUMMARY
In conclusion the Menem administration has
endeavored to ameliorate the position of a sector of the
national electorate, the middle class and the medium to high
industrial commercial/ industrial sector, by improving its
general economic welfare. This situation is clearly evident by
the swing of approximately U$S 10 billion dollars as this
pertains to the previous national U$S 8 billion trade surplus
to the current U$S 2 billion trade deficit. This tends to be
32
See, Haas, pg. 83.
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indicative of increased consumer consumption, facilitated by
the national government, which implies that political
discontent may have been effectively neutralized or
significantly reduced in the short-term.33 Thus, as a
consequence of macroeconomic stability President Menem has
been allowed the possibility of promulgating constitutional
reform in order to assure himself the opportunity of immediate
reelection in 1995. The official government logic behind this
endeavor has been to guarantee the continued and uninterrupted
implementation of the economic reform measures which have
brought to the Argentine Republic macroeconomic stability.
This being a stability brought about by implementing a policy
of privatization and fiscal responsibility which has allowed
the government to cut back drastically on its expenditure.
Though these measures have met with a large degree
of success, and thus have inspired foreign invrestor
confidence, they have come to exert an increasingly elevated
domestic social price. A major problem is that the liquidation
of assets is merely a temporary or short-term measure or
stimulus. Eventually the Argentine state will run out of
33
The government's fiscally sound policies have resulted in
not only improving the Argentine Republic's international
credit, but has also "trickled down" to the Argentine
population of improve access to credit. In essence the middle
class has seen itself able to borrow increased amounts of
monies against their personal credit cards. This has allowed
them to continue to consume even though they may not have the
funds necessary to make the purchases.
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assets to privatize, since, for example, the only two major
remaining state concerns are the atomic energy power-plants
and the country's airports, both of which have been slated for
eventual privatization. An additional argument against the
complete privatization of the state-sector is that in the
future those assets that have been privatized (physical assets
and equipment utilized in the production process and service
industry) will commence to generate returns not for the state,
but rather for the new owners. The fear is that under certain
circumstances, especially those associated with sociopolitical
and economic instability, these may increasingly be shipped
overseas which could further contribute to aggravate local
tensions. In essence it becomes a case in which the state will
no longer be able to exert unquestioned control over those
assets. Rather, it will merely exercise the more traditional
role of revenue collecting entity, instead of reaping profits
from the means of production, as well as from the exploitation
of national resources.
It should be pointed out with regards to the
foregoing that the issue of State-Centric Development and
Foreign Investment is in reality at the heart of the Argentine
economic problem and thus a primary cause of sociopolitical
and economic tensions. Recall that during the 1955 to 1973
period there existed broad agreement among Argentine
economists, government officials, and military officers that
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the move towards large and sophisticated enterprises was
desirable. Yet, the problem then resided in the fact that much
of the country's "dynamic" industries were controlled by
foreign concerns. This was an issue that Radl Prebisch pointed
when he argued that controversy would without a doubt arise
with Argentines, for whom economic independence was a
principle source of national pride.34
Regardless of the issue of hostility to the massive
entry of foreign investment capital into the Argentine economy
it is worthwhile to point out that the Menem government is not
the first presidential administration to have adopted neo-
liberal policy measures that favor foreign investment. Arturo
Frondizi of the Union Civica Radical Intransigente (UCRI)
sought to win the Peronists masses over by building up
Argentine heavy industry which would not only create new jobs,
but also secure the country's economic independence. In order
to achieve this goal the government had to attract massive
amounts of foreign investment via the reduction of government
regulations, balancing the budget, curbing inflation, and
keeping labor unions under control. Furthermore, profit
remittances and the repatriation of capital were freely
permitted. In addition these measures were accompanied by
special tax incentives for those firms which would reinvest
their profits in Argentina. The problem for Frondizi was that
34
See, Lewis, pg. 300 - 301.
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his economic policies depended on a continuing inflow of
capital.35
Unlike other neo-liberal economic policies of the
past the one implemented by Menem has succeeded in the sense
that it has been able to reassure foreign investors of the
profitability of investing in a stable Argentina. The
government is no longer shackled by the notion of developing
the country on its own for reasons of economic nationalism,
nor for that matter is it any longer forced by political
necessity to form a political alliance with labor. This in
turn allows one to agree in the 1990s with Guido Di Tella's
statement that what Argentina required in the 1960s was a
Schumpeterian entrepreneur which would be both innovative and
daring. Thus, the Menem government has forgone the Colbertian
notions of the businessman, inextricably linked to the state
in a kind of neo-mercantalist arrangement which shield
business from competition while simultaneously assuring it
35
Mallon and Sourrouille both observed that Frondizi's neo-
liberal policy was an "all or nothing strategy" that required
constant forward motion in order to attain success. In essence
they have argued that "all desirable investment programs could
be financed rapidly and simultaneously with a massive inflow
of foreign investment, which would take care of the balance of
payments constraints." Critical to this situation was the
issue of investor confidence in the sense that should it be
shaken there would result a slowdown of inflows of new capital
and cause the entire strategy to collapse. See, Lewis, pg.
304.
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profit, which crippled the entrepreneurial spirit."
In the process the Menem administration's
privatization program has had the positive effect not only of
reducing the state-sector's operating deficit, but has also
contributed in transforming money losing state enterprises
into more efficient and profit-orientated private-sector tax
paying entities. It has already been stated above that these
actions have been carried out by abandoning the outdated
nationalistic economic rhetoric as a means of contributing to
the further consolidation of investor confidence in the
Argentine Republic.
Even so, there are major concerns, especially
relating to the proper workings of Argentine democratic
mechanisms. The government may eventually see itself obliged
to resorting to the promulgation of presidential decrees, thus
circumventing the elected congressional authorities of the
country, as means of continuing with its successful economic
policies. In effect such a situation would indicate a marked
reduction in congressional oversight, as well as increased
Executive Branch supremacy.
Also troubling in this regard has been the Argentine
state's vulnerability to fluctuations associated with any
increase in interest rates in the United States. These could
supposedly come to negatively influence the Argentine economy,
36
Ibid, pg. 329.
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and thus the Argentine political system, by increasing
financial pressures upon the national government. The Menem
administration may thus see itself required by the need to
remain internationally creditworthy with no other recourse
than to increase the Argentine interest rates. This would be
a de-stabilizing measure on a macroeconomic level, since it
would tend to be highly inflationary in nature. 37 Even though
a falling dollar rate might eventually lead the dollar-linked
Argentine economy to increase its exports, it may also result
in increased prices of imports, that are currently required
for the modernization of the national infra-structure. In turn
this could renew inflationary pressures brought about by
increased prices.38
The successful implementation of economic reform has
led to breaking up vertically and horizontally the previously
monolithic state-owned industries into smaller, more natural
business units, and has increased in the process both
efficiency and productivity. Yet, this situation may come to
demand a higher than expected price on the mechanisms of
37
Though rising interest rates may constitute disposable
income in other states, in Menem's Argentina this situation
tends to imply an inflationary situation. In effect the
success of the country's economic policy, and thus by default
its economic stability, has been pegged at a low inflation
rate in conjunction with reduced wages as a means of
attracting foreign investment.
38
See, Victoria Griffith, "Hills and Valleys" in
LatinFinance ( July/ August 1994 ), n* 59, pg. 22-23.
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Argentine democracy. This may result, as a consequence of the
state's perceived need to continue the economic reform program
on a macroeconomic level, without granting microeconomic
concerns due consideration. Such action might, in turn lead,
the state to implement measures which aim to further promote
foreign investment to the detriment of the local Argentine
labor sector which may thus come to be required to increase
productivity by sacrificing more - reduced wages and reduced
consumption in favor of increased productivity aimed at
servicing the interests of the export sector.39
In the end it can be seen that during the 45 months
of the Convertibility Plan, defined as from April 1991 to
December 1994, there have occurred the following changes in
Argentine relative prices:
39
As a consequence of such measures it is not surprising to
realize that the evolution of relative prices in 1994 and
since the implementation of the Convertibility Plan tend to
suggest greater deflation in order to make the country more
competitive. The aforesaid arises as a fact even though the
country's productivity during this period has continued to
increase. This manner of situation allows one to concur with
the notion that distortions in relative prices lead business
in general to make easy microeconomic adjustments to adopt to
modern times in the context of an opening economy. Within this
context it is worthwhile to recall that the government has
adopted various economic policy measures geared towards
helping lower the cost to business by eliminating distortive
taxes, reducing social security contributions, deregulating
various activities, and taken active steps to counter import
competition. Yet, there still remain serious difficulties,
which may lead to increased tensions in the Argentine system,
due to resistance regarding changes in working conditions. The
previous includes such issues as the gradual restriction on
greater job demand. See, Consejo Tecnico de Inversiones, pg.
74.
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1) sharp rise of agricultural prices in industrial costs
2) marked upturn in labor costs for industry
3) heavy growth in real industrial wage
4) significant increase in industrial salary in dollars
5) hike in utility costs for industry
6) steady appreciation in agricultural prices in dollar terms
7) noticeable decline in utility costs for agriculture
8) substantial relative decline in utility costs for
industrial workers
9) improvement in the purchasing power of the food basket for
salaried industrial workers.4"
Thus, in order to increased its competitiveness the
state must implement measures that aim not only at market
liberalization, but that also favor export-competing
producers. As the national economy take-off the costs to
business should be reduced by increased profitability, thus
offsetting the cost of labor. Menem has laid the foundation
for this by attacking organized labor's hold on the nation,
essentially by divesting the state of import-substitution
policies and exposing industry to competition."
40
Ibid, pg. 74.
41
In essence the Menem government has identified
macroeconomic instability as arising from the strength which
organized labor exerted upon the Republic. Menem has attacked
Peronism's labor power base, but the alliance with the middle
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As a final comment the argument can be made,
utilizing Peter Evans's position calling for a more active and
entrepreneurial state, in the sense that the Argentine state
ought to become the nation's promoter of its industry and not
the nation's primary businessman. This would fortify the
notion that even when industrial development is underway an
active state apparatus is still required to counteract the
tendencies of international capital to centralize newer,
higher earning industrial activity in the core. 42  The
Argentine state role would be to accumulate capital at the
local level by attracting it from overseas for investment in
Argentina. This could be done not only by guaranteeing the
access to local and regional markets, but also by offering
technologically sophisticated labor at competitive
international prices.
class and conservative sectors of the economy has offset the
more negative effects of such measures. Menem and Cavallo
have identified that import substitution policies of the past
in conjunction to subsides to manufacturing had created by
1989 swollen industries artificially powerful labor unions.
See, Jeffrey A. Frieden, Debt, Development, and Democracy:
Modern Political Economy and Latin America, 1965 - 1985.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991, pg. 210.
42
See, Peter Evans, "Class, State, and Dependence in East
Asia: Lessons for Latin Americanists" in The Political Economy
of the New Asian Industrialism. ed. Frederic Deyo. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1987, pg. 205 & 221, as quoted in
Frieden, pg. 238.
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CHAPTER FOUR
TENDENCIES OF THE LOCAL ARGENTINE ELECTORATE
RESIDENT IN THE CITY OF MIAMI, FLORIDA
The chapter will address the issues of economic
development and the possibility of the erosion of democracy by
measuring the Miami Argentine electorate's tendencies. The
principal premise is that support for the ruling party, in
this case Menem and his brand of sociopolitical and economic
reforms, tends to indicate a propensity for the aforesaid as
a means of assuring the continuity of economic reform and
stability.
This survey tends to mirror the tendencies of the
larger Argentine electorate in that not only has the local
expatriate community maintained close cultural and political
ties to Argentina, as is evidenced by the large voter turnout
for a voluntary election on a Sunday, but also the composition
of the local electorate is demographically similar to that of
the City of Buenos Aires.
With regards to the preceding it should be pointed
out that the City of Buenos Aires is Argentina's largest and
most politically sophisticated electorial district. Though in
many respects the local electorate is similar to that of the
City of Buenos Aires and the major urban center of the
Argentine Republic, Miami' expatriate community is prone to be
much more representative of Argentina's upper middle class
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than would be the case if the same survey had been
administered across the board in Argentina. This fact tends to
eliminate not only the influence of a large segment of the
poorer class, but also of the economically powerful upper
class. Consequently, the results of the survey are biased
towards a middle class perspective as would be the case for
the City of Buenos Aires.
The sociopolitical and economic survey was
administered to registered voters during the October 3, 1993,
Argentine Parliamentary elections held at that nation's
Consular Mission in the City of Miami, Florida. These local
results have tended to mirror the overall tendencies of the
Argentine national electorate within the national boundaries
of the Argentine Republic. Of added importance in this matter
is the fact that during August and September 1993, Gallup
Argentina administered a series of polls in the Argentine
Republic which aimed at gauging the Argentine electorate's
particular sociopolitical and economic orientation in
conjunction with its electorial tendencies. Gallup Argentina's
study concluded that approximately 41 percent of those polled
would vote for the current ruling party of Carlos Saul Menem).
Furthermore, this tendency has been made amply evident by the
electorate's 42 percent vote of support on the October 1993,
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elections.' It should be pointed out that the preceding
figure of popular support has largely been carried through
until the eve of the 1995 presidential election.
THE SURVEY: ITS PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY
The survey administered during the October 1993,
Argentine Parliamentary election has sought to gauge the
particular tendencies of the resident Argentine community
registered to vote at that country's Consular Mission in the
City of Miami, Florida. This particular survey is composed of
sixteen questions, of which five are of general demographic
and background information and the balance are structured to
determine the individual respondent's sociopolitical and
economic orientation.
Though the questionnaire administered for the survey
does not require the respondent to directly identify his or
her party affiliation, since that would violate the concept of
the secret ballot, it is structured to allow one to determine
if the respondent is or is not in favor of the current
government and its polices. This is further supported by
tabulating the results of the questionnaire with the overall
ballot box count.
Marita Carballo, "C6mo votaron los argentinos y el
perfil del sufragio partidario" in La Nacion, (Politica/
Educaci6n) Buenos Aires, Argentina, Oct. 9, 1993.
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In order to properly comprehend the results of this
survey, in comparison to the overall results in the Argentine
Republic, it is worthwhile to initially review each question
and its responses. Subsequently, the responses for a set of
specific questions shall be compared in order to gain an
overall picture of the local Argentine electorate's
sociopolitical and economic proclivity in regards to the
possibility of it coming to acquiesce to the erosion of
certain democratic mechanisms.
In overall terms 204 individual electors were
surveyed on October 3, 1993, out of 422 who participated in
the election. Consequently, the survey was administered to
approximately 48 percent of that electorial contest's voting
population. With regards to voter turnout it should be
mentioned that 64 percent of those registered to vote (653)
participated.2
In order to gain a clearer understanding of the
voters who participated in the survey I will break down the
survey group along age and gender lines. This is primarily
done as a result of the fact that these two variables are the
ones which hold the most statistically meaningful analysis
2
It should be realized that as opposed to the
obligatory nature of voting within the Argentine Republic,
voting overseas is non-obligatory for Argentine nationals.
Consequently, a large voter turnout can be held to be merely
a sign of political/ civic indoctrination or hopefully a
definitive sign of advanced civic responsibility.
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value for this particular study. The survey has shown that
nearly almost all of the respondents are working private
sector employees or trained professionals. As a consequence
the survey group has therefore largely been made up of
respondents that have completed high school and some measure
university education.
TABLE N* 09
BREAKDOWN BY AGE AND GENDER GROUPS
MALE (126 total)
18 - 35 36 - 50 51 - 65 OVER 66
31 51 34 10
FEMALE (78 total)
18 - 35 36 - 50 51 - 65 OVER 66
24 36 13 5
A much more graphical representation of the
aforesaid can be construed by creating a pyramid of the
respondents independent of gender, marital status, educational
and/ or professional background. This is both a worthwhile
measure, as well as a preliminary step required prior to
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addressing each individual question. This measure should allow
one to gain a better understanding of the makeup of the
participating electorate.
OVER 66 (15)
51 - 65 (47)
36 - 50 (87)
18 - 35 (55)
Fig. 2. Age pyramid of local Argentine electorate
participating in the October 3, 1993, Argentine
Parliamentary elections, as well as surveyed
during the same.
In fig. 2, one can denote both the breakdown by age,
as well as the total number of respondent per age category.
This sort of method assists one in identifying age blocks
which allow certain conclusions, that shall be addressed
shortly, to be drawn. Consequently, the next step involved is
to address each individual question and its particular
responses.
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QUESTION N* 6
Some people hold the opinion that the Argentina's economic
situation has improved as a result of the economic policy
adopted by the Menem government.
In overall terms, regardless of personal background,
46 percent (98) of the respondents agreed with the question.
While an additional 29 percent (61) tend to agree. This shows
that a large percentage of the local electorate supported
during that period in time the notion that the country's
economic situation had improved as a consequence of the
measures adopted by the Menem government. These results
demonstrate a strong tendency of support which can be
graphically visualized in the following pie chart.
Parliamentary Election Results
Question N4 6 (Overall)
AGREE 4e%
98
TEND NOT TO AGREE 5Z\\ 11
DNT KNOW/ DNT ANSNRR 7%TEND TO AGREE 29% 15
DO NOT AGREE 13%
28
Out of 204 voters
Fig. 3. Parliamentary Election Results (Question N* 6).
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QUESTION N* 7
Some people hold the opinion that the pluralistic democratic
system currently in place should be temporarily suspended if
it results to be an impediment to the economic development of
Argentina.
With regards to this question 49 percent (99) of
those polled did not agree with the question and only 8
percent (17) tend not to agree. What is troublesome is that
though only 13 percent (27) of the electorate, largely
composed of middle class professionals, agree with the
question and a further 6 percent (13) tend to agree, nearly a
quarter ( 24 percent) of those surveyed responded that they
did not know/ did not wish to answer (possibility of consent).
Parliamentary Election Results
Question N° 7 (Overall)
DO NOT AGREE 49%
99
TEND TO AGREE 6%
13
DNT KNOW/ DNT ANSWER 24% TEND NOT TO AGREE 8%
48 17
AGREE 13%
27
Out of 204 voter.
Fig. 4. Parliamentary Election Results (Question N* 7).
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QUESTION N* 8
Some people hold the opinion that the privatization program
adopted by the government has been a positive step taken for
Argentine development.
The surveyed electorate responded overwhelmingly, 62
percent (126), that they agree with the question. Furthermore,
21 percent (43) tend to agree. This represents that
approximately 83 percent of those surveyed agree and/ or tend
to largely agree with the current government's privatization
program.
Parliamentary Election Results
Question N9 8 (Overall)
AGREE 62%
126
DNT KNOW/DNT ANSER 4%
N 9
- DO NO[ AG1lEE /%
15
TEND NOT TO AGREE 5%
TEND TO AGREE 21%
43
Out of 204 voters
Fig. 5. Parliamentary Election Results (Question N* 8).
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QUESTION N* 9
Some people hold the opinion that the economic measures taken
by Domingo Cavallo in order to control inflation have been the
most adequate ones possible.
More than half of those surveyed, 55 percent (113),
agree with the question. In addition 25 percent (50) also tend
to agree with the question. Whereas, only 5 percent (10) of
the respondents tend not to agree and 4 mere percent (9) did
not agree with the question outright.
Parliamentary Election Results
Question N4 9 (Overall)
AGREE 66%
113
DO NOT AGREE 4%
TEND NOT TO AGREE 5%
10
DNT KNOW/DNT ANSWER 11xTEND TO AGREE 25% 22
50
Out of 204 voters
Fig. 6. Parliamentary Election Results (Question N* 9).
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QUESTION N* 10
Some people hold the opinion that the individual members of a
society should be prepared to sacrifice their own economic
interests in order to assure full national economic
development.
Approximately half of those interviewed, 46 percent
(93) agree with the question, while an additional 17 percent
(34) tend to agree. On the other hand 17 percent (34) did not
agree with the question's premise and an additional 9 percent
(19) tend not to agree either. On middle ground one finds that
12 percent (24) of those polled answered that they did not
know/ did not want to answer the question.
Parliamentary Election Results
Question N2 10 (Overall)
AGREE 46%
93
TEND TO AGREE 17%
34/
34DO NOT AGREE 17%
34
DNT KNOW/DN ANSWER 12% TEND NOT TO AGREE 9%
19
Out of 204 voters
Fig. 7. Parliamentary Election Results (Question N* 10)
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QUESTION N* 11
As a consequence of the world's new reality in wake of the
post-Cold War some people say that Argentina ought to accede
to American foreign policy interests ( ie dismantle the Condor
II, vote with the United States at the United Nations, sign
the non-proliferation treaty, etc ) in order to assure access
to economic aid and credits controlled by the United States.
Nationalistic sentiments in this case have balanced
out more equitably the respondents opinions. Only 30 percent
(62) of those polled agree with the question's premise. While
16 percent (33) tend to agree. Nearly a quarter of the
electorate, 24 percent (49) did not agree outright with the
question followed by 14 percent (29) which tended not to
agree. The swing vote in this particular case is held by the
group that answered that they did not know/ did not wish to
answer, which makes up 15 percent (31) in this case.
Parliamentary Election Results
Question N9 11 (Overall)
AGREE 30%
TEND TO AGREE 16% 62
33
DNT KNOW/DNT ANSWER 15% /
31
DO NOT AGREE 24%
49
TEND NOT TO AGREE 14%
Out of 204 "otore 29
Fig. 8. Parliamentary Election Results (Question N* 11).
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QUESTION N* 12
Some people say that it is necessary to reform the national
constitution in order to permit. the reelection of the
president.
Nearly half, 45 percent (92), of the respondents
agree with the question. These are in turn supported by 17
percent (34) which tend to agree. Though 22 percent (45) of
those surveyed do not agree with the question, as well as 5
percent (11) which tend not to agree, these groups are in the
minority. Even if the entire group that answered that they did
not know/ did not answer were to place its support in the camp
of the anti-reformists, constitutional reform still would be
adopted, since the former holds 62 percent of the electorate.
Parliamentary Election Results
Question N4 12 (Overall)
AGREE 45%
92
TEND TO AGREE 17%
34
DO NOT AGREE 22%
45
DNT KNOW/DNT ANSWER 11%
22 TEND NOT TO AGREE 5%
11
Out of 204 voters
Fig. 9. Parliamentary Election Results (Question N* 12).
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QUESTION N* 13
Other people say that constitutional reform intents ought to
be supported only if President Menem were not the principal
beneficiary of an such undertaking.
32 percent (66) do not agree with the question
followed by an additional 10 percent (20) that tend not to
agree for a possible total of 42 percent support for President
Menem. In overall terms 45 percent (93) of those interviewed
agree and/ or tend to agree with the question. The issue
becomes irrelevant due to the fact of the polarization of the
Argentine electorate, since even with such a figure of public
support Carlos Saul Menem still controls the largest block of
potential voters.
Parliamentary Election Results
Question N° 13 (Overall)
TEND TO AGREE 1% AGREE 30%
SDNT KNOW/DNT AN WER 12%
25
TEND NOT TO AGREE 10%
20 DO NOT AGREE 32%
66
Owl of 204 voters
Fig. 10. Parliamentary Election Results (Question N* 13)
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QUESTION N* 14
Some people say that if they had a million U$S dollars they
would invest them in Argentina.
Nearly half ( 45 percent ) of those surveyed support
the question's premise, 34 percent (70) agree and 11 percent
(23) tend to agree. A quarter of those surveyed (50)
manifested that they do not know/ do not wish to answer. This
can be inferred to mean that they are largely unopposed to the
idea and thus subsequently tend to tacitly support the notion.
Only 19 percent (38) of those polled did not agree with the
question followed an 11 percent (23) which tend not to agree.
Parliamentary Election Results
Question N° 14 (Overall)
AGREE 34%
TEND TO AGREE 11%
23\\\
DNT KNOW/DNT ANSWER 25% DO NOT AGREE 19%50 38
TEND NOT TO AGREE 11%
23
Out or 204 voters
Fig. 11. Parliamentary Election Results (Question N* 14)
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QUESTION N* 15
Some people say that it is more important to have development
and economic stability ( defined in this case as access to the
latest consumer items, as well as low inflationary levels )
than to have full political and labor rights, in other words
a situation similar to Chile under the Pinochet regime.
Only 21 percent (42) of those polled answered that
they agree with the question. Yet, that percentile added to
the 11 percent (22) which answered that it tended to agree
with such a notion in addition to a large 18 percent (37)
segment, which responded that they did not know/ did not wish
to answer, makes this question quite troubling. Half the
electorate could surrender liberty for material well being.
Parliamentary Election Results
Question N° 15 (Overall)
TEND TO AGREE 11%
22
DNT KNOW/DNT ANSWER 18% AGREE 21%
37 42
TEND NOT TO AGREE 13%
26
DO NOT AGREE 38%
77
Out of 204 voters
Fig. 12. Parliamentary Election Results (Question N* 15)
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QUESTION No 16
Some people are in agreement with Menem that it is more
important to have a democracy of accomplishments and not one
of words.
In overall terms 71 percent (145) of those polled
agree with the question and therefore one can infer that they
agree with President Menem's statement. An additional 14
percent (28) tend also to agree with the question. Thus,
relegating to the remaining three groups a mere 25 percent of
the electorate.
Parliamentary Election Results
Question N° 16 (Overall)
AGREE 71%
146
DO NOT AGREE 7%
TEND NOI1410 AGREE 2%
DNT KNOW/DfTT ANSWER 6%
13
TEND TO AGREE 14%
28
Out of 204 voter.
Fig. 13. Parliamentary Election Results (Question N* 16)
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ANALYSIS
Of the eleven sociopolitical and economic questions
raised by the survey, four of these hold particular relevance
to this study. These questions are geared towards addressing
the issue of democracy vis-a-vis economic development and the
need for constitutional reform. The questions being analyzed
in this case are numbers seven, ten, thirteen and fifteen. The
study has already viewed the above mentioned questions, as
well as the other questions in the survey in overall terms
regardless of age and sex. The next logical step is to see if
these particular questions if viewed in terms of age and sex
tend to deviate from the previous analysis. Furthermore, the
aim here is to see if the results of these questions coincide
with the results obtained by the Argentine Gallup survey of
August/ September 1993.3 Consequently, this should allow one
to draw a conclusion as to the premise that the successful
implementation of economic reform and continued adherence to
such a plan may result in the erosion of democratic
mechanisms.
3
See, Carballo, in La Nacion. (Politica/ Educacion),
Oct. 09, 1993.
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QUESTION N* 7
Some people hold the opinion that the pluralistic democratic
system currently in place should be temporarily suspended if
it results to be an impediment to the economic development of
Argentina.
In overall terms the survey showed that 49 percent
(99) of the electorate did not agree with the question (see
fig. 4). If the same question is viewed in terms of the male
gender's response regardless of age the result is 55 percent
of those surveyed did not agree with the question.
Question Ng 7
Men ( Regardless of Age )
DNT KNOW/ DNT ANSWER 17% TEND TO AGREE 8%
21 7
TEND NOT TO AGREE 9%
11 AGREE 14%
17
ii Irr i 15 i
DO NOT AGREE 56%
69
Out of 126 voters
Fig. 14. Parliamentary Election Results (Question No 7)
for men regardless of age.
The same question reviewed in terms of women and
regardless of age shows that only 41 percent of those polled
did not agree with the question's premise.
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Question N2 7
Women ( Regardless of Age )
DNT KNOW/ ONT ANSWER 28% TEND TO AGREE 9%
22 7
AGREE 12%
TEND NOT TO AGREE 10%
DO NOT AGREE 41%
32
Out of 7o voters
Fig. 15. Parliamentary Election Results (Question N0 7)
for women regardless of age.
Now if the male and female variables are combined
with the age group 18 - 35 one can see that still 44 percent
of those polled continue not to agree with the question.
Question N2 7
Men & Women ( Ages 18 - 35 )
ONT KNOW/ DNT ANSWER 31%
17 TEND TO AGREE 11%
6
AGREE 7%
TEND NOT TO AGREE 7%
DO NOT AGREE 44%
24
Out of 66 Vetere
Fig. 16. Parliamentary Election Results (Question No 7)
for male and female/ age group 18 - 35.
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When the same question is viewed in terms of male
and female gender considering the age groups 36 - 50 and 51 -
65 one sees a variance to 56 percent of the responding
electorate non approval of the question.
Question N2 7
Men & Women ( Ages 36 - 50 & 51 - 65 )
DNT KNOW/ DNT ANSWER 15%
20 TNTOARE5%
TEND NOT TO AGREE 11% 8
14 AGREE 14%
19
DO NOT AGREE 56%
74
Out of 134 voters
Fig. 17. Parliamentary Election Results (Question N0 7)
for male and female/ age groups 36 - 50 and 51 - 65.
QUESTION N0 10
Some people hold the opinion that the individual members of a
society should be prepared to sacrifice their own economic
interests in order to assure full national economic
development.
In overall terms we have seen that the surveyed
population has responded that it agrees with the premise that
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the individual members of a society should be prepared to
sacrifice their individual economic interests in order to
assure full national economic development (see fig. 7). What
is interesting to note is that when one considers men
(regardless of age) the previous overall figure (both male and
female) jumps from 46 percent to 50 percent, but in the same
instance and under the same conditions the female population
(regardless of age) response rate decreases to 38 percent.
That sort of factor tends to imply that males are
more willing to accept the notion of individual sacrifice than
would be the case of the female population. Yet, it is
worthwhile to realize that males may also be more predisposed
to impose such a "sacrifice" on their fellow compatriots than
would be the case of their female counterparts.
The followings graphs tend to illustrate that
regardless of the aforesaid conclusions the Argentine
electorate, regardless of age and sex, tends to be highly
predisposed towards accepting the premises of the question.
This is made amply evident not only by the acceptance rate
towards the question, but especially by the low non-agreeing
rate involved in overall terms and according to gender
regardless of age. What is surprising that in the three
scenarios at least 10 percent of the population responded that
they did not know/ did not answer. This can be construed to
largely mean that if they do not oppose the question's premise
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they do not necessarily oppose it significantly enough to
worry about its implications.
Question N2 10
Men ( Regardless of Age )
AGREE 50%
62
TEND TO AGREE 15% DO NOT AGREE 16%
19 20
DNT KNOW/ DNT ANSWER 10% TEND NOT TO AGREE 9%
12 11
Out of 126 voters
Question N2 10
Women ( Regardless of Age )
AGREE 38%
30
TEND TO AGREE 16%
14
DO NOT AGREE 17%
13
DNT KNOW/ DNT ANSWER 15%
TEND NOT TO AGREE 12%
9
Out of 76 voters
Fig. 18. Parliamentary Election Results (Question N* 10)
for men and women regardless of age.
What is statistically interesting to note with
regards to this particular scenario is that the age factor
seems to play an important role. The younger section of the
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population (males and females ages 18 - 35) tend to be more
opposed to the implications involved with the question than
their elders. This can logically be held to be a product of
may be the younger generation's inexperience with the failed
sociopolitical and economic policies of their country, as well
as a result of youthful idealism.
Question N2 10
Men & Women ( Ages 18 - 35 )
AGREE 28%
TEND TO AGREE 22% 15
12
DNT KNOW/ DNT ANSWER 20% DO NOT AGREE 19%
out of , o,. r TEND NOT TO AGREE 11%
0
Question N2 10
Men & Women ( Ages 36 - 50 & 51 - 65 )
AGREE 51%
68
TEND TO AGREE 13% DO NOT AGREE 17%17 23
DNT KNOW/ DNT ANSWER 10% TEND NOT TO AGREE 10%313
Out of 134 voters
Fig. 19. Parliamentary Election Results (Question N* 10)
men and women groupings according to age breakdown.
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QUESTION N* 13
Other people say that constitutional reform intents ought to
be supported only if President Menem were not the principal
beneficiary of an such undertaking.
This question has been structured along such lines
as to gauge party affiliation. The responses obtained seem to
imply that males are more predisposed to back Menem.
Question N2 13
Men ( Regardless of Age )
TEND TO AGREE 14% AGREE 28%
17 35
DNT KNOW/ DNT ANSWER 10%
12
TEND NOT TO AGREE 11% \>
14
DO NOT AGREE 38%
47
Out of 120 moto "Otore
Question N' 13
Women ( Regardless of Age )
AGREE 34%
28
TEND TO AGREE 18%
DNT KNOW/ DNT ANSWER 14%
11 DO NOT AGREE 26%
20
Out of 7 female "teS TEND NOT TO AGREE 8%
8
Fig. 20. Parliamentary Election Results (Question N0 13)
support for Menem according to gender.
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With regards to the age factor and regardless of
gender what is interesting to note is that Menem overseas has
a stronger backing than seems to be the case in the Argentine
Republic among the population over 36 years of age and less
than 66 years of age. This further leads credence to the
various polls' conclusion that Menem (Justicialista Party)
holds the lion's share of the Argentine electorate.
Question N2 13
Men & Women ( Ages 18 - 35 )
TEND TO AGREE 1 / EE 28%
DNT KNOW/ DNT ANSWER 19%
10
DO NOT AGREE 24%
TEND NOT TO AGREE 11%
6
Out of ''''t' Question N1 13
Men & Women ( Ages 36 - 50 & 51 - 65 )
,REE 31%
TEND TO AGREE 14 41
19
DN T YNOW/ DNT ANSWER 7%
10
TJEND NOT TO AGREE 10%
DO NOT AGREE 38%
Out of 134 voter. 51
Fig. 21. Parliamentary Election Results (Question N* 13)
with regards to age.
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QUESTION N* 15
Some people say that it is more important to have development
and economic stability ( defined in this case as access to the
latest consumer items, as well as low inflationary levels )
than to have full political and labor rights, in other words
a situation similar to Chile under the Pinochet regime.
As has been made evident in overall terms (see fig.
12) the surveyed population does not agree with the question's
premise (38 percent). This is a fact that is further
strengthen by the results obtained by breaking down the
responses along gender and age lines, as well as mutually
combining elements of these. What continues to remain as a
defining constant is the propensity for a large sector of the
population to answer that they did not know/ did not wish to
answer the question.
Though the evidence presented by this question is
quite apparent if one reviews the resulting graphs what is
particularly interesting is not only the result, but also the
contradiction raised in comparison with question number 10. It
should be recalled that the aforementioned question raises the
issue of the need for personal sacrifice in order to assure
national economic development. It has been shown that 46
percent (see fig. 7) of the surveyed electorate are in favor
of such a measure, but the same electorate when asked if they
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support the premise of question 15 did not agree in the same
proportion as in the other question. This can be held to be a
result of the fact that question 15 is structured along much
more personal lines than question 10. This goes a long way
into supporting the notion that it is easier to pass/ transfer
the burden of sacrifice to another, than to place it upon
one's own shoulders.
Question N* 15
Men & Women ( Ages 18 - 35 )
DNT KNOW/DNT ANSWER 24%
13
TEND TO AGREE 11%
TEND NOT TO AGREE 16% aGREE 5%
g 3
DO NOT AGREE 44%
24
Ou,of .. t.,. Question N2  15
Men & Women ( Ages 36 - 50 & 51 - 65 )
TEND TO AGREE 8% AGREE 31%
12 44
DNT KNOW/ DNT ANSWER 14%
20
TEND NOT TO AGREE 11%
16
DO NOT AGREE 36%
52
out of 134 vot.rs
Fig. 22. Parliamentary Election Results (Question N°15)
men and women with regards to age.
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The aforementioned tends to be additionally
supported by the fact that there does not exist a significant
variance, to its contrary, if one takes into consideration
only the gender issue without regard to the age factor.
Question N2 15
Men ( Regardless of Age )
TEND TO AGREE 12%
DNT KNOW/ DNT ANSWER 15%
18 AGRE E 19%
\ 22
T END NO T TO AGREE 13x
16
DO NOT AGREE 43%
53
outo26.ot.r Question N* 15
Women ( Regardless of Age )
TEND TO AGREE 9r
6 AGPEE 24%
DNT KNOW/ DNT ANSWER 21%
16
TEND NOT TO AGREE 13%
10
DO NOT AGREE 35%
27
Out of 76 votbrS
Fig. 23. Parliamentary Election Results (Question N* 15)
men and women regardless of age.
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CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions that can be drawn from this chapter
are basically held to be that the variables utilized, in this
case age and gender, have tended to demonstrate that there
does exist a sociopolitical and economic tendency for the
Argentine electorate to acquiesce to certain aspects
associated with the possibility for the erosion of democratic
mechanisms. This is especially the case when one takes into
consideration the results associated with question number 10
and number 13. These two questions refer to the need for
individual economic sacrifice for national development (n* 10)
and political support (n° 13) for a candidate that has imaged
himself as a representative of economic stability via the
implementation of radical privatization/ neo-liberal market
strategies.
What is worthwhile to realize here is that though
the electorate (by percentages) has shown itself to be a
supporter of democracy, in overall terms (49 percent), it has
also shown itself to be willing to back a presidential
administration that has been able to implement its policy
goals by circumventing congressional opposition. It is
worthwhile to note that the Argentine political system has
traditionally been characterized by the fact that the
Executive Branch of the Government has always been the
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"princeps entre pares". This has historically meant that it
has been able to impose most of its measures with minimal
Legislative and/ or Judicial opposition. These sort of issues,
in conjunction with the electorate's overall propensity to be
willing to accept the viability of the concept of individual
economic sacrifice (question n* 10) for national development,
supports the notion that the implementation of drastic
economic reform may come to eventually undermine democratic
mechanisms in a crisis situation.
Precisely, as mentioned above, the current
administration has been able to largely accomplish many of its
policy goals by recurring to the implementation of
presidential decree legislation. Sustained popular and
institutional opposition to the privatization program and its
implications has been circumvented by the preceding sort of
presidential action. Furthermore, with regards to the
preceding it should be clarified that Congressional opposition
to such measures has only been half hearted at best as a
result of the fact that Menem's party after the October 3,
1993, elections walked away with 43 percent of the popular
vote compared to the main opposition, Radical Union (UCR),
which obtained only 30 percent of the popular vote.
As a consequence that election has resulted in
granting the current government and its Justicialista Party
complete control of the Chamber of Deputies, the
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Justicialistas won 18 of 24 electoral districts, as well as
hold 2/3 of the Senate until 1998 and an absolute majority
until 2001. Such an effective dominance of the Argentine
political arena tends to bolster the implementation of the
government's economic policy and continued near term adherence
to it as well. The mechanisms of democracy may have not been
cashiered, but rather have been revamped to conform to the
current realities of development in the post-Debt Crisis era
in conjunction with the demands imposed by the World-System
perspective.
In closing it is also worthwhile to mention with
regards to the above mentioned facts the issue of the freedom
of the press. Sustained criticism of the Menem government and
its methods has arisen lately, in part also a result of the
economic downswing, this has prompted the government to seek
to restrain and/ or gag the independent Argentine press. The
Government has thus forwarded to the Argentine Senate a series
of proposed legislation that would in effect equate slander
with involuntary manslaughter. The proposed legislation, known
as the ley Barra (Barra's Law) after Menem's Minister of
Justice, counts with the backing of the President and the
Minster of the Interior, Carlos Corach.4  The proposed
4
See, " Sigu4 la polemica por la ley contra la prensa ",
in La Nacion. Buenos Aires, Argentina, Jan 9, 1995, pg. 11.
Menem has publicly insisted that the proposed legislation sent
to the National Senate is not aimed at the press.
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legislation aims at inhibiting criticism.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION
This study has attempted to address the possibility
of erosion of democratic mechanisms as a result of the
implementation of drastic economic reform in the Argentine
Republic. The theoretical background utilized in this
undertaking has been the Modern Political Economy perspective.
As a theoretical discipline it defines actors and their
objectives as per their need to maximize utility. Presently
the Argentine Republic is without a doubt a state which seeks
to accomplish the foregoing.
What needs to be defined in this case is the notion
of democracy and the need for economic development. The ever
expanding international commercial and financial ties of the
late twentieth century world have made both Communism and
State-Centric development, as well as autarky, economic
dinosaurs of another age. The post-Debt Crisis World has
forced the Third World and the Developing Countries to seek
not only new sources of development financing, but also to
adhere to neo-liberal market principles, ie deregulating local
markets, lowering of tariffs, privatizing of the state-sector,
etc. This has occurred in turn of an ever expanding world
dominated by the political and economic interests of the
industrialized core nations. These consequently have naturally
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come to exert ever increasing demands for adherence to its
particular policy objectives and economic priorities from
developing nations of the world.
As part of the cyclical nature of history and
economics these regions once again are realistically accepting
the notions that in order to advance they first must be
subservient to the interests of the industrialized states. The
core currently is repository of the bulk of the planet's
financial wealth, as well as of its technological advances.
The hope for many in the developing world is that these
nations will succumb to attrition amongst themselves or with
aspirants to the so-called core status, and thus by default
make room for new developing nations to arise.
Such an issue pertains to the realities which Carlos
Menem's Argentina currently faces. The Argentine Republic has
gone from being an international isolationist and a sponsor of
an alternative path of development (Tercer Camino) than that
blazed by the capitalist West, led by the United States, or
that advocated by the communist Soviet Union. Argentina has
now hitched its proverbial wagon to the notions of free
markets which has become the hallmark United States economic
policy.
In the process the Menem/ Cavallo team have
privatized the Argentine state's vast public sector in the
hope of attracting new investment financing, as well as a
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means of modernizing the Argentine national infrastructure and
economy. To this point in time the neo-Liberal market
strategies adopted by the current Argentine Government have
resulted in both a substantial repatriation of Argentine
capital, which had previously fled overseas during the years
of sociopolitical and economic instability, as well as renewed
foreign investor financing.
The problem that has arisen is that in order to make
the country internationally attractive, and thus
internationally competitive, a high social cost is being
extracted from sectors of the Argentine electorate, in
particular the working and lower middle classes, as well as
old-age pensioners. The need to make the country economically
viable has resulted in atomizing the national electorate. In
essence people tend to vote according to their overall
situation.
A highly atomized electorate, in which one party
holds controls of at least 40 percent of the popular vote, may
come to undermine certain aspects or mechanisms of democracy.
This is especially the case if safeguards against political
abuse are not implemented and respected by all parties. I
refer specifically to those issues associated with the recent
constitutional reform. Institutional abuse may arise as a
result of the need to continue an economic policy which may
have run its course, but whose proponents may not necessarily
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have become aware of that situation. Thus, one sector or
several of the electorate are forced to bear an ever-
increasing and larger share of the burden of maintaining a
failing and/or no longer appropriate sociopolitical and
economic policy.
The current Government is convinced that in order
for the Argentine nation to prosper it must continue to
maintain the Argentine peso at an equal rate of exchange with
the U.S. dollar. Consequently, it is convinced that it must
maintain a sound non-inflationary economic policy which
fundamentally prohibits the Government from printing
additional currency if it does not have the hard currency or
gold reserves to back the new monies. As a consequence of such
measures, and in conjunction with the country's much heralded
privatization program, the current Government has been able to
pump much needed new financing into the previously stagnant
Argentine national economy.
An additional issue that needs to be considered is
the fact that the Argentine state can ill afford the luxury of
devaluing its national coin at this moment in time. The
implementation of a devaluation following the lines of the
recent Mexican one would undermine international confidence
the in whole Argentine economy. Devaluation would make the
vast majority of Argentine debt papers and bonds less
valuable. This in turn would send definitive shock waves
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through the world financial system and in turn could possibly
bring about a new series of Latin American devaluations. Under
such a situation the Argentine Republic, as well as the rest
of the region would find its access to renewed financing even
more difficult. Recall that the Argentine public sector has
few viable remaining physical assets with which to entice
foreign investors. Economic instability could be catastrophic,
since the state no longer has in its possession the physical
infrastructure necessary to provide employment for the masses
as was the case during State-Centric development. The
recognition of that possibility has forced the current
government to continue not only to back Cavallo's
Convertibility Plan, but also to further dollarize the
Argentine economy in the hope of maintaining the value of the
peso. This is in addition to the need of keeping the dollar
liquidity of financial institutions requirement to exchange
pesos for dollars.
The privatization measures have largely been
implemented by resorting to presidential decrees in order to
circumvent Congressional opposition. The electorate has
largely supported the Menem/ Cavallo measures, because it has
seen marked improvements in the Argentine national economy as
new financing has entered the country. Yet, these measures and
the need to make Argentina internationally economically viable
has resulted in the need to cut operational costs principally
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by downsizing previously over bloated industries. This in turn
has increased by unemployment and under-employment for sectors
of the economy.
Measures as those detailed above can possibly
continue to be implemented because reshuffling of the national
economy has resulted in the atomization of the Argentine
electorate in the process. Furthermore, the lack of political
solidarity amongst the nation's different opposition parties
strengthens the preceding. This issue is further supported by
the fact there exists a strong propensity in the Argentine
electorate to be either unwilling to take a definitive stance
or, worse still, a large percentage, approximately 25 percent
according to this study's electoral survey, willing to impose
harsher policies on their compatriots. It is precisely the
strong tendency in the electorate for swing votes that upsets
the balance of stability in the Argentine sociopolitical and
economic arena.
Menem's control of his country's political arena
following the October 3, 1993, elections has necessitated that
the Radical Party, as the country's main opposition, to
essentially capitulate to the desires of government in order
to avoid a further deterioration of its national position.
This is a fact that was further strengthened by the April
1994, Constitutional Assembly elections. Though the government
party's percentage of the overall popular vote dropped from
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approximately 43 percent to 37.7 percent, the main
opposition's percentage dropped from 30 percent to 19.9
percent. In overall terms a much worse political defeat was
suffered by the opposition than by the Government. National
political opposition has consequently been fragmented by
Menem's success into six main national opposition parties,
whereas in the past it had always been exclusively a bi-polar
electorate.'
With a mere 40 percent of the popular vote Mr. Menem
will most likely be reelected to the Argentine presidency in
May of 1995, because of the atomization of the Argentine
Republic's opposition parties. With 40 percent of the popular
vote Menem could consequently come to impose even harsher
terms on the Argentine working class in order to continue to
maintain the competitiveness of Argentine industry
internationally, as well as safeguard the financial interests
of the international banking and investment community by
maintaining the Argentine peso at parity with the U.S. dollar
as a means of promoting principally foreign investment.
In essence it becomes a situation in which national
investment increases as foreign savings and government savings
1
As a result of the April 10, 1994, elections the
Justicialista Party obtains 37.7 percent of the vote, Uni6n
Civica Radical obtains 19.9 percent, Frente Grande 12.7
percent, Modin 9.1 percent, Unidad Socialista 2.0 percent,
Partido Democrata Progresista 1.7 percent, UCEDE 1.6 percent,
and 4.5 percent blank votes.
205
increase. Under such a scenario the Argentine domestic
marketplace's value could tend to decline in importance, which
is not really a relevant issue if one compares its relative
size to that of the Brazilian marketplace. In exchange the
Argentine Republic would become an export oriented economy,
servicing Brazil's consumer market as a result of increased
ties brought about by MERCOSUR, internationally competitive
because of low production costs with a highly skilled labor
force. In the process Argentine labor and the middle class
would be forced to accept the wages offered in most cases,
because of the rate of their dollar indebtedness brought about
by recent widespread and easy access to credit financing. This
sort of issue could play a fundamental role in deciding the
outcome of the Presidential Election of May 1995. In turn the
result of that electoral contest will determine whether
democracy as is currently known in the Argentine Republic
shall continue as before or shall be modified for the new
millennium.
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